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Abstract  
Mentalising as a process for explaining and predicting behaviour relates to 
inferring mental states and traits of others. Previous research of mentalising has 
focused too heavily on mental states and insufficiently on personality traits. Given 
this context, the current thesis aimed to explore the phenomenon of forming first 
impressions of personality based on a brief sample of behavior.  
 In the current research, after being filmed in diverse naturalistic scenarios, 
WDUJHWVILOOHGLQDQ³HPSDWK\TXRWLHQW´(4TXHVWLRQQDLUHDQGWKH1(2)LYH-Factor 
Inventory-3 (NEO-FFI-3) for respectively measuring empathic traits and the Big-
Five personality dimensions. Perceivers were asked to guess the results of target self-
reported EQ or the Big Five traits while observing the target in the context of 
minimal information presented in different types of way (e.g., videos, audios and 
photographs). Findings from Studies 1 to 8 converge in revealing that perceivers are 
surprisingly effective in accurately guessing targets who either had low or high EQ 
and targets who were extreme in one or more personality dimensions, but not so 
effective in identifying targets with average personality. These judgments were based 
on the behaviour of the target and not merely on an image of the target. Studies 1 and 
2 revealed that perceivers were biased to assume the targets were rather similar to 
how empathising WKH\ SHUFHLYHG WKHPVHOYHV EXW SHUFHLYHUV¶ FRQILGHQFH GLG QRW
predict their accuracy in judgments of target empathy. Study 6 demonstrated a 
UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQSHUFHLYHUV¶UDWLQJVRI WDUJHWV¶H[SUHVVLYLW\DQGKRZSHUFHLYHUV
MXGJHG WDUJHW (4 $GGLWLRQDOO\ D VXUYH\ ZDV FUHDWHG WR H[DPLQH SHRSOH¶V
commonsense views about first impressions of personality.  
 Results of all studies were discussed with reference to the processes by which 
people make first-impression personality judgments. The current research adds to the 
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literature of mentalising in speaking about the breadth, versatility and sensitivity of 
our mindreading abilities.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
%DFNJURXQGV 3HRSOH¶ $ELOLW\ WR 0DNH 3sychological 
Inferences      
1.1 History of Research on Mentalising   
1.1.1 Philosophical Background: The Philosophy of Mind 
The philosophy of mind centers on two important issues, the mind-body 
problem and the problem of other minds. The former concerns how mental 
phenomena are related to physical phenomena, while the latter asks how we can 
know about the mental states of another person (Stich & Nichols, 2003). Due to the 
nature of mind being non-physical and private, for centuries, philosophers had not 
found solutions to these problems. For example, for solving the mind-body problem, 
René Descartes proposed substance dualism, distinguishing a physical substance that 
exists in space and time from a mental substance that only has extension of time. If, 
as Descartes suggested, there is two-way causal interaction between the physical and 
the mental, how can this interaction occurs as one is in space while the other is not 
(Stich & Nichols, 2003)? And, if, as Descartes believed, we can merely experience 
and access to our own mental states from a first-person subjective position, then how 
can we come to understand the mental states of other people?  
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In contrast, abandoning many of the assumptions implicit in the Cartesian 
WUDGLWLRQ6HOODUV¶VLGHDVDERXWWKHSKLORsophy of mind focus on a naturalistic concept 
(Rosenberg, 2011). He believed that our concepts of mental states are in some 
important ways like theoretical concepts in sciences, allowing us to explain human 
behaviour (Sellars, 1956). Building on this idea, Lewis (1972) suggested that 
ordinary terms of psychological states imply a set of tacit laws and knowledge that 
function to explain and predict behaviour. Thenceforth, philosophers in the camp of 
folk psychology claim that people are inclined to endorse a broad body of default 
postulates about propositional attitudes like intentions, desires, and beliefs, which 
constitute the explanatory psychological system for everyday practices of 
interpreting and predicting behaviour.   
+HLGHU¶V&RPPRQVHQVH3V\FKology  
In a similar vein, grounded in commonsense psychology, social psychologist 
Fritz Heider developed his person perception model, trying to make causal 
H[SODQDWLRQV DERXW WKH SURFHVVHV E\ ZKLFK SHRSOH GUDZ LQIHUHQFHV DERXW ³WKH
presumed events inside WKHRWKHUSHUVRQ¶VVNLQ´+HLGHUSE\REVHUYLQJWKH
SHUVRQ¶V DFWLRQV LQ WKH VRFLDO ZRUOG %\ GUDZLQJ DQDORJ\ ZLWK REMHFW SHUFHSWLRQ
where the inferential processes allow people to comprehend the properties of objects 
by their appearance and motion, Heider (1958) proposes that causal inferences also 
enable people to understand psychological characteristics (involving mental states 
and psychological dispositions) adduced from the streams of ongoing behaviour in 
everyday life. But he recognized that person perception is more complex than object 
perception in that people have motives that make them act purposefully. According 
to Heider, people possess a naïve psychology involving an array of unformulated 
principles and knowledge that allow a causal anDO\VLVRIRWKHUSHRSOH¶V LQWHQWLRQDO
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behaviour. Although Heider provided an elaborate description for a conceptual 
framework of causal mental inferences, he provided no supporting experimental data. 
His research method was philosophical, which relies on conceptual analysis 
supplemented with linguistic examples and thought experiments (Malle, 2001).  
1.1.3 Empirical Research on Mentalising  
 Though philosophers and psychologists have proposed intriguing theoretical 
explanations about the problem of how we engage in understanding mental 
phenomena, the empirical research on mentalising only began with a study by 
3UHPDFN DQG :RRGUXII  DVNLQJ µ'RHV FKLPSDQ]HH KDYH D WKHRU\ RI PLQG¶
7KH\RULJLQDOO\LQYHQWHGWKHWHUP³WKHRU\RIPLQG´7R0UHIHUULQJWRWKH ability to 
impute mental states, such as desires, intentions and beliefs to oneself and to others, 
DQG WKLV DELOLW\ DOORZV RQH WR H[SODLQ RWKHU SHRSOH¶V SDVW EHKDYLRur and to predict 
what they will do in the future (e.g., Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Wimmer & Perner, 
1983; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Flavell, 
 7KH RWKHU ODEHOV VXFK DV ³PLQGUHDGLQJ´ DQG ³PHQWDOLVLQJ´ DUH DOVR XVHG WR
denote the same capacity.  
 To examine whether or not chimpanzee possesses a human-like capacity to 
attribute actions to mental states, such as intention, knowledge, belief, thinking and 
the like, Premack and Woodruff (1978) designed a series of experiments in their 
pioneering research. In these experiments, an adult chimpanzee was shown a series 
of videoed scenes of a human actor struggling with various problems, ranging from a 
relatively simple ones such as inaccessible bananas to the more complex cases, 
involving an actor unable to extricate himself from a locked cage, shivering because 
of a malfunctioning heater, and so on. Along with each videotape, the chimpanzee 
was given several photographs involving one that showed a solution to the problem, 
  16 
such as a stick for inaccessible bananas and a key to release the locked up actor. 
Premack and Woodruff assumed that if the chimpanzee could consistently choose the 
correct solution for each scenario, then it would indicate that the chimpanzee had 
recognized that each videotape represented an unsolved problem and understood that 
WKH DFWRU¶V EHhaviour would be guided by his intention of solving that problem. 
Selecting the correct solution was accordingly regarded as a sign of having a theory 
of mind. 
However, according to Daniel Dennett (1978), the task Premack and 
Woodruff devised is not a good WHVWIRUWKHRU\RIPLQG,QKLVFRPPHQWDU\³%HOLHIV
DERXWEHOLHIV´'HQQHWWSRLQWHGRXW WKDWSHUIRUPDQFHLQWKHSUREOHP-solving 
WDVNVFDQQRWGHWHUPLQHWKHEDVLVIRUWKHFKLPSDQ]HH¶VVROXWLRQWRWKHSUREOHPIDFLQJ
the actor. Did the chimpanzee makH D SUHGLFWLRQ RI WKH DFWRU¶V EHKDYLRur (by 
choosing the solution to each problem) based on its beliefs about the beliefs and 
desires of the actor? Alternatively, was the chimpanzee simply offering a solution to 
a physical problem without giving any considHUDWLRQWRWKHDFWRU¶VPHQWDOVWDWHV",I
so, then the chimpanzee did not need to have a theory of mind to pass the problem-
solving tasks.  
Dennett suggested an alternative task, enabling the concept of false belief to 
be tested. Beliefs are characterized by properties of mental representation (Flavell, 
Miller, & Miller, 1993; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Saying that one has a state of 
belief means he/she is representing the physical world in accordance with his/her 
belief, the contents of which could truly reflect reality in some cases while in other 
cases (when the beliefs are false) could incorrectly represent or even conflict with the 
situations and events around the person. That is, the concept of false belief serves to 
connect the internal world with the external world (Dennett, 1978; Wellman et al., 
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2001). More importantly, behaviour that is grounded in a false belief is predictive 
(Flavell et al., 1993): Whether a belief is false or not can to some degree be 
GHWHUPLQHG E\ REVHUYLQJ DQ DFWRU¶V RYHUW EHKDYLRU ± If a person is earnestly 
searching for a particular object but in the wrong place, this could be a sign that he or 
she holds a false belief.  
In one example suggested by Dennett (1978), based on the popular puppet 
show characters, Punch and Judy, he described a scenario in which Punch holds a 
IDOVHEHOLHIDERXWWKHORFDWLRQRI-XG\-XG\KDGHVFDSHGWKHER[ZKLOH3XQFK¶VEDFN
was turned. If observing children expected Punch to incorrectly search for Judy in 
the box, this could be a sign that the children have an understanding of false belief. 
In other words, the concept of false belief provides a practical approach to studying 
ToM via examining prediction of belief-related actions.  
Grounded upon these ideas, Wimmer and Perner (1983) developed the 
famous IDOVHEHOLHISDUDGLJPZKLFKKDVEHHQZDUPO\HPEUDFHGDVWKH³OLWPXVWHVW´
RI FKLOGUHQ¶V DFTXLULQJ RI VRSKLVWLFDWHG 7R0 ,Q WKH VWDQGDUG IDOVH EHOLHI WDVN WKH
change-of-locations task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; see Fig. 1.1), a story protagonist, 
Maxi, puts his chocolate in the green cupboard, and then leaves the scene. In his 
absence, the other character, his mother, moves the chocolate to the blue cupboard. A 
child participant is asked the focal false-belief question in terms of action prediction 
³ZKHUHZLOO0D[LORRNIRUKLVFKRFRODWHZKHQKHUHWXUQV"´RULQWHUPVRIWKRXJKWV
³ZKHUHGRHV0D[L WKLQNKLVFKRFRODWH LV"´  ,I WKHFKLOGFDQFRUUHFWO\ DQVZHU WKH
question by predicting Maxi will search for the chocolate in the original place where 
he left it or by saying Maxi thinks his chocolate is in the green cupboard, then the 
child is regarded as being able to understand false belief.  
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Fig. 1.1. The chocolate story (adopted from Perner & Lang, 1999). 
 
The other widely used false-belief task, the unexpected-contents task (Gopnik 
& Astington, 1988), engenders a familiar container with an unexpected content (see 
)LJ)RUH[DPSOHLQWKH³6PDUWLHV´WDVNDFKLOGLVDVNHGZKDWVKHKHEHOLHYHV
to be the contents of a box that looks as if it holds candy cDOOHG³6PDUWLHV´$IWHU
UHSO\LQJWRWKHTXHVWLRQXVXDOO\ZLWK³6PDUWLHV´WKHFKLOGLVVKRZHGWKDWWKHER[LQ
fact contains pencils. And then the box is closed and the false-belief question is 
DVNHG³ZKDWGR\RXWKLQNDQRWKHUSHUVRQZKRKDVQRWEHHQVKown the true contents 
RI WKH ER[ ZLOO WKLQN LV LQVLGH"´ 7KH FKLOG SDVVHV WKH WDVN LI VKHKH DQVZHUV
³6PDUWLHV´LQVWHDGRI³SHQFLOV´ 
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Fig. 1.2. An illustration of the unexpected-contents task (adopted from www.autismservice.org). 
 
Using these false-belief tasks, researchers investigate when and how children 
begin to have a theory of mind. Numerous studies in the field of developmental 
psychology have revealed an improvement at the age of 4 years when children start 
to systemically pass the change-of-locations task and the unexpected-contents task 
(e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Flavell, 2000; Wellman et al., 2001; Sabbagh, Moses, 
& Shiverick, 2006). Some studies introduced modifications to the standard false 
belief tasks that led to improvements in 3-year-ROGV¶ SHUIRUPDQFH HJ Chanlder, 
Fritz, Hala, 1989; Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998). Subsequently, Wellman et al. (2001) 
conducted a meta-analysis of 178 studies that used a false-belief task, and concluded 
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that although performance can be affected by the characteristics of any particular 
task, the general impression is still that children improve considerably around the 
time of their fourth birthday.     
Does that mean infants and young children do not have a theory of mind? 
Recent work using spontaneous-response tasks (nonverbal false belief tasks) has 
shown that infants first understand that others hold false beliefs during the second 
year of life (e.g., Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007; 
Surina, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007; Song, Onishi, Baillargeon, & Fisher, 2008; 
Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Baillargeon, Scott & He, 2010). In a 
violation-of-expectation task (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005), for example, infants as 
young as 15 months looked for longer at the unexpected than at the expected action. 
In the case of an unexpected action, the actor searched for the target object as if she 
did not hold a false belief, even though this particular actor had no basis for holding 
a true belief. Hence, infants behaved as if they were surprised that the actor appeared 
to have a true belief, suggesting that they expected the actor to hold a false belief. 
These results indicate that when we use an implicit false-belief test even infants can 
demonstrate mentalising to some extent. We do not yet know if this mentalising 
takes the same form as that seen in a four-year-old child who gives the correct 
answer in an unexpected-contents task or a change-of-locations task. This matter 
might be clarified by the findings of future research.  
1.2 Mental State Reasoning 
1.2.1 Error and Bias in Mental State Reasoning   
Although even infants exhibit some understanding of false belief in 
spontaneous-response tasks, studies using the standard false-belief tasks have 
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consistently suggested that children around the age of 3 years have difficulty in 
explicitly imputing false beliefs to other people. They systemically show errors and 
ELDVHVZKHQDVNHGWRSUHGLFWRWKHUV¶EHKDYLRur in relation to their false beliefs: In the 
change-of-locations task, they expect Maxi to look for the chocolate in the place 
where it is located; likewise, in the unexpected-contents task, they seem to think 
another person knows that the box holds pencils rather than Smarties when first 
shown the Smarties box. Despite that, some researchers have pointed out that young 
FKLOGUHQ¶VGLIILFXOWLHVLQ LQIHUULQJIDOVHEHOLHIVPD\UHVXOWIURPWDVNDUWLIDFWVUHODWHG
with requirements in language processing and demands on executive functioning 
skills, including working memory and inhibition (e.g., Apperly, Samson, & 
Humphreys, 2005; Birch & Bloom, 2004; Carlson & Moses, 2001; Bloom & German, 
2000; Zelazo, Carter, Reznick, & Frye, 1997). Notwithstanding, the results of the 
meta-analysis by Wellman et al. (2001) have revealed that these factors cannot 
wholly explain age-UHODWHGGHYHORSPHQWDOFKDQJHVLQFKLOGUHQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHRQWKH
standard false belief tasks.    
In the false belief tasks, child participants know the current state of reality  
³ZKHUHWKHFKRFRODWHLVQRZ´LQWKHFKDQJH-of-locations tasN³ZKDWLVUHDOO\LQWKH
6PDUWLH ER[´ LQ WKH XQH[SHFWHG-contents task) that conflicts with the contents of 
0D[LRUDQRWKHUSHUVRQ¶VEHOLHIV<RXQJFKLOGUHQ WKXV VHHPQRW WRXQGHUVWDQG WKDW
minds hold beliefs about the world and these beliefs have an essential impact on 
behaviour even if they sometimes can be false. Without this comprehension of mind, 
\RXQJFKLOGUHQDUHLQHIIHFWLYHLQPDNLQJSUHGLFWLRQVRIRWKHUV¶EHKDYLRur related to 
false beliefs and are prone to be biased by their own knowledge about reality.  
Given the fact that 4-year-old children pass a test of false belief, and therefore 
demonstrably have a sophisticated concept of false belief, would it be the case that 
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older individuals, especially adults, are extremely proficient in guessing what other 
people are thinking? Lines of research have reported that adults usually have trouble 
LQ PDNLQJ PXOWLSO\ HPEHGGHG LQIHUHQFHV DERXW PHQWDO VWDWHV RI RWKHUV HJ ³%RE
WKLQNVWKDW-RKQNQHZWKDW0DU\ZDQWHGWRJRWRWKHVKLS´.LQGHUPDQ'XQEDU	
Bentall, 1998; Rutherford, 2004), and they often make errors in false belief tasks 
when asked to perform a demanding concurrent task requiring working memory or 
other components of executive functioning (e.g., McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007; 
German & Hehman, 2006), though they usually have no difficulty in inferring one 
SHUVRQ¶VEHOLHIRURQHSHUVRQ¶VEHOLHIDERXWDQRWKHUSHUVRQ¶VEHOLHI)OHWFKHU+DSSp
Baker, Dolan, Frackowiak, et al., 1995; Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998). But 
some researchers view these findings more cautiously, and argue that this kind of 
ToM task might not adequately control for incidental demands on executive 
functioning, leading to underlying undervaluation of mentalising abilities (Bloom & 
German, 2000; Apperly et al., 2005; Apperly, Back, Samson, & France, 2008). Even 
VR ZKHQ VLPSO\ WROG DERXW VRPHRQH¶V IDOVH EHOLHIV DGXOWV SHUIRUP PXFK IDVWHU LQ
judging the true state of an object instead of the false belief that a person holds about 
the object (Apperly et al., 2008). In particular, adults were presented two sentences 
FRUUHVSRQGLQJWRWKHLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWDVLWXDWLRQHJ³5HDOO\WKHEDOORQWKHWDEOH
LV\HOORZ´DQGWKHLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWVRPHRQH¶VIDOVHEHOLHIDERXWWKHVLWXDWLRQHJ
³+HWKLQNVWKDWWKHEDOORQWKHWDEOHLVUHG´DQGWKHQWKH\ZHUHDVNHGWRMXGJHWKH
DFFXUDF\RIDSLFWXUHSUREHWKDWHLWKHUGHSLFWVUHDOLW\RUWKHSHUVRQ¶VIDOVHEHOLHI7KH
results show that adults made more errors and responded slower in the condition of 
false belief than the condition of reality. 
,Q DQRWKHU H[SHULPHQW %LUFK DQG %ORRP  PDQLSXODWHG SDUWLFLSDQWV¶
NQRZOHGJH DERXW WKH UHDOLW\ RI WKH WDUJHW REMHFW¶V YLROLQ SODFH WR ZKHUH LW ZDV
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moved and rearranged in the absence of the protagonist Vicki (see Fig. 1.3). The 
observing participant had to predict to which of four given places the protagonist will 
ILUVW ORRN IRU WKH YLROLQ 7KH ILQGLQJV GHPRQVWUDWH WKDW DQ DGXOW¶V RZQ NQRZOHGJH
ELDVHV KLVKHU SUHGLFWLRQ RI DQRWKHU¶V DFWLRQ 3DUWLFLSDQWV ZKR NQHZ WR ZKHUH WKH
violin was exactly displaced, and who had available a plausible explanation for Vicki 
to act in accord with their knowledge, were significantly less likely to predict that 
Vicki would act according to a false belief than were those who knew the reality of 
the place of the violin but did not have available a plausible explanation for Vicki to 
act in line with their knowledge (Birch & Bloom, 2007).  
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Fig. 1.3. The knowledge-plausible version of the task (adopted from Birch & Bloom, 2007). 
 
Keysar and colleagues (Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000; Keysar, Lin, & 
Barr, 2003) devised a communication game and found that adults frequently had 
difficulty separating their own privileged knowledge of a target from that of a 
competitor who held incomplete knowledge.  Using a similar task, Apperly, Carroll, 
Samson et al. (2010) conducted three experiments to investigate the cognitive 
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SURFHVVHV FRQWULEXWLQJ WR DGXOWV¶ HUURUV LQ 7R0 XQGHUVWDQGLQJ 7KH\ VXJJHVW WKDW
adults are efficient at switching perspectives, but actually using what another person 
knows to interpret what they say is relatively inefficient, giving rise to egocentric 
errors during communication. Further evidence from a study using computer-based 
tests of false-desire reasoning (Apperly, Warren, Andrews, Grant & Todd, 2011), 
which records response times and error rates, reveals that as with young children, 
older children and adults found it more challenging to reason about false belief and 
negative desires than true beliefs and positive desires. The researchers therefore 
suggest developmental continuity in ToM (Apperly et al., 2011; Apperly, 2013, for a 
UHYLHZRIDGXOWV¶7R0 
1.2.2 Is Mental State Reasoning Automatic?  
 It is beyond doubt that normal adults are equipped with mature mentalising 
abilities. Even so, according to the aforementioned studies, they still exhibit a pattern 
of reasoning bias similar to that found in children younger than 4 years when 
drawing inferences about false beliefs of others. Given this intriguing fact, it seems 
UHDVRQDEOHWRDVN³,VPHQWDOVWDWHLQIHUHQFHDXWRPDWLF"´ 
 Apperly and colleagues (2006) conducted the first investigation to address 
this question. According to them, if false belief reasoning is an automatic process, 
then participants should draw false belief inferences even if they do not have any 
particular reason to do so. In each trial, participants watched the same video stimuli 
in which a male actor hid an object in one of two of the same opaque boxes and a 
female actor indicated where she thought it was hidden. During the presentation of 
the video stimuli, probe sentences were presented at unpredictable intervals to elicit 
false belief or reality judgments from participants. Participants needed to respond to 
the probe sentences corresponding to either a belief question or a reality question, 
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and their response times were recorded. In Condition 1, an incidental false belief task 
where participants could track relevant aspects of reality but with no particular 
UHDVRQV WR WUDFN WKH ZRPDQ¶V IDOVe beliefs, participants responded more slowly to 
XQH[SHFWHGTXHVWLRQVUHJDUGLQJWKHIHPDOH¶VIDOVHEHOLHIVDERXWWKHREMHFW¶VORFDWLRQ
WKDQWRTXHVWLRQVFRQFHUQLQJWKHREMHFW¶VUHDOORFDWLRQ,Q&RQGLWLRQH[SOLFLWEHOLHI
and reality tracking, participants were explicitly instructed to keep track of where the 
woman thought the object was located and where it really was located, whereas in 
Condition 3 explicit belief tracking, participants were only asked to monitor where 
the object was located but were not required to indicate the correct location of the 
object at the end of trials. The results of these two further conditions displayed no 
difference in response times to belief and reality questions when participants were 
LQVWUXFWHG WR WUDFN WKH ZRPDQ¶V EHOLefs about the location. Taken together, the 
researchers concluded that adults do not automatically reason about false beliefs of 
another person.  
In a subsequent study, Back and Apperly (2010) have extended the method to 
examine true beliefs that are sometLPHV WKRXJKW WR EH LPSXWHG E\ ³GHIDXOW´ HJ
Leslie & Thaiss, 1992). Sequences of pictures were shown in which the location of 
DQ REMHFW DQG D IHPDOH FKDUDFWHU¶V EHOLHI DERXW WKH ORFDWLRQ RI WKH REMHFW RIWHQ
changed (see Fig. 1.4). During the picture sequences, participants had to respond to 
an unpredictable probe picture about where the woman thought the object was 
located or where the object was actually located. Following the same hypothesis in 
Apperly et al. (2006), in Experiment 1 using an incidental belief task, participants 
were explicitly instructed to monitor the real location of the object but they were not 
VSHFLDOO\ LQVWUXFWHG WR NHHS WUDFN RI WKH ZRPDQ¶V EHOLHIV DERXW WKH ORFDWLRQ RI WKH
object. If belief reasoning is automatic, participants should respond to the belief 
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questions as fast as to the reality questions even when there is no reason for making 
belief inferences. The results replicated and bolstered the previous findings by 
Apperly et al. (2006), providing new evidence indicating that even in the cases of 
true beliefs participants responded more slowly to belief probes in contrast with 
matched reality probes. Two further experiments ruled out the possibility of intrinsic 
differences between the belief and reality probes and confirmed that there was no 
difference in reaction times to belief and reality questions when participants had few 
reasons to infer beliefs spontaneously. All in all, the evidence suggests that adults do 
not spontaneously attribute beliefs to other people, whether their beliefs are true or 
false.  
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Fig. 1.4. Examples of a true and false belief experimental sequence (adopted from Back & Apperly, 
2010).        
 
3HRSOH¶V,QIHUHQFHVRI7UDLW 
Comprehension of false belief has been widely thought to be the milestone of a 
mature adult-like mentalising capability which functions to explain and predict 
SHRSOH¶VLQWHQWLRQDODFWLRQVLQHYHU\GD\OLIH7KLVIUDPHZRUNWDNHVLWIRUJUDQWHGWKDW
we act according to our mental states involving intentions, desires and beliefs, and 
that we can infer such mental states from situational factors.  
  29 
Take the change-of-ORFDWLRQVWDVNDVDQH[DPSOH ,QRUGHUWRSUHGLFW0D[L¶V
behaviour in searching for the chocolate, an observer needs to realize the scenario 
Maxi experienced (in which the location of the chocolate was transferred from one 
SODFH WR WKH RWKHU LQ KLV DEVHQFH DQG PHQWDOO\ SLFWXUH WKH VLWXDWLRQ IURP 0D[L¶V
perspective. In other words, inferring false beliefs in this kind of task requires the 
observer to understand how the situation that Maxi experiences leads him to hold a 
false belief. In short, Maxi finds himself in a situation that gives rise to a state of 
false belief, and taking only this into consideration, we might predict that he will 
wrongly search in the place he last saw the chocolate.  
Imagine, though, that we know that Maxi is an extremely intelligent boy who 
is good at guessing that his mother will move the chocolate to the fridge. Maxi might 
realize that the chocolate will melt in the cupboard and he might further realize that 
his mother will have enough sense to move the chocolate to a place where it will be 
SUHVHUYHG DQG UHPDLQ HGLEOH +HQFH LQ WDNLQJ DFFRXQW RI 0D[L¶V LQWHOOLJHQFH ZH
predict that he will not look in the place he last saw the chocolate but that he will 
look in the fridge on appreciating that he is sensible enough to realize that his mother 
will have moved the chocolate.  
Another instance is taken from ordinary observation in the social world. 
Imagine that you were invited to a fantastic Christmas party held by your friend, and 
you were told that other friends of your friend were also invited, many of whom you 
had never met: Would you be happy to join the party? If only considering the 
situational factors (a fantastic party and a friendly social environment), we might 
predict that you would attend the party; however, your friends who know you are 
introverted and very shy might predict that you would not attend.  
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There is no doubt that the examples outlined above of reasoning about 
personality in making predictions of behavior require the ability to mentalise. 
Consequently, it seems that previous research has focused too heavily on mental 
states and insufficiently on personality traits when investigating how people 
mentalise. 
There is evidence showing that it is very common to describe people and 
behaviour in terms of personality traits: In one study students were asked to provide 
confidential descriptions of their classmates, and traits dominated the description 
(65%) among the five categories (Park, 1986). Furthermore, the terms of personality 
traits not only serve to summarize behaviour, but also function as causal concepts. 
Classic attribution theories, concerning the processes by which people explain the 
causes of behaviour and mental events, suppose that people naturally give first 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQ WR DQ DFWRU¶V SHUVRQDOLW\ WUDLWV ZKHQ H[SODLQLQJ DQG SUHGLFWLQJ KLV
behaviour. For instance, Heider believed that psychological characteristics of the 
person (including mental states and psychological dispositions) should be on the 
central focus in scientific research of person perception. He claimed: 
 ³7KHGLVFXVVLRQRI LQWHUSHUVRQDOUHODWLRQVZLOOFHQWHURQWKHSHUVRQ as the 
EDVLFXQLWWREHLQYHVWLJDWHG«2IFRXUVHLQGHDOLQJZLWKWKHSHUVRQDVDPHPEHURI
a dyad, he cannot be described as a lone subject in an impersonal environment, but 
must be represented as standing in relation to and interacting with another person. 
Moreover, the fact that the interrelation is with another person and not an object 
means that the psychological world of the other person as seen by the subject must 
HQWHULQWRWKHDQDO\VLV´+HLGHUS 
The subsequent attribution theorists, such as Jones and Davis (1965), duly 
FUHGLW WKH FDXVDO UROH RI SHUVRQDOLW\ WUDLWV LQ SHRSOH¶V H[SODQDWLRQV RI RWKHUV¶
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behaviouU 7KH\ VXJJHVWHG WKDW SHRSOH XVH LQIRUPDWLRQ DERXW DQRWKHU SHUVRQ¶V
behaviour and its effects to draw trait correspondence inferences. For example, if 
someone is willing to lend money for his friend who is in need (intentional 
behaviour), and also would like to help strangers, people probably attribute a 
corresponding trait to the person (He is helpful.). 
Granted, the attribution theories have highlighted the kinds of information 
that promote inferring traits and dispositions about the person rather than the 
situation, but they have provided little empirical research for investigating fine-
grained characterizations of the kind of information used to produce particular trait 
inferences (Uleman, 2005). Research into spontaneous trait inferences (STIs) offers a 
wealth of evidence for trait inferences, suggesting that we draw trait inferences to 
explain behaviour of others even if we are not cued to reason about trait information 
and such spontaneous trait inferences can even occur without awareness (Winter & 
Uleman, 1984; Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996, for a review; Uleman, Hon, 
Roman, & Moskowitz, 1996; Todorov & Uleman, 2004; Rim, Uleman, & Trope, 
2009; McCarthy & Skowronski, 2011).  
In the very first STIs study, Winter and Uleman (1984) investigated whether 
people infer personality traits automatically while processing behavioral information. 
7KH VWXG\ DGRSWHG 7XOYLQJ¶V HQFRGLQJ-specificity paradigm, in which participants 
read sentences describing people performing trait-implied actions, and then they had 
to recall each sentence in the different cuing conditions, including a dispositional cue 
(e.g., generous), a strong non-dispositional semantic associate to an important word 
in the sentence, and no cue. Participants were asked to memorize each sentence 
under one of the three cuing conditions. They performed best in the condition of 
dispositional cues and were apparently unaware of having made trait inferences. 
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According to the encoding-specificity paradigm, these results suggest that people 
XQLQWHQWLRQDOO\PDNH WUDLW LQIHUHQFHVGXULQJ WKHSURFHVVRIHQFRGLQJRWKHUSHRSOH¶V
DFWLRQV5HVHDUFKHUVWKXVFODLPHG³DWWULEXWLRQVPD\EHPDGHVSontaneously, as part 
RIWKHURXWLQHFRPSUHKHQVLRQRIVRFLDOHYHQWV´:LQWHU	8OHPDQS 
These initial findings have been extensively replicated in considerable 
literature on STIs using various paradigms. In one example, Kressel and Uleman 
(2010) reported a relation recognition paradigm where participants were asked to 
determine whether there is causal connection between a group of word pairs in a 
nonsocial task and a social task. Nonsocial stimuli included 32 casually related word 
pairs (e.g., spark ± fire) and 32 associated word pairs (e.g., shrimp ± ocean), and 
social stimuli involved 32 trait-behaviours word pairs (e.g., dumb ± fail) and 32 filler 
adjective-verb word pairs (e.g., gentle ± touch). In both tasks, half the pairs were 
presented in each order. Participants completed the nonsocial and then the social 
UHODWLRQ UHFRJQLWLRQ WDVNVRQFRPSXWHUE\ UHVSRQGLQJ WR WKH LQVWUXFWLRQ³GHWHUPLQH
ZKHWKHUWKHFRQFHSWVGHVFULEHGE\HDFKZRUGSDLUDUHFDXVDOO\UHODWHG´VHH)LJ
The researchers hypothesized that if traits and actions are causally linked, 
participants should identify predictive sequences (e.g., clumsy Æ stumble) faster 
than diagnostic sequences (e.g., blush Æ shy). The results confirmed their hypothesis, 
revealing asymmetric reaction times for detecting causal relationships, with 
predictive words (trait Æ behaviour) being faster than diagnostic orders (behaviour 
Æ trait), and this spontaneous trait attribution was as strong as for nonsocial cause-
effect inferences. Therefore, Kressel and Uleman suggest that traits and behaviours 
are mentally represented as causally correlated, and that isolated traits are inherently 
causes of actions. 
 
  33 
 
Fig. 1.5. Sample trials from nonsocial and social relation recognition tasks (adopted from Kressel & 
Uleman, 2010).  
 
Spontaneous trait inferences can also influence how people predict what the 
other person will do in the future (McCarthy & Skowronski, 2011). In a series of 
studies, participants were first exposed to a group of photo-behaviour dyads in an 
initial exposure task, with each dyad pairing a trait-implicative behaviour described 
in a sentence with an actor (who is presumed to perform that action). This procedure 
aimed to elicit an implicit trait inference about the actor. In the following task, 
participants were required to match the actors with whom the behaviours were paired 
to new actions the actors were thought to be likely to perform. The results show that 
participants made predictions of actions that were consistent with the inferred traits, 
and this prediction occurred regardless of behaviour recall, and regardless of whether 
participants were explicitly instructed to make trait inferences or not, which 
altogether provides compelling evidence suggesting that an unintentional trait 
LQIHUHQFHKDVDQHIIHFWRQSHRSOH¶VSUHGLFWLRQRIRWKHUSHRSOH¶VEHKDYLRur.  
To summarize, from attribution theories it seems that it is important for 
people to be able to infer traits when trying to explain behaviour or when making 
predictions of behaviour. Moreover, research into spontaneous trait inferences has 
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provided credible evidence suggesting that inferring traits helps people to interpret 
and predict behaviour; and it might be an automatic process (e.g., McCarthy & 
Skowronski, 2011; Kreseel & Uleman, 2010; Winter & Uleman, 1984).  
Why is it so important to infer traits? According to simulation theory of 
mentalising, we infer what is in the mind of another by the capacity to project 
ourselves imaginatively into the perspective of another person and then deploy our 
own decision-making capacity to simulate similar psychological states and processes 
in ourselves (e.g., Gordon, 1986; Gorman, 1989; Apperly, 2008, for a review). In this 
OLJKWLIZHFDQPDNHYDOLGMXGJPHQWVRQRWKHUSHRSOH¶VSV\FKRORJLFDOWUDLWVZHDUH
PRUH OLNHO\ WR VWDQG D FKDQFH RI DGRSWLQJ WKH RWKHU¶V SHUVSHFWLYH DQG WKHQ
WHPSRUDULO\ µVHHLQJ WKHZRUOG WKURXJK WKHLUH\HV¶3HWHUVRQ	5LJJV. Doing 
so allows us to reason about their mental states effectively. To illustrate, here is a 
quote from the famous fictional detective Sherlock Holmes depicted in the short 
VWRU\7KH0XVJUDYH5LWXDO,QRUGHUWRWUDFHZKDWKDSSHQHGWR0XVJUDYH¶VPLVVLQJ
servant Brunton who had stole the document of the Musgrave ritual that records the 
position of treasure, Sherlock Holmes utilized his amazing capacity for mental 
simulation: 
"You know my methods in such cases, Watson. I put myself in the man's 
place and, having first gauged his intelligence, I try to imagine how I should myself 
have proceeded under the same circumstances. In this case the matter was simplified 
by Brunton's intelligence being quite first-rate, so that it was unnecessary to make 
any allowance for the personal equation, as the astronomers have dubbed it. He 
knows that something valuable was concealed. He had spotted the place. He found 
that the stone which covered it was just too heavy for a man to move unaided. What 
would he do next? He could not get help from outside, even if he had someone 
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whom he could trust, without the unbarring of doors and considerable risk of 
detection. It was better, if he could, to have his helpmate inside the house. But whom 
could he ask? This girl had been devoted to him. A man always finds it hard to 
realise that he may have finally lost a woman's love, however badly he may have 
treated her. He would try by a few attentions to make his peace with the girl Howells, 
and then would engage her as his accomplice. Together they would come at night to 
the cellar, and their united force would suffice to raise the stone. So far I could 
IROORZWKHLUDFWLRQVDVLI,KDGDFWXDOO\VHHQWKHP´$UWKXU&RQDQ'R\OH 
In short, reasoning about personality traits plays an essentially important role 
in mentalising, because like mental state inferences it shares the same properties as 
intentionally-generalized inferences (McCarthy & Skowronski, 2011), serving to 
make sense of behaviour in daily life; because it can occur unintentionally as part of 
the routine comprehension of social events (Winter & Uleman, 1984), and because it 
focuses on the person instead of the situation, allowing us to be more or less a 
Sherlock Holmes in our complex social world ± We put ourselves in the place of 
VRPHRQHHOVHZHPDNHDQDGMXVWPHQWIRUWKH³SHUVRQDOHTXDWLRQ´LHZHWDNHLQWR
FRQVLGHUDWLRQ WKH WDUJHW¶VSHUVRQDOLW\ WUDLWV DQG LQGRLQJ VRZHPHQWDOO\ VWLPXODWH
what is in the mind of the target person.   
1.4 Can People Infer Mental States Based on a Sample of Behaviour?  
We already know that even typical adults show some egocentric biases, 
VRPHWLPHVFDOOHG³WKHFXUVHRINQRZOHGJH´%LUFK	%ORRPZKHQLQIHUULQJ
false beliefs. This implies that even if we possess a fully-fledged mentalising 
capacity, it does not ensure that we are adept in employing our mentalising to reason 
about the multifaceted mental states without bias. In the real world, our practices of 
everyday mindreading are more complicated and much subtler than drawing 
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inferencHVRIVRPHRQH¶V IDOVHEHOLHIDERXW WKH ORFDWLRQRIDQREMHFW:HRIWHQRQO\
have information from a single observation to guide us in immediately drawing a 
FDXVDOLQIHUHQFH)RUH[DPSOHRQZLWQHVVLQJDQDWKOHWH¶VIDFHDWWKHHQGRIWKHJDPH
we might have conjectured whether his team had won even though we missed the 
live coverage of the contest. Consider another example in observing of our friends: 
We can probably tell whether that smile truly indicates happiness with their birthday 
presents or whether it is just a sign of courtesy.  
 To what extent is this everyday mindreading accurate when it is based on but 
a brief sample of behaviour? Apparently, various versions of false belief tasks cannot 
help us to answer this question. False belief tasks are usually simple and repetitive, 
and may lack the subtlety, sophistication and uncertainty of much everyday 
mindreading (Apperly, 2013).  
 Considering these factors, researchers have developed an ecologically valid 
DSSURDFK ³HPSDWKLF DFFXUDF\´ LQGH[HG DFFXUDF\ RI everyday mindreading; Ickes, 
Buysse, Pham, Rivers, Erickson et al., 2000, for a review) to examine whether we 
can reason about the contents of mental states on observing segments of behaviour 
under naturalistic circumstances. In a study by Zaki and colleagues (2009; see Fig. 
1.6), targets were asked to talk about the 4 most positive and 4 most negative 
autobiographical events (that they were willing to discuss in a laboratory context) 
while being videotaped. After that, they were asked to view the videos and rate each 
event for emotional valence and intensity using a 9-point Likert scale (from very 
negative to very positive) by responding to the question "how did you feel while 
WDONLQJ"´/DWHU3HUFHLYHUVZHUHLQVWUXFWHGWRYLHZWKHYLGHRFOLSVRIHDFKWDUJet and 
evaluate each event for emotional valence and intensity using the same 9-point scale 
E\UHVSRQGLQJWRWKHTXHVWLRQ³KRZGLGWKLVSHUVRQIHHOZKLOHWDONLQJ"´7KHUHVXOWV
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GHPRQVWUDWH WKDW SHUFHLYHUV¶ LQIHUHQFHV RI WKH WDUJHWV¶ DIIHFW PRGHUDWHO\ FRUUHOated 
ZLWKWKHWDUJHWV¶VHOI-ratings. 
 
 
Fig. 1.6. Task design and sample behavioral data (adopted from Zaki, Weber, Bolger, & Ochsner, 
2009).  
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Using a procedure with similar ecological validity, researchers have recently 
LQYHVWLJDWHGWKH³UHWURGLFWLYH´DVSect of mindreading in realistic situations instead of 
artificial settings or hypothetical scenarios. According to Gallese and Goldman 
(1998), an ability to read minds enables us to retrodict what another person had 
experienced or what they had thought and IHOW WKDW LV ³PDNLQJ D µEDFNZDUG¶
LQIHUHQFH IURP WKH REVHUYHG DFWLRQ WR D K\SRWKHVL]HG JRDO VWDWH´ *DOOHVH 	
Goldman, 1998, p.497). Researchers have created a novel study for examining this 
kind of mindreading (Cassidy, Mitchell, Acquah et al., in press). Thirty normally 
developing adults and 19 adults with autism viewed 21 video clips lasting from 1.3 
VHFRQGV WR  VHFRQGV HDFK VKRZLQJ D WDUJHW¶V UHDFWLRQ DV KHVKH UHFHLYHG RQH RI
three gifts (chocolate, monopoly money or a homemade novelty). Participants were 
asked to guess which gift the target had been offered out of the three options and to 
estimate the emotion of the target. The results show that normal adults could 
correctly guess who received chocolate, a homemade novelty or monopoly money at 
above chance levels, while autistic individuals performed above chance only in the 
scenario when the recipients had received monopoly money. Furthermore, typical 
adults who made accurate inferences about the gifts also tended to be successful in 
reasoning about the emotions expressed by the recipients in the three gift conditions, 
whereas the autistic individuals only successfully estimated the emotions when 
monopoly money had been received as a gift. These data suggest that in processing 
DQRWKHUSHUVRQ¶VIDFLDl expressions, typical adults can infer which gifts other people 
had received with reference to reasoning about their emotions. Moreover, even 
autistic individuals had success at least in one of the scenarios in that they could 
guess when the target had received monopoly money.   
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Pillai, Sheppard, and Mitchell (2012) reported a similar finding based on a 
study of whether people can guess what occurred to targets after observing their 
reactions to real-life scenarios. Forty video clips each lasting only a few seconds 
were used as stimuli, in each of which, a target person unexpectedly experienced one 
of four possible events performed by the researcher (joke, waiting, compliments and 
story). For example, in the story scenario, the researcher related a story about a series 
of misfortunes that she experienced earlier that day. Thirty-five participants were 
asked to guess which of the four scenarios they thought the target person was 
responding to while viewing each video clip, and their eye movements were recorded. 
The participants were able to successfully judge from a small sample of behavior 
which events had previously happened to the targets, with best performance in the 
scenario of waiting. As we might expect, the eye movement strategy of the 
participants varied according to scenarios experienced by the target but surprisingly, 
looking at the eye region of the target correlated with poorer identification of the 
scenarios. The researchers concluded that participants flexibly use different visual 
strategies for making retrodictive mentalising inferences about events happening in 
the world and that participants do not necessarily attend to the eyes most of all when 
mentalising.  
In light of these data, it seems that people have a great talent for inferring a 
state based on a brief sample of behaviour. They can make inferences about the 
affect another person was experiencing while viewing fragments of behaviour; they 
can infer what gift one had unexpectedly received by observing their facial reactions 
spanning but a few seconds; they can guess what had happened to others from 
witnessing a brief sample of behaviour; and they also can infer the contents of mental 
and emotional states the other person was experiencing at some given moments 
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during unstructured dyadic interactions or merely in watching such interactions in 
videos (e.g., Ickes et al., 2000, for a review; Hall & Mast, 2007). 
1.5 How Well Can People Infer Personality Traits on First Meeting?  
Mentalising as a process for predicting and explaining behaviour has two broad 
FRPSRQHQWV2QHUHODWHVWR WKHSURFHVVRI LQIHUULQJWKHVWDWHRID WDUJHW¶VPLQGDQG
WKH RWKHU UHODWHV WR LQIHUHQFHV DERXW WKH WDUJHW¶V WUDLWV 7KH SUHFHGLQJ SDUDJUDSKV
report that people have a great aptitude for determining mental states through a 
process known as retrodiction. Can people also draw somewhat accurate inferences 
about personality traits on first meeting someone? If STIs are basic to human 
processing, it seems that people should be able to infer traits accordingly based on 
scant behavioral (including speech) information. Indeed, research on spontaneous 
trait inferences using a false recognition paradigm seems to suggest that people can 
IRUP DQ LPSOLFLW LQLWLDO LPSUHVVLRQ RQ DQRWKHU¶V WUDLWV 7RGRURY 	 8OHPDQ 
2003; 2004): They bind STIs to the person who performed a trait-implying behaviour 
(Todorov & Uleman, 2002) but not to the person who was only paired with the 
implied trait randomly (Todorov & Uleman, 2003), and such implicit impressions of 
trait persist after a week-long delay between the formation and the recognition test of 
that impression (Todorov & Uleman, 2004). 
In one example, Todorvo and Uleman (2004) reported a series of studies using a 
false recognition paradigm. In each trial of each study, participants were presented 
two pictures of faces with two names (e.g., Judith & Kim) and a behavioral sentence 
GHVFULELQJ DQ LPSOLHG WUDLW HJ ³-XGLWK SLFNHG RXW WKH EHVW FKRFRODWH EHIRUH WKH
JXHVVHV DUULYHG´Æ implying selfish RQ D FRPSXWHU VFUHHQ ,Q WKLV FDVH -XGLWK¶s 
IDFH ZDV WKH DFWRU¶V IDFH DQG .LP¶V IDFH ZDV WKH FRQWURO IDFH ,Q WKH IROORZLQJ
recognition test, they saw face-trait pairs and were instructed to indicate whether 
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they had seen the trait in the sentence presented with the face. If participants had 
drawn an implicit trait inference on the actor in the study trial, then they should tend 
WRLQGLFDWHWKDWWKHLPSOLHGWUDLWDSSHDUHGLQWKHVHQWHQFHZKHQWKHDFWRU¶VIDFHZDV
paired with the implied trait though in fact it was not true (the trait was not presented 
in the behavioral sentence). The results demonstrated that participants incorrectly 
UHFRJQL]HGLPSOLHGWUDLWVPRUHZKHQWKHVHWUDLWVZHUHSDLUHGZLWKDFWRUV¶IDFHVWKDQ
with control faces. This effect was replicated for a large set of 120 faces, and after 
delay between study and recognition phase, when equal attention was paid to each 
face, and when orientation of the face at recognition was different from the 
orientation at encoding (Todorov & Uleman, 2004). In other words, there is 
compelling evidence that people form impressions of strangers spontaneously, 
without having a particular goal or even without being aware that they have made an 
inference.  
However, this does not necessarily mean that people can form an accurate 
impression on personality of another person. Though it is fairly well established to 
explore whether and how people can make an implicit personality judgment of the 
other person, STIs research has not told us how well people can form a first 
impression of personality in the social world.  
Social life presents frequent opportunities to form impressions of strangers; we 
interact with people every day, and directly observe the activities they perform in 
their lives and the ways in which they do them. More often, we may have formed an 
impression of another on the basis of minimal behavioral information, such as a 
fleeting face, a quick eye gaze, a brief nodding, and so forth. In contrast, inferring 
traits by reading a sentence or processing trait-implying words might lack external 
validity for the following reasons. First, people, either perceivers or targets, have 
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their own personalities and mindsets, which makes them behave in a more 
imperceptible and complicated way than a presumed person performing a single 
action in a decontextualized situation. Second, in the STIs paradigm, an inferred trait 
is always previously matched with a relevant action by the researchers. Yet, 
according to the concept of global traits (detailed discussion appears in Chapter 2), 
people have an array of traits, and different traits may manifest as similar actions, 
and the same behaviour may arise from different or even conflicting traits (e.g., 
Heyman & Gelman, 1998; Funder, 1991); hence, it seems unlikely that we can map 
one particular trait onto one particular behavior in everyday life.  
,Q VXPPDU\ WKLV FKDSWHU H[SORUHG SHRSOH¶V DELOLW\ WR PDNH SV\FKRORJLFDO
inferences. I began with a brief introduction of the history of research on mentalising, 
linking the philosophical concerns of mind with the psychological research of 
mentalising in both theoretical and empirical terms. As such, I described a 
mentalising capacity (also called ToM) for understanding false beliefs, which 
develops in the preschool years for the purpose of interpreting and predicting 
behaviour with reference to mental states. I then provided evidence for the errors and 
biases of mental state reasoning, and suggested that inferring mental states is not an 
automatic process. Meanwhile, I proposed that research into reasoning about mental 
states concentrates too much on the situation but ignores the person; and yet 
according to attribution theories, people naturally focus strongly on traits when 
making causal attributions of behaviouU,WKHQGLVFXVVHGSHRSOH¶VLQIHUHQFHVRIWUDLWV
based on the studies of STIs, and concluded that like mental state inferences, 
inferring traits also functions as a causal psychological process for behavioral 
explanation and prediction. Moreover, it seems that inferring traits can occur 
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automatically. In addition, I emphasized the inherent association between mental 
state inferences and trait inferences that seems to be implied by simulation theory.  
$IWHU WKDW , LOOXVWUDWHG OLQHV RI UHVHDUFK FRQFHUQLQJ SHRSOH¶V DELOLW\ WR UHDVRQ
about mental states while observing a brief sample of behaviour, and ended this 
FKDSWHUE\DVNLQJWKHTXHVWLRQ³+RZZHOOFDQSHRSOHLQIHUSHUVRQDOLW\WUDLWVRQILUVW
PHHWLQJ"´7KLVTXHVWLRQ IUDPHV WKH HPSLULFDOZRUN LQ WKLV WKHVLV$VKDYHDUJXHG
the STIs paradigm is incapable of providing an answer to this question; in Chapter 2, 
I will articulate an alternative accuracy-oriented approach that will be adopted in the 
practical studies reported in this thesis.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Methodological Considerations in Research on First 
Impressions of Personality 
2.1 Introduction   
Every day we encounter and meet people from all walks of life in a wide 
range of social contexts, with many of whom we are unacquainted. By noticing 
threads of clues in relation to their daily life, such as the bedrooms and the offices 
they arrange (Gosling, Ko, Mannarelli, & Morris, 2002), the profiles they publish on 
Facebook (Back, Stopfer, Vazire, Gaddis, Schmukle, et al., 2010), or the music they 
prefer (Rentfrow & Gosling, 2003), we intuitively form impressions of them in 
regard to their personalities. By glimpsing fleeting facial expressions (Todorov & 
Uleman, 2003), or watching the gait of a person (Thoresen, Vuong, & Atkinson, 
2012), we swiftly form an impression of personality. As such, through connecting 
the visible with the invisible, we make sense of the implications of behaviour and 
perceive other people as individuals. This essential mentalising ability enables us to 
explain and predict behaviour and thus successfully navigate the complex social 
world.    
How well FDQ ZH LQIHU DQRWKHU SHUVRQ¶V SHUVRQDOLW\ RQ ILUVW PHHWLQJ" 7KLV
problem is important for its theoretical and practical significance. For theoretical 
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reasons, there are at least three considerations. First of all, as psychologists have 
noted, the long-standing and controversial dichotomy of person-situation concerning 
how personality and situational factors contribute in explaining and predicting 
behaviour has been criticized (e.g. Kenrick & Funder, 1988; Malle, 2011; Funder, 
2006; Shiner, 2009). Research on accuracy of personality judgments will be 
LQIRUPDWLYHLQWKHRQJRLQJUHVROXWLRQRIWKLVGHEDWHE\H[DPLQLQJSHRSOH¶VDELOLW\WR
infer personality based on a battery of observable behaviour samples in more than 
one situation (Funder, 2006). Second, empirical research of accuracy in personality 
judgments will help to build up testable models (Borkenau, Mauer, Rieman, Spinath, 
& Angleitner, 2004), such as the most notable realistic accuracy model (RAM, 
Funder, 1995) and weighted average model (Kenny, 1991), serving to decide the 
XQGHUO\LQJ IDFWRUV WKDW LQIOXHQFH SHRSOH¶ SHUVRQDOLW\ MXGJPHQWV DQG WR LQYHVWLJDWH
how these factors play a role in the judgmental accuracy (Borkenau et al., 2004). 
Last but not least, studying accuracy of personality judgments will help us to test and 
LGHQWLI\ SHRSOH¶V LPSOLFLW IRON WKHRULHV H[DPLQLQJ WKH H[WHQW WR ZKLFK SHRSOH¶V
intuitive theories about the relationship between personality and everyday behavior 
are accurate (Mehl, Gosling, & Pennebaker, 2006).   
For practical reasons, it seems self-evident that personality judgments usually 
lead to important social consequences in our daily life, either for the judge or for the 
person who is judged (Funder, 2012). For example, in the social world, people often 
need to decide who will be only nodding acquaintances and who may be friends after 
engaging in a brief interaction with each other; in job interviews, employers usually 
have to quickly determine who will be the ideal candidates even after merely 
observing the ways in which the candidates introduce themselves. Once made, such 
judgments usually feed into a decision on whom to trust, befriend, hire, cooperate 
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with, date, and even marry. Such judgments could therefore vitally affect the quality 
RISHRSOH¶VVRFLDOOLYHVDQGWKHLUVXFcess in the workplaces.   
Accuracy is a fundamental concept in science that requires evaluation of 
validity, reliability, theoretical cogency and many other qualities of data and theory 
(Funder, 2012). In psychology, the concept of accuracy has been especially 
challenging in the research of personality judgments because there is an implication 
that people have stable and enduring traits that determine who they really are 
(Funder, 2012). But if the implication is wrong then we can hardly expect observers 
to EHDEOHWRGHWHUPLQHDQRWKHU¶VSHUVRQDOLW\7KLVYH[LQJSUREOHPKDVPRUHRUOHVV
GLUHFWO\ JXLGHG UHVHDUFKHUV¶ VFLHQWLILF HQGHDYRUV WR VHHN DQVZHUV WR WKH TXHVW WR
achieve accuracy of personality judgments in social psychology and personality 
psychology in a history that goes back more than 70 years (e.g., Funder, 1995; 
Ambady, Bernieri, & Richeson, 2000).  
2.2 Background of Accuracy Research  
 As early as the 1930s, the pioneer personality psychologist Godorn Allport 
became very interested in the issue of the accuracy of everyday impressions and 
judgments of others. Early studies on accurate personality judgment concentrated on 
the agreement between self-ratings and evaluation of others, in a search of correlates 
RIWKH³JRRGMXGJH´(VWHV7DIWVHH$PEDG\HWDOIRUDUHYLHZ
,Q7DIWUHYLHZHGZKDWZDVNQRZQDERXWSHRSOH¶VDFFXUDWHMXGJPHQWRIRWKHUV
in the very same year, some researchers, such as Cronbach (1955) and Gage (Gage & 
Cronbach, 1955), casted doubt on the findings concerning judgmental ability because 
of severe methodological issues inherent in the existing experimental designs and 
data-analysis techniques. They argued, for example, self-other agreement (based on a 
variety of questionnaires) as an index for accuracy, used by all the studies of the time, 
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might reflect artifacts of base-rate accuracy and artifacts of shared stereotypes 
between perceivers and targets (Cronbach, 1955; Gage & Cronbach, 1955). 
0RUHRYHURZLQJWRDODFNRIUHOLDEOHDQGYDOLGDVVHVVPHQWRISHUVRQDOLW\0LVFKHO¶V
(1968) critique of personality research led to questions about whether there is 
anything to be accurate about (Uleman & Saribay, 2012).  
 Although the problems that the critics raised were not insuperable, many 
researchers withdrew owing to the difficulty in establishing accuracy criteria to 
assess psychological constructs; and they eluded the challenge of solving the 
problems associated with the extant accuracy measurements (Ambady et al., 2000). 
Research into accuracy of personality judgments duly waned for several decades 
since the 1950s primarily for methodological rather than theoretical reasons (Funder, 
1995; Jussim, 1991; Kenny, 1994; Ambady et al., 2000; Funder, 2010). Instead, 
UHVHDUFKHUV VKLIWHG WKHLU LQWHUHVW DQGDWWHQWLRQ WR UHYHDOLQJSHRSOH¶V OLPLWDWLRQV DQG
fallibilities in the process of interpersonal judgment using an error paradigm (e.g., 
Tagiuri, 1958; Funder, 1995; Ambady et al., 2000), in which participants were asked 
to draw inferences about traits of hypothetical characters in hypothesized 
circumstances instead of forming impressions of personalities of real persons in the 
real life.  
,Q $VFK¶V ORJLFDOO\ SURFess-oriented approach (Asch, 1946), for example, 
participants were instructed to form impressions of personalities of imagined 
characters portrayed by sentences involving trait-related adjectives, by which Asch 
intended to study the principles that govern the process of personality judgments. 
6WXGLHV OLNH WKLV RIWHQ IRFXVHG RQ LQYHVWLJDWLQJ KRZ DQG ZKHQ SHRSOH¶V VRFLDO
perception is biased and erroneous. In the above example, Asch found a primacy 
effect during the process of impression formation, that is, the earliest words in a list 
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tend to dominate the impressions people form of the depicted characters. As a result, 
researchers using the paradigm of cognitive processing were prone to suggest that 
our first impressions of other people are unreliable and that human inferences 
drawing on heuristic strategies are filled with shortcomings and errors (e.g., Nisbett 
& Ross, 1980).  
 +RZHYHU ³VXFFHVVIXO DV LW KDV EHHQ WKH µHUURU SDUDGLJP¶ FDQ WHOO QR PRUH
WKDQ KDOI RI WKH VWRU\´ )XQGHU  S 6RPH UHVHDUchers rekindled their 
interest in the attempt to qualify the accuracy of social judgments in the 1980s 
(McArthur & Baron, 1983; Swann, 1984; Funder, 1987; Kenny & Albright, 1987). 
They have realised that the question of accuracy is different from the question of 
error (e.g. Funder, 1995; 2010): The former is based on critical realism concerning a 
real person making judgments of another in social life with practical consequences; 
WKH ODWWHU LV EDVHG RQ UHVHDUFKHUV¶ SUHVXPDEO\ LGHDO PRGHO IRU H[DPLQLQJ KRZ
participants process the artificial stimulus (such as hypothetical target and trait-
related words) in the laboratory, which might not necessarily reflect the true nature 
of human social judgment in the real world. With this agreement, researchers began 
to develop new methods for addressing accuracy issues raised earlier (Bernieri, 
Zuckerman, Koestner, & Rosenthal, 1994; Funder, 1995; Kenny, 1994; Snodgrass, 
1985), along with developing theoretical frameworks to interpret what factors affect 
accuracy of personality judgment and how the judgmental accuracy can be achieved 
(e.g., Funder, 1995; Kenney, 1991). Since then, research on accuracy of personality 
judgment has reported plenty of novel and intriguing studies, and has become a 
lively area in the fields of social psychology and personality psychology (Uleman & 
Saribay, 2012).  
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2.3 Criteria of Accuracy  
 Three main criteria are commonly used to evaluate the accuracy of 
personality judgments. Self-other agreement, as the most often used benchmark for 
accuracy, UHIHUV WR WKH FRUUHVSRQGHQFH EHWZHHQ D WDUJHW¶V VHOI-ratings of some 
SHUVRQDOLW\ WUDLWV DQG D SHUFHLYHU¶V MXGJPHQWV RQ WKH VDPH WUDLWV RI WKH WDUJHW ,W
seems reasonable to expect that people know themselves better than anyone else 
knows them because the self has first-person privileged and direct access to his/her 
own states of mind. Besides, the self is the only person who experiences his or her 
life in a diverse range of situations over the life-span (e.g., Funder, 2010). Of course, 
not any accuracy criterion for personality judgment is perfect. If people sometimes 
are unwilling to reveal undesirable aspects of their personality or are prone to report 
socially desirable characteristics for self-enhancement, or even the self-reports of 
their own actions do not always agree with direct observations (e.g., Vazire & Mehl, 
2008), then the accuracy of self-agreement will be weakened.  
 A criterion used relatively less often is consensus that involves having two or 
more judges making judgments about some traits of a particular target and then 
computing their degree of agreement with one another. For example, if more 
perceivers judge that a person is extraverted, then it is more likely that the person 
possesses the characteristics of a trait for extraversion, such as talkative and sociable. 
But not all researchers agree with consensus or reliability of judgments as an 
appropriate criterion of accuracy. Kenny (1991), for example, has argued that 
consensus is not equivalent to accuracy though it is closely related to accuracy. If all 
judges are subject to the same constant bias for a given target, or share a false 
consensus effect that occurs when we overestimate the extent to which others think, 
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feel and act as we do (Kilianski, 2008), or the judges cannot achieve consensus, then 
the consensus-based judgment will be inaccurate.  
The so-FDOOHG³JROGVWDQGDUG´RIDFFXUDWHMXGJPHQWLVEHKDYLRUDOSUHGLFWLRQ
³,I D MXGJPHQW RI SHUVRQDOLW\ FDQ SUHGLFW D EHKDYLRU RU D EHKDYLRUDOO\-related life 
outcome, then it would seem likeO\WKDWLWLVDFFXUDWHLQVRPHVHQVH´)XQGHU
Accuracy of behaviour ratings or predictions is of critical importance for many fields, 
for example, self-ratings and other-ratings as used to predict health behaviours, job 
performance, relationship outcomes, and academic performance (Ozer & Benet-
Martínez, 2006; Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi, & Goldberg, 2007). Nevertheless, 
systematic examinations of the predictive validity of personality ratings are still 
surprisingly rare in the literature due to the methodological challenges (Vazire & 
Mehl, 2008; Funder, 2012).  
In short, there are pros and cons in the three criteria for accuracy of 
personality judgment. Given the fact that consensus does not actually measure what a 
WDUJHWSHUVRQ¶SHUVRQDOLW\ LVDQd the criterion of behavioral prediction is faced with 
difficulty of operation, the current thesis uses self-other agreement as the standard of 
accuracy: Self-report ratings on personality questionnaires are used as the baseline to 
determine whether a percHLYHU¶V MXGJPHQW DJUHHV ZLWK WKH VHOI-ratings. Although 
self-report may be imperfect for measuring personalities, it is the most common 
technique for examining the behaviours associated with psychological traits, and 
offers an efficient method to gather wide-ranging information about what people do 
in daily life (Funder, 2010). Moreover, when it comes to judging personality, it 
seems essentially important to achieve agreement between self-perception and other-
perception: Without this agreement, we would be puzzled at what another person is 
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like, communicating with others would become utterly perplexing, and friendships 
would be unlikely.   
2.4 Accuracy-oriented Approach to Research of Initial Personality 
Judgment  
7R H[SORUH SHRSOH¶V DELOLW\ WR PDNH DQ LQLWLal judgment of personality that 
occurs every day, an accuracy-oriented approach is more appropriate as opposed to a 
process-oriented method given its properties of ecological validity detailed in the 
following. First of all, according to Funder (1995), accuracy, has attendant 
consequences for social judgments, is realistic and testable. In line with the studies 
on STIs (see Chapter 1), we are accustomed to forming first impressions on someone 
else, and ordinary observation from our daily experiences seems sufficient to verify 
the fact that we are certainly concerned with whether our initial judgments of a 
person are correct or not. In addition, unlike the process-based approaches in which 
perceivers are asked to judge imagined persons in hypothetical situations, the 
accuracy-RULHQWHGPHWKRGRORJ\IRFXVHVRQWHVWLQJSHRSOH¶VFDSDFLW\IRUPDNLQJWUDLW
inferences on real persons based on a sample of behaviour related to the events and 
phenomena that probably happen to every ordinary person in real life. In the 
following, I will articulate the concepts and paradigms involved in the accuracy-
oriented approach to study first-impression personality judgments.    
2.4.1 Global Personality Traits  
According to Allport (1937), traits are psychological mechanisms that 
deteUPLQH SHRSOH¶V UHVSRQVHV WR VWLPXOL WKH\ PRWLYDWH DQG RUJDQL]H SHRSOH¶V
behaviour. This definition implies that personality traits can be inferred from 
observable behaviouU )ROORZLQJ $OOSRUW¶V SRVLWLRQ )XQGHU   SURSRVHV
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that personality traitVDUHDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VFKDUDFWHULVWLFSDWWHUQVRI WKRXJKWHPRWLRQ
and behaviour that are relatively consistent over time and across situations, together 
with the hidden or visible psychological mechanisms underlying those patterns.  
 In the social world, almost everyone gets used to thinking about and 
SRUWUD\LQJWKHSHRSOHRQHPHHWVDQGNQRZVXVLQJWHUPVOLNH³IULHQGO\´³VRFLDEOH´
³SHVVLPLVWLF´³QDUFLVVLVWLF´DQGWKHOLNH$VFODLPHGE\)XQGHU³7UDLWVOLNH
these are global because each refers not just to one or a few specific behaviours, but 
patterns of behaviouUSUHVXPHGWRWUDQVFHQGWLPHDQGVSHFLILFVLWXDWLRQV´S$
ERG\RIHYLGHQFHKDVVKRZQWKDWSHRSOH¶VJOREDOSHUVRQDOLW\DIIHFWVWKHLUSHUVRQDOLW\
in specific contexts, their behaviour, and fluctuations in behaviour (Fleeson, 2001; 
Heller, Watson, & Ilies, 2004).     
 Aiming to investigate formation of first impressions on personality in daily 
life, this thesis adopts the concepts of global personality traits because global traits 
are an important part of everyday social discourse. They encompass a good deal of 
wisdom and common sense, and offer legitimate, if necessarily incomplete, 
explanations of behaviour (Funder, 1991). A person has more than one personality 
trait and behaves differently in different instances; meanwhile, two distinct 
psychological traits may manifest as the same behaviour and one trait may manifest 
as different behaviours. This means that though actions express relatively invariant 
personality traits, particular behaviours do not simply and necessarily express 
particular traits. In other words, a global trait gives rise to a complex pattern of 
behaviour from which the trait is inferred, and suggests the psychological 
mechanisms that are the source of the pattern (Funder, 1991).  
  53 
2.4.2 Thin Slices of Behaviour  
 With the aim of understanding the meaningful, consequential, and for the 
most part social behaviours of daily life, research on interpersonal judgments should 
focus on direct observation of relevant activities that people perform in daily life 
situations. However, few studies on personality judgments have paid sufficient 
attention to direct observation of actual behaviour (Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder, 
2007; Vazire & Mehl, 2008; Funder, 2010). Personality psychology has long relied 
extensively on questionnaire ratings and introspective self-reports; social psychology 
has moved in recent years to study reaction time (Baumeister, et al., 2007). However, 
questionnaire responses and laboratory-based behaviours may differ from how a 
person typically behaves.  
 The basic principle of behaviour is its continuous flow (Allport, 1937), and 
SHRSOH¶VHYHU\GD\EHKDYLRur usually reflects their multiple traits rather than a single 
particular trait. This means that disentangling the relationship between a given trait 
and a given behaviouULVH[WUHPHO\GLIILFXOW)XQGHU$³WKLQVOLFH´HPERGLHV
this concept of behaviour. It is a brief excerpt of expressive behaviour drawn from 
the ongoing behavioral stream, with dynamic information occupying less than 5-
minutes (Ambady, & Rosenthal, 1992; 1993; Ambady et al., 2000). According to 
Ambady et al. (2000): 
³7KLQVOLFHVFDQEHVDPSOHG IURPDQ\DYDLODEOH FKDQQHORI FRPPXQLFDWLRQ
including the face, the body, speech, the voice, transcripts, or combinations of the 
above. Thin slices remain much, if not most, of the information encoded via dynamic, 
fluid behaviour while reducing or sometimes eliminating: (a) the information 
encoded within the ongoing verbal stream; (b) the past history of targets; and (c) the 
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global, comprehensive context within which the behaviouU LV WDNLQJSODFH´ S-
204). 
 A wealth of research has examined judgments based on thin slices pertaining 
to a wide spectrum of psychological constructs, ranging from informing the affective 
states (e.g., Waxer, 1976), rating personalities (e.g., Borkenau et al., 2004), to 
evaluating teacher effectiveness (Ambady & Rosenhal, 1993). Most importantly, the 
thin-slice paradigm has proved to be ecologically valid as a measure of interpersonal 
sensitivity (see Ambady, LaPlante, & Johnson, 2001, for a review), providing an 
HIILFLHQW PHDQV RI DVVHVVLQJ WKLQJV LQ WKH KHDG VXFK DV RWKHUV¶ LQWHQWLRQV DIIHFWV
emotions, motivation, and personalities.  
In tandem with other measures such as self-reports, judgments of thin slice 
can provide unique insight regarding the dynamics and processes underlying 
psychological inferences in the real world because thin slice judgments are intuitive 
and efficient (Ambady, 2010), and because thin slice methodology allows for 
manipulations in the amount of exposure time and temporal location of the slice 
presented to judges. This methodology also allows us to manipulate communication 
channels (including silent videotapes, audiotapes, and standard videotapes) presented 
to judges, and the types of behaviours that need to be judged from the slices 
(Ambady et al., 2001).  
*LYHQ WKHVHPHULWV WKLV WKHVLVSXUVXHVDPHWKRGRORJ\ LQYROYLQJµWKLQVOLFHV
of behaviouU¶ GHILQLQJ EHKDYLRuU DV µWKLQ VOLFHV¶ WKDW DUH H[Wracted from ongoing 
observable behavioral streams that occur in naturalistic environments and that are 
GHSLFWHGLQWHUPVRIYLGHRDXGLRDQGVWLOOLPDJH6XFK³WKLQVOLFHV´DUHHFRORJLFDOO\
valid because they derive from part of everyday behaviour in social interactions, 
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because they are products of global personalities, and because they provide minimal 
information for people to draw inferences about personalities.    
2.4.3 Zero-acquaintance Paradigm  
 To evaluate the degree to which a personality judgment is accurate, 
researchers usually compare multiple sources of information about a person, 
including ratings of strangers and judgments made by the well-acquainted such as 
friends, spouse, and family. Some studies show that the tendency for observers to 
agree with a self-report by the target increases with greater acquaintance (e.g., 
Norman & Goldberg, 1966; Funder & Colvin, 1988; Paulhus & Bruce, 1992); other 
studies, however, provide no evidence to suggest that agreement increases with 
increasing acquaintance (e.g., Funder, Kolar, & Blackman, 1995; Kenny, Albright, 
Malloy, & Kashy, 1994). There is no intention in the current research to investigate 
how acquaintanceship affects accuracy in personality judgments; instead, the aim is 
to discover the accuracy of personality judgments and the process involved in 
making those judgments on first meeting someone else. Thus, the zero-acquaintance 
paradigm (Norman & Goldberg, 1966; Albright, Kenny, & Malloy, 1988) is adopted 
where the perceiver is asked to judge a targHW¶V SV\FKRORJLFDO WUDLWV ZLWKRXW DQ\
opportunity to interact with the target; that is, the perceiver is unacquainted with and 
has no prior knowledge about the given target.  
 Norman and Goldberg (1966) reported the first major study of zero 
acquaintance. 7KH\ DVNHG 8QLYHUVLW\ RI 0LFKLJDQ VWXGHQWV WR UDWH HDFK RWKHU¶V
personality traits on the very first day of class: The students were randomly assigned 
to a 6- to 9-person group in the absence of any opportunity to interact with one 
another and without any prior acquaintance. They were asked to independently rate 
each member of their group and themselves on personality traits. This face-to-face 
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zero-acquaintance procedure was criticized for its potential contamination of zero 
acquaintance ± Participants may have interacted with one another while making 
personality judgments in the face-to-face environment. Thus, a video-based zero 
acquaintance procedure has been widely used in preference, in which perceivers are 
asked to make judgments on personalities of targets while viewing targets 
performing activities presented in the format of video.  
2.4.4 Summary  
To summarize, in order to explore how well we can draw an inference about 
personality of another person, this thesis adopts the accuracy-oriented approach, 
uVLQJµWKLQVOLFHV¶RIEHKDYLRur in the context of zero-acquaintance.  
In the opinion of Funder (1995; 2012), accuracy in personality judgments is a 
function of the availability, detection and utilization of relevant behavioral cues. The 
research in this thesis utilizes self-other agreement as the criterion of accuracy: A 
WDUJHW¶V DFWXDO WUDLWV DUH DVVHVVHGE\KLVKHU VHOI-reports on relevant questionnaires, 
WKHUHVXOWVRIZKLFKVHUYHDVWKHVWDQGDUGRIDFFXUDF\,ISHUFHLYHUV¶DVVHVVPHQWVRI
the corresponding traits are consistent with the self-report ratings, then accuracy is 
established. Instead of using artificially trait-laced behaviour, the perceiver is asked 
to form an intuitive impression of a target after being exposed to thin slices of 
behaviour tKDW WKH WDUJHW SHUIRUPHG LQ UHDOLVWLF VFHQDULRV 7KH ³WKLQ VOLFHV´ DUH
H[WUDFWHG IURP WDUJHW¶V EHKDYLRUDO VWUHDPV LQ VFHQDULRV RI WKH PXQGDQH OLIH 7KH
zero-acquaintance enables perceivers to share the same information about a common 
target, and on which they rely to form an impression of the target. The procedure of 
integrating the zero-DFTXDLQWDQFHSDUDGLJPZLWK WKHFRQFHSWRI ³WKLQ VOLFH´ LV WKXV
particularly appropriate for studying first-impression judgments of personality.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
Can People Guess How Empathising Another Person Is 
After Watching a Short Video?  
3.1 Introduction  
3.1.1 The Role of Empathy in Mentalising 
7KHZRUG³HPSDWK\´ZDVFRLQHGE\7LWFKHQHUDV WUDQVODWLRQRI WKH*HUPDQ
ZRUG³(LQIKOXQJ´ LWVHOID WHUPIURPSKLORVRSKLFDO DHVWKHWLFVPHDQLQJ³WRSURMHFW
\RXUVHOILQWRZKDW\RXREVHUYH´7LWFKHQHU$WWKHHQGRIWKHth century, the 
notion of empathy was introduced to the philosophy of mind as the primary means 
for gaining knowledge of other minds, and since then psychologists have taken it as 
an essential part of psychological events and processes to be studied by empirical 
methods (Stueber, 2013).  
Generally, psychologists distinguish between situational empathy concerning 
a momentary mental state in a specific situation and dispositional empathy that is 
regarded as a stable psychological disposition (Zhou, Valiente, & Eisenberg, 2003; 
Rumble, Van Lange, & Parks, 2010; Stueber, 2013). The situational empathic state is 
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UHODWHGWRDSKHQRPHQRQRI³LQQHULPLWDWLRQ´ZKHUHRQHSHUVRQPHQWDOO\PLUURUVWKH
mental activities or experiences of another person through observing the SHUVRQ¶V
bodily activities or facial expressions in a certain context (Stueber, 2013). In this 
sense, empathy is thought to function in a way similar to mental simulation. Hence, 
some psychologists understand empathy as an everyday mindreading ability (that is 
ODEHOHGDV³HPSDWKLFDFFXUDF\´WRLQIHUWKHFRQWHQWVRIPHQWDODQGHPRWLRQDOVWDWHV
of other people in given moments (e.g., Ickes, Stinson, Bissonnette, & Garcia, 1990; 
Ickes et al., 2000; Hall & Mast, 2007; Zaki, Bolger & Ochsner, 2008).  
In a typical paradigm of empathic accuracy (e.g., Ickes, 1993), two strangers 
are led into a waiting room and are asked to wait for the experiment to begin, and 
WKHQWKH\DUHOHIW WRJHWKHULQ WKHH[SHULPHQWHU¶VDEVHQFH'XULQJWKLV LQWHUYDO WKHLU
verbal and nonverbal behaviours are inconspicuously videotaped. In the main study, 
each of them is instructed to view a separate videotape of the interaction and make a 
written, time-logged listing of their own specific thoughts and feelings during the 
interaction. After that, while watching the videotape a second time, they are required 
WRLQIHUWKHFRQWHQWVRIWKHLUSDUWQHU¶VWKRXJKWVDQGIHHOLQJVZKHQWKHWDSHLVVWRSSHG
for them at each of those points at which their interaction partner had reported a 
thought or feeling. Later, independent raters are instructed to code the extent to 
which the contents of mental and emotional states inferred by the perceiver are 
VLPLODU WR WKH WDUJHW¶V VHOI-reports, which serves to establish the measurement of 
accuracy. Using this face-to-face procedure or a similar video-based task, researchers 
have found that perceivers can to some extent infer the contents of thoughts and 
feelings a person was experiencing in some moments in an unstructured dyadic 
interaction (e.g., Ickes et al., 1990; Ickes, 2003; Hall & Mast, 2007), and they can 
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also moderately infer how a target person might feel while watching the person 
talking about autobiographical events (Zaki, Bolger, & Ochsner, 2008; 2009).  
As such, we are able to reason about transient mental and emotional states of 
other people  (Ickes et al., 2000; Ickes, 2003; Baron-Cohen, 2012), and we are 
capable of experiencing an emotion triggered by the emotion of someone else 
(Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Zaki et al., 2009). According to Baron-Cohen 
(2012), the capacity for empathy is effective for anticipating and resolving a variety 
of interpersonal problems; without it, we would lack one of the most valuable 
resources in our world. If one lacked a capacity for empathy, as might be the case in 
autism and psychopathy, this could be associated with a severe difficulty in 
understanding minds of others, leading to difficulties in functioning in the social 
world (Baron-Cohen, 2012; Flury, Ickes & Schweinle, 2008). 
3.1.2 The Present Study    
Research on empathic accuracy has addressed the cognitive dimension of 
empathy that is implicated as the capability of inferring momentary psychological 
states (Stueber, 2013). However, the psychological architecture of human empathy 
embodies multidimensional factors in both cognitive and affective terms (e.g., Davis, 
1980; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Decety & Jackson, 2004), which is 
reflected in the concept of empathic disposition, concerning individual differences in 
empathy.  
That is, people not only experience an empathic state induced by a variety of 
situations, but also possess empathic disposition that reflects relatively consistent 
characteristic patterns of behaviour and thought pertaining to empathy; those who 
have a strong empathizing disposition may experience more empathic states than 
those who have a weak empathizing disposition. When empathy is understood as a 
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comparatively stable psychological disposition, is this something that other people 
can sense? If so, to what extent can people make an accurate judgment on how 
empathizing another person is on the basis of thin slices of behaviour?   
Accuracy research has suggested that people can make an accurate inference 
about some psychological dispositions on first meeting someone. For example, in 
lines of UHVHDUFK E\ 1RUWK 7RGRURY DQG 2VKHUVRQ   WDUJHW SHUVRQV¶
natural facial reactions to relatively mundane stimuli were recorded unobtrusively 
while they were reporting which ones they find more appealing. After watching the 
videos of the targets each lasting several seconds, perceivers had to infer the choices 
of the targets. The results show that perceivers could somewhat infer the preferences 
of the targets across four different stimuli categories (people (attractiveness), 
cartoons (humor), paintings (decorative appeal), and animals (cuteness)) from 
spontaneous facial expressions alone. Besides, research on personality judgments has 
suggested that at least in some cases perceivers show noteworthy levels of accuracy 
in forming a first impression of some dimensions of the Big Five personality traits. 
For instance, after watching a segment of video where a target read a standard 
weather forecast, perceivers could form an accurate first impression of the traits of 
extraversion and conscientiousness (Borkenau & Liebler, 1993); in watching college 
students having a get-acquainted conversation, perceivers could form an accurate 
first impression of different factors of the Big Five personality traits in different 
amounts of exposure time (Carney, Colvin, & Hall, 2007). Together with the 
findings in the research of empathic accuracy, these data consistently suggest that 
facial expressions and behavioral manners (including speech) play a role in 
conveying mental states and psychological dispositions. It seems that observers are 
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able to perceive and interpret this information to determine the contents of other 
minds and perceive the dispositions of the target.  
Likewise, Empathic disposition, in relation to many domains of our everyday 
life, could be more or less revealed in empathy-related responding, such as facial 
expressions, bodily movements and vocal behaviour (Zhou, et al., 2003). 
Researchers have found that accuracy of emotion recognition is positively correlated 
with empathic concern following brief H[SRVXUHWRSLFWXUHVRIDWDUJHWSHUVRQ¶VIDFLDO
expression (Besel & Yuille, 2010); and recognition of facial expressions is 
significantly associated with self-reported emotional empathy (Martin, Berry, 
Dobranski, & Van Horne, 1996; Gery, Milijkovitch, Berthoz & Soussignan, 2009), 
trait emotional intelligence involving empathy (Austin, 2004; Petrides & Furnham, 
2003), and social-cognitive mindreading tasks (Ferguson & Austin, 2010). This 
HYLGHQFHVXJJHVWVWKDWHPSDWK\FRXOGOHDNRXWLQWRDSHUVRQ¶VIDFLDOHxpressions and 
subtle behaviors; therefore an observer might stand some chance of being able to 
interpret those signs as being indicators that the person is empathic. Can people make 
use of these indicators to form an accurate first impression on how empathizing 
another person is after watching a short video?  
To seek an answer to this question, the current study developed a novel 
procedure based on the accuracy-oriented paradigm articulated in Chapter 2. In 
particular, theoretically, based on the concept of realistic accuracy (Funder, 1995), 
this study is concerned with accuracy defined as the correspondence between 
SHUFHLYHUV¶ LQIHUHQFHV DQG WDUJHWV¶ VHOI-report ratings of empathic traits. 
2SHUDWLRQDOO\ D SHUFHLYHU LV DVNHG WR GLUHFWO\ JXHVV WKH WDUJHW¶V score on the 
empathic trait measurement, thereby linking perceiver inferences to objective 
outcomes. In line with the concept of global traits, instead of using artificially trait-
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UHOHYDQW DFWLRQV WKLV UHVHDUFK XWLOL]HV D ³WKLQ VOLFH´ WR GHILQH EHKDYLRur, which is 
extracted from ongoing behaviour happening in the real settings. After viewing 
segments of behaviour presented in a video, perceivers are asked to judge how 
empathizing the target is. The zero-acquaintance procedure is used to ensure that 
perceivers make a judgment on empathic trait on the basis of the presented thin slices 
of behaviour rather than their previous knowledge about the targets.  
Considering its wide application and putative reliability and validity 
(Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen, & David, 2004), this study adopts the 
µHPSDWK\TXRWLHQW¶(4VFDOHGHYHORSHGE\%DURQ-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004), 
to measure the trait for empathy. According to Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 
(2004), empathy is the ability to understand what another person might be thinking 
or how a person is feeling, and to respond to the mental and emotional states of the 
person with an appropriate emotion. Following this understanding, they created the 
EQ questionnaire, providing a comprehensive measurement of the psychological 
structure of empathy covering both cognitive and affective factors. It comprises 40 
items pertaining to a range of behaviours associated with empathizing, with a total 
score providing an overall rating of individual differences in empathy tendencies. All 
targets completed this EQ questionnaire, and their EQs served as the reference point 
for gauging whether perceivers can guess their scores on the EQ questionnaire.   
3.2 Study 1 
In the study by Pillai et al. (2012), targets were randomly assigned to 
experience one of four potential events performed by the researcher, in which the 
target might be induced to experience an empathic state. For example, in a story 
scenario, targets heard an empathizing story in which the researcher was relating a 
series of misfortunes she experienced earlier that day, such as missed the bus to 
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university, left mobile phone at home and the like. In hearing such a story, targets 
PLJKW EH PRUH OLNHO\ WR WXQH LQWR WKH UHVHDUFKHU¶V IHHOLQJV DQG WU\ WR FRQVROH KHU
thereby demonstrating an empathic state. Even so, some targets who are less 
empathizing might not feel sympathetic with the researcher: They came to participate 
LQDQH[SHULPHQWEXWZHUHXQH[SHFWHGO\GHWDLQHGE\WKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VVWRU\WKXVWKH\
might feel annoyed or unhappy rather than sympathetic. That is, even in the same 
situation, different people could experience and respond in a different way depending 
on their capacity for empathy. 
According to the study of Pillai et al. (2012), perceivers seemed to be able to 
GUDZ LQIHUHQFHV DERXW WDUJHWV¶ PRPHQWDU\ HPSDWKLF VWDWHV LQ VRPH FRQWH[WV $IWHU
ZDWFKLQJ D EULHI YLGHR UHFRUGLQJ D WDUJHW¶V QDWXUDO UHDFWLRQV WR D JLYHQ VFHQDULR
perceivers could fairly accurately guess which scenario the target responded to. 
Would participants also be able to infer who is more empathic and who is less 
empathic? Using the same video stimuli, the main goal of Study 1 was to explore 
how well people could draw inferences about empathic traits of others while 
watching a 3- to 9-second video clip.  
The other purpose of Study 1 was to explore how effectively people form a 
first impression of empathy of another based on minimal information. According to 
WKH VLPXODWLRQ WKHRU\ RI PHQWDOLVLQJ SHRSOH VRPHWLPHV XQGHUVWDQG RWKHUV¶ PHQWDO
states by mentally VLPXODWLQJRWKHUV¶PLQGVRUE\SURMHFWLQJWKHLURZQSV\FKRORJLFDO
states and processes into others, especially when accessible information about others 
is poor and limited (Stich & Nichols, 2003). In one example (Zaki et al., 2009), while 
watching a person narrating his/her autobiographic emotional events, perceivers 
experienced similarly emotional experience in themselves, and on this basis they 
reasoned about the affect of the target. Would people also anchor their empathic 
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traits to someone else when forming a first impression of empathizing? That is, 
would those who are highly empathic be inclined to judge others as highly empathic? 
And would those who are low in empathy tend to consider others as having low 
empathy?  
3.2.1 Method 
Summary  
Participants (KHQFHIRUWK µSHUFHLYHUV¶YLHZHGVKRUW VLOHQWYLGHRFOLSV WDNHQ
IURP 3LOODL HW DO  RI WDUJHWV¶ UHDFWLRQV HLWKHU WR D MRNH OLVWHQLQJ WR D SHUVRQ
telling them about difficulties they had experienced earlier in the day, being 
subjected to a frustrating wait or receiving a compliment. The targets completed an 
EQ questionnaire (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004) and each was placed into one 
of four categories (ranging from low to high EQ) according to their EQ score-range. 
Perceivers completed the EQ questionnaire as well and received feedback on their 
EQ category (they were handed a sheet in which their own EQ was circled on a four-
point scale, ranging from low to high) before watching the videos and being asked to 
guess the EQ of each target. The purpose was to determine how well the perceivers 
could estimate the EQ of the target and whether there was a correlation between 
SHUFHLYHUV¶ RZQ (4 DQG WKHLU MXGJPHQWV RI WKH WDUJHWV¶ (4V 7KH SURFHGXUH ZDV
scrutinized and approved by the Faculty of Science ethics committee in the 
University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus, which was constituted and operated 
according to the guidelines prescribed by the British Psychological Society. 
Participants 
Sixty-one students (24 females & 37 males) aged 18 to 30 years (mean age = 
21 years, SD = 2.40) were recruited from the University of Nottingham Malaysia 
Campus, including one male who later withdrew. After completing the task, the 
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perceivers were asked whether they had previously seen any of the targets in the 
videos. All perceivers denied having any knowledge of the targets.  
  Materials  
A 13-inch MacBook Pro laptop (10.6.8 Mac OSX system) was used to 
present a sample of video clips using the software PsychoPy (1.70.00 OSX version) 
(Peirce, 2007).  The 40 video clips (21 female & 19 male targets) were obtained from 
a previous study (Pillai et al., 2012). In these, ten targets in each of four scenarios 
were unobtrusively filmed; the researcher was not in the frame and not audible: 
1. Joke Scenario: The researcher told a simple joke to the target. 
2. Story Scenario: The researcher related a story about a series of misfortunes 
she had experienced earlier in the day. 
3. Waiting Scenario: The researcher kept the target waiting for 5-8 minutes 
whilst she was doing personal tasks such as making a phone call and texting. 
4. Compliment Scenario: The researcher paid the target a series of compliments. 
After being filmed, the targets completed the EQ questionnaire, and their 
scores ranged from 11 to 58 (M = 41.38, SD = 11.32). A score in the range of 0-32 is 
low EQ and 8 targets were in this category, 33-52 is average and 25 targets were in 
this category, 53-63 is above average and 7 targets were in this category, and 64-80 
is high but no targets were in this category (Baron-Cohen, 2012). In order to 
PDLQWDLQIRXUFDWHJRULHVZHVSOLWWKHµDYHUDJH¶FDWHJRU\LQWRWZRFDWHJRULHVUDQJLQJ
IURP  WR   WDUJHWV DQG  WR   WDUJHWV DQG FRPELQHG WKH µDERYH
DYHUDJH¶DQGµKLJK¶FDWHJRULHVLQWRRQHUDQJHIURP3 to 80. We re-label these four 
categories as Scale 1 (8 targets), Scale 2 (12 targets), Scale 3 (13 targets) and Scale 4 
(7 targets), where Scale 1 is lowest EQ and Scale 4 is highest EQ. 
Procedure 
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Perceivers were tested individually and began by completing the EQ 
questionnaire, which took approximately 10 minutes. After completion of the EQ 
questionnaire, they were given the definition of empathy and EQ, and told that the 
questionnaire measures EQ and also told which of the four scales their score fell into, 
where Scale 1 is low empathizing ability and Scale 4 is high empathizing ability. 
Subsequently, all 40 video clips were presented on the laptop (600 × 400 pixels) in 
full colour without sound in a random order determined by the software PsychoPy. 
Due to the nature of the scenarios, the duration of the video clips varied somewhat, 
ranging from 3s to 9s (M = 6.03s, SD = 1.25). Following presentation of each video 
clip a response screen appeared immediately, displaying Scale 1 to Scale 4 (from low 
to high EQ) as response options (see Fig. 3.1). The perceivers registered their 
DVVHVVPHQW RI WKH WDUJHW¶V (4 E\ XVLQJ WKH PRXVH WR FOLFN RQH RI WKH IRXU VFDOHV
Once the perceiver made the choice the screen moved immediately to next video clip. 
Responses were automatically recorded by the software for later retrieval. It took 
about 10 minutes to complete the video task.  
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Video presentation screen  Ð 
 
Response screen  
Fig. 3.1. An example of a trial in Study 1.  
 
3.2.2 Results and Discussion  
Preliminary Analysis ± The EQ Scores of the Perceivers and the Targets  
The EQ scores of the targets (M = 41.38, SD = 11.32, ranging from 11 to 58) 
were slightly higher than those of the perceivers (M = 37.15, SD = 9.52, ranging 
from 19 to 65), t (98) = 2.02, p = .05. Strangely, the EQ scores of the targets differed 
depending on the scenario they had been randomly assigned to according to a one-
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way between-groups analysis of variance (ANOVA), F (3, 36) = 4.97, p = .006. Post 
hoc LSD tests showed that the targets assigned to the story scenario had higher 
average EQ than those assigned to the joke (p = .014) and the waiting (p = .001) 
scenarios, but there was no difference between those assigned to the joke and 
compliment scenarios; and those assigned to the compliment scenario were slightly 
higher than those assigned to the waiting scenario (p =. 045).  
:H H[DPLQHG WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ WKH SHUFHLYHUV¶ VHOI-report EQs and 
WKHLU UDWLQJV RI WKH WDUJHWV¶ (4V )RU HDFK SHUFHLYHU WKH DYHUDJH UDWLQJ RI the 40 
WDUJHWV¶(4ZDVFDOFXODWHGEDVHGRQWKHIRXU-point scale (M = 2.19, SD = .38). There 
ZDV D VLJQLILFDQW FRUUHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH SHUFHLYHU¶V RZQ (4 WUDQVODWHG LQWR WKH
same four-point scale, M = 2.00, SD = .92) and the guesses they made about the 
targets, r (58) = .46, p < .001. In other words, an empathic perceiver was inclined to 
judge that targets were empathic, while a perceiver who lacked empathy tended to 
MXGJHWKDWWDUJHWVODFNHGHPSDWK\,QVKRUWLWVHHPVWRVRPHGHJUHHWKDWSHUFHLYHUV¶
estiPDWLRQV RI WDUJHWV¶ (4 ZHUH DQFKRUHG WR WKH IHHGEDFN WKH\ KDG UHFHLYHG DERXW
their own actual EQ. 
Main Analysis ± Guessing the EQ of the Target   
Adapting the procedure developed by Pillai et al (2012), signal detection 
(SDT) was used to investigate the acFXUDF\RI WKHSHUFHLYHUV¶ MXGJPHQWVRQZKLFK
EQ scale each target belonged. This method allows an assessment of accuracy that is 
LQGHSHQGHQW RI XQGHUO\LQJ EDVH UDWHV RI WDUJHW DFWXDO (4 VFDOHV DQG SHUFHLYHUV¶
response bias in a particular EQ scale. Correct MXGJPHQWVRIWKHWDUJHWV¶(4VRQHDFK
scale were counted as hits, incorrect judgments on each EQ scale were counted as 
false alarms, and the index of accuracy was computed as d-SULPH G¶ 7DEOH 
VKRZVWKHPHDQVRI WKHKLWUDWHVIDOVHDODUPUDWHVG¶ in each category of the four-
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point scale, along with the corresponding t values of one-VDPSOH W WHVWVRIHDFKG¶
where the comparison value is zero. If a perceiver guessed at random when 
HVWLPDWLQJWKH(4RIWKHWDUJHWWKLVZRXOG\LHOGDG¶RI]HUR 
 
Table 3.1. Means (and standard deviations) of hit rates (HR), false alarm rates (FAR), d-SULPHG¶LQ
each EQ scale, and values of one-VDPSOHWWHVWVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKHDFKG¶LQ6WXG\ 
 Scale 1 Scale 2 Scale 3 Scale 4 
HR .40 (.23) .40 (.18) .28 (.15) .18 (.13) 
FAR .23 (.16) .38 (.15) .28 (.14) .09 (.10) 
G¶ .51 (.57) .06 (.47) -.02 (.42) .50 (.52) 
t 6.90* .96 -.37 7.35* 
  Note:  *p < .001, two-tailed, df = 59.    
 
$VVKRZQLQ7DEOHWKHPHDVXUHRIGLVFULPLQDWLRQG¶LQ6FDOHVDQG
4 was .51, .06, -.02 and .50 respectively, and perceivers were systematically correct 
in judging the EQs of targets who were in Scale 1 and in Scale 4 but not in Scale 2 
and in Scale 3 according to the results of one-VDPSOHW WHVWV7KHDYHUDJHG¶DFURVV
the four scales (M = .26, SD  ZDVDOVRFRPSXWHGDVDQLQGLFDWRURISHUFHLYHUV¶
ability to guess the EQs of targets at an overall level; the result of a one-sample t test 
was significant (t (59) = 7.42, p < .001). A repeated measures one-way ANOVA 
revealed that tKHG¶YDOXHVDPRQJWKHIRXUVFDOHVZHUHVLJQLILFDQWO\GLIIHUHQWF (3, 
117) = 20.28, p   3RVW KRF /6' WHVWV VKRZHG WKDW G¶ YDOXHV ZHUH KLJKHU LQ
Scale 1 than in Scale 2 (p < .001) and Scale 3 (p $OVRG¶YDOXHVZHUHKLJKHU
in Scale 4 than in Scale 2 (p < .001) and Scale 3 (p < .001); there was no difference 
between Scale 1 and Scale 4 and neither was there a difference between Scale 2 and 
Scale 3. 
In summarizing the results of Study 1, perceivers demonstrated a general 
DELOLW\WRIRUPDQLQLWLDOLPSUHVVLRQRIDQRWKHUSHUVRQLQGLFDWHGE\WKHDYHUDJHG¶
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and made systematically correct judgments when targets either had low or high EQ 
based on videos lasting only about 6s with sound muted. Indeed, perceivers were 
better at estimating the EQs of targets at the two extremes of the scale than targets 
who were in the middle two categories. Interestingly, perceivers seemed to assume 
that targets were somewKDWVLPLODUWRWKHPVHOYHV2QDYHUDJHSHUFHLYHUV¶UDWLQJVRI
WDUJHWV¶(4VFRUUHODWHGZLWKWKHLURZQ(4DVFRQYH\HGWRWKHPLQIHHGEDFN 
3.3 Study 2 
It is tempting to conclude from the results of Study 1 that people are adept in 
perceiving the trait of empathy in others, especially in cases of high and low empathy. 
They could do this despite the fact that they do not know the target and despite the 
fact that their estimation was on the basis of video clips that lasted merely 3 to 9 
seconds presented without sound. However, there is an obstacle to such an 
interpretation. According to the preliminary analysis of the results in Study 1, the 
EQs of the targets varied according to scenarios, even though the targets were 
assigned to scenarios at random. How can we explain this unexpected result? One 
possibility is that targets varied in their EQ across scenarios purely by chance. 
Another possibility is that the different scenarios affected the way in which the 
targets filled in the EQ questionnaire. Notably, targets assigned to the story scenario 
tended to have relatively high EQ while those assigned to the waiting scenario 
tended to have relatively low EQ. Perhaps the story scenario caused targets to have a 
sense of empathy, as they consoled the researcher on her difficult day. In contrast, 
perhaps the waiting scenario caused the targets to feel annoyed and disagreeable in a 
ZD\WKDWLQKLELWHGHPSDWKL]LQJ,IVRWKHQDSSDUHQWO\WKHWDUJHW¶V(4VFRUHUHIOHFWHG
not their trait but their state of empathy. We already know from Pillai et al (2012) 
that perceivers are able to make fairly accurate judgments of the mental state of the 
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target and now the question arises as to whether the result of Study 1 has merely 
replicated that finding. 
In view of this lack of clarity RQZKHWKHUSHUFHLYHUVUDWHGWKHWDUJHW¶VVWDWHRU
trait, we conducted a further study where all targets experienced the same set of 
scenarios ± Hence, all targets were subjected to the same state. If perceivers can only 
detect empathy as a state, then in Study 2 they would not be able to estimate EQ 
systematically. If, in contrast, perceivers can estimate empathy as a trait then they 
should be able to estimate EQ systematically in Study 2 as well as in Study 1. 
3.3.1 Method 
Summary 
Targets completed the scenarios before they filled in the EQ to ensure that the 
way they filled in the questionnaire could not have affected their experience of the 
scenarios. Targets were classified according to the same four-point EQ scale devised 
for Study 1. A 4 × 3 mixed design was used. Each target experienced three scenarios 
and they were a brief conversation (the targets answered some questions about 
themselves), telling a joke (the target told a joke to the camera from a script) and 
performing a screen test (the target read out an advertisement to the camera about the 
University of Nottingham). Subsequently, the video clips were presented to 
perceivers as with Study 1; the perceivers had to guess the EQ of the target. The 
procedure was scrutinized and approved by the Faculty of Science ethics committee 
in the University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus, which was constituted and 
operated according to guidelines prescribed by the British Psychological Society. 
Participants 
The perceivers were 90 students (49 females and 41 males) aged 18 to 32 
years (mean age 21 years, SD = 2.40), recruited from the University of Nottingham 
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Malaysia Campus. To ensure that the perceivers did not know the targets, they were 
shown photographs of the targets (taken from their videos) and asked whether they 
had previously seen any of them. Twenty additional participants who reported one or 
more acquaintances in the sample of the targets were excluded and replaced by 
another 20. Thus, we assumed that all 90 perceivers who proceeded to the testing 
phase were unacquainted with the targets. The perceivers were randomly assigned to 
view targets either in the Conversation, the Joke or the Screen Test Scenario.  Details 
of targets appear below.  
Materials 
One hundred and forty-one video clips were developed as stimuli, with 47 
clips in each condition where the targets were videoed during the conversation, 
reading a joke or doing the screen test. Therefore, 30 perceivers viewed 47 clips 
showing the targets in the Conversation Scenario, 30 perceivers viewed 47 clips 
showing the same targets in the Joke Scenario and 30 perceivers viewed 47 clips 
showing the same targets in the Screen Test Scenario. All the videos were presented 
either on the same 13-inch MacBook Pro laptop in Study 1 using the software 
PsychoPy 1.70.00 OSX version or on a 14-inch HP EliteBook 8460p laptop using 
PsychoPy 1.74.00 windows version.  
Video Stimuli collection and editing  
A Sony Handycam DCR-SR60 video camera was used to film targets. Videos 
were collected from 50 students (targets) from the University of Nottingham 
Malaysia Campus, including 3 whose data were later deleted because of mistakes in 
the process of recording. The remaining targets were 24 males and 23 females aged 
18 to 32 years (mean age = 21 years, SD = 2.85), all of whom responded to a call to 
do a screen test advertising the University. On arrival, targets were issued with a 
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script for the joke and the screen test for them to study. All were individually 
videoed in a quiet laboratory with the camera mounted on the tripod placed 
DSSUR[LPDWHO\PHWHUVDZD\ WR UHFRUG WKH WDUJHW¶V IDFHDQG WKH WRSSDUWRI WKHLU
body. The researcher sat next to the target but out of view of the camera. Unknown 
to the target, the camera automatically began recording as soon as the target entered 
the room. Once inside the lab, after the target read some written information 
(including an information sheet, a script for the joke, a script for the screen test and a 
consent form), the researcher began with a brief conversation in which she asked a 
seULHV RI TXHVWLRQV DQG ZURWH GRZQ WKH UHVSRQVHV DERXW WKH WDUJHW¶V QDPH DJH
what course they were enrolled on, where they were from and so on. The 
conversation lasted approximately two minutes. The camera was then ostensibly 
VZLWFKHG WR µUHFRUG PRGH¶ DQd the target was invited to read out the joke to the 
camera: 
"Excuse me, but the seat you've taken is mine." 
"Yours? Can you prove it?" 
"Yes, I put a cup of ice cream on it." 
After a pause of about one minute the target was then invited to read out a 
verbatim script of the screen test: 
³$W WKH 8QLYHUVLW\ RI 1RWWLQJKDP ZH DUH FRPPLWWHG WR SURYLGLQJ D WUXO\
international education, inspiring our students, producing world-leading research and 
benefiting the communities around our campuses in the UK, China and Malaysia. 
Our purpose is to improve life for individuals and societies worldwide. By bold 
innovation and excellence in all that we do, we make both knowledge and 
GLVFRYHULHVPDWWHU´ 
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After filming and a short break for a couple of minutes, the target was asked 
to fill in the EQ questionnaire (plus various other questionnaires that were not 
relevant to the aims of the current study). The EQ scores ranged from 19 to 61 (M = 
37.96, SD = 10.19), and each target was classified according to the same four-point 
scale used in Study 1: Twelve were in Scale 1, 20 in Scale 2, 11 in Scale 3 and 4 in 
Scale 4.   
The video of each target began when he/she entered the laboratory and ended 
when he/she finished the screen test. From this raw material, three separate video 
clips were made for each target (the Conversation, the Joke and the Screen Test) 
using a MacBook Pro laptop with the software Total Video Converter Pro 3.1.8, 
+DQG%UDNH0DF26;YHUVLRQDQGL0RYLH¶,QWKH-RNHDQGWKH6FUHHQ
Test scenarios, each video clip began when the target started the task and ended 
about two seconds after the target completed reading the script. The average duration 
of the video clips was 30.87s (SD = 2.56; ranging from 24s to 35s) for the 
Conversation, 8.94s (SD = 1.36; ranging from 7s to 12s) for the Joke and 29.36s for 
the Screen Test (SD = 4.48; ranging from 22s to 42s). Because the raw filming of the 
Conversation actually lasted around two minutes, we extracted 30-second clips from 
either the beginning (15 targets), the middle (16 targets) or the end (16 targets) of the 
conversation videos. In total, we created 47 Conversation, 47 Joke and 47 Screen 
Test video clips. Each of the three sets of 47 clips was presented to a different group 
of perceivers (30 in each group) in full colour and with sound. 
Procedure 
The procedure was similar to Study 1 except for the following. First, as with 
Study 1, perceivers were fed back their own EQ before they judged the EQs of the 
targets by viewing the video clips. However, in Study 2 the researcher explained that 
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VKHGLGQRWKDYH WLPH WR VFRUH WKHSHUFHLYHU¶V(4DQGZRXOGGR LW ODWHU$IWHU WKH
perceiver finished judging the EQs of the targets while watching the videos, the 
researcher asked the perceiver to guess his/her own EQ (on the 4-point scale) and to 
rate how confident he/she felt (on a 7-point scale from very low to very high). 
Second, in addition to guessing the EQ of the target in each video clip (on the same 
4-point scale), perceivers also rated how confident they felt in making each judgment 
(on the same 7-point scale from very low to very high) (see Fig. 3.2). After 
presentation of each video clip, a new screen appeared showing the two rating scales, 
with the four-point EQ scale at the top and the 7-point confidence scale beneath. 
Perceivers registered their response by using the mouse to click the relevant point on 
each scale. 
The 47 video clips were displayed in a random order to each perceiver 
(divided into three groups: Conversation, Joke, Screen Test) determined by the 
software PsychoPy on a laptop. Responses (a four-way forced choice guess of the 
WDUJHW¶V (4 DQG D -way confidence rating) were automatically recorded by the 
software.  Perceivers typically took about 15 minutes in the Joke Scenario and about 
40 minutes in the Conversation and the Screen Test Scenario to view and rate the 
videos. 
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Video presentation screen            Ð 
 
Response screen  
Fig. 3.2. An example of a trial in Study 2.   
 
3.3.2 Results and Discussion 
Preliminary Analysis ± The EQ Scores of the Perceivers and the Targets 
The average EQs of perceivers were 38.77 (SD = 10.63, ranging from 19 to 
58) in the Conversation Scenario, 37.07 (SD = 8.31, ranging from 19 to 56) in the 
Joke Scenario, and 39.47 (SD = 8.40, ranging from 23 to 56) in the Screen Test 
Scenario. Preliminary analyses did not identify any differences between the average 
  77 
EQs of the targets (M = 38.43, SD = 9.13, ranging from 19 to 58) and the perceivers 
and neither was there any evidence of difference between the three groups of 
perceivers in their average EQ scores.  
5HDVVXULQJO\ WKHUH ZDV D FRUUHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH SHUFHLYHUV¶ DFWXDO (4
(converted to the four-point scale) and the guesses they made about their own EQ (on 
the same four-point scale), r (88) = .46, p < .001, suggesting that to some degree 
perceivers are aware of how empathizing they are. The actual EQs of the perceivers 
ZHUHQRWUHODWHGZLWKWKHDYHUDJHGJXHVVHVWKDWWKHSHUFHLYHUVPDGHDERXWWKHWDUJHWV¶
EQs, r (88) = .09, p = .40. But, interestingly, the EQ that the perceivers guessed 
about themselves was related with the averaged guesses that the perceivers made 
DERXWWKHWDUJHWV¶(4Vr (88) = .39, p < .001. The significant correlation between the 
EQs that perceivers guessed about themselves and guessed about the targets survived 
even when the actual EQs of the perceivers were partialled out, r (88) = .39, p < .001. 
As with Study 1, it seems that the EQ the perceivers believed they had impacted 
upon how they rated the targets. In Study 1, this belief would have been based on 
information of EQ fed back to the perceiver before he/she made judgments about the 
WDUJHWV,Q6WXG\LQWKHDEVHQFHRIVXFKIHHGEDFNWKHSHUFHLYHUV¶EHOLHIDERXWWKHLU
own EQ was based on their own intuition, an intuition which surfaced at the end of 
the procedure when perceivers were invited to disclose what they thought their own 
EQ was. 
Preliminary Analysis ± Judgmental Confidence   
In addition to estimating the EQ of targets and themselves, perceivers also 
registered how confident they were in making these estimations. The average 
confidence estimations of EQ judgments about the targets were 4.97 (SD =. 58), 5.09 
(SD = .66) and 4.96 (SD = .71) in the Conversation, Joke and Screen Test Scenarios 
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respectively, and the average judgmental confidence RIWKHSHUFHLYHUV¶RZQ(4ZDV
5.27 (SD = 1.11), 5.47 (SD = .82) and 5.07 (SD = 1.31) in the corresponding three 
scenarios. All six mean confidence values were higher than the middle point of the 
rating scale according to one-sample t tests, suggesting that perceivers had a rather 
positive feeling about being able to guess EQs. Not surprisingly, perceivers were 
significantly more confident of guessing their own EQ than guessing the EQ of the 
targets, t (89) = 2.47, p = .015. However, there was no evidence of a significant 
UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQSHUFHLYHUV¶MXGJPHQWDOFRQILGHQFHDQGWKHLURYHUDOODFFXUDF\LQ
MXGJPHQWVRIWKH(4LQGLFDWHGE\WKHDYHUDJHG¶YDOXHV,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHUHZDV
no evidence to suggest that confident perceivers were any better at guessing EQs 
than perceivers who lacked confidence. 
Main Analysis ± Guessing the EQ of the Target   
7KH DFFXUDF\ RI WKH SHUFHLYHUV¶ UDWLQJV RI WKH WDUJHWV¶ (4V ZDV DQDO\]HG
XVLQJVLJQDOGHWHFWLRQ$VZLWK6WXG\SHUFHLYHUV¶DFFXUDWHMXGJPHQWVRIWKHWDUJHWV¶
EQs on each scale were counted as hits, inaccurate judgments on each EQ scale were 
FRXQWHGDV IDOVH DODUPV DQG WKH LQGH[RI DFFXUDF\ ZDV FRPSXWHGDVG¶ 7DEOH
GLVSOD\VWKHPHDQVRIWKHKLWUDWHVIDOVHDODUPUDWHVG¶YDOXHVLQHDFKFDWHJRU\RIWKH
four-point scale in each condition, and the t values of the one-sample t tests of each 
G¶ 7KH DYHUDJH G¶ DFURVV VFDOHV DQG VFHQDULRV ZDV  SD = .30), which was 
significantly above chance according to a one-sample t test, t (89) = 6.01, p < .001. 
However, as Table 3.2 reveals, perceivers were not uniformly effective in guessing 
the EQs of the targets. As with Study 1, perceivers made systematically correct 
MXGJPHQWV LQGLFDWHGE\G¶ZHOODERYH]HUR LQ WKHFDVHRI ORZ6FDOHDQGKLJK
(Scale 4) EQ, while in all but one case (Scale 2 in the Joke Scenario) there was no 
evidence of systematic judging for targets who were in the middle of the EQ range 
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6FDOHVDQG)LJRIIHUVDVXPPDU\RIWKHVHUHVXOWV3HUFHLYHUV¶SHUIRUPDQFH
in each condition presented a U-VKDSHGSDWWHUQLQZKLFKG¶YDOXHVZHUHKLJKLQWKH
two extremes of EQ scales but low in the two middle EQ score ranges.   
 
Table 3.2. Means (and standard deviations) of hit rates (HR), false alarm rates (FAR), d-SULPHG¶LQ
each EQ scale, along with values of one-VDPSOHWWHVWVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKHDFKG¶LQ6WXG\ 
 Conversation Joke Screen Test 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S1 S2 S3 S4 S1 S2 S3 S4 
HR .14 
(.13) 
.34 
(.15) 
.44 
(.18) 
.36 
(.27) 
.22 
(.20) 
.37 
(.15) 
.38 
(.19) 
.29 
(.22) 
.16 
(.14) 
.35 
(.12) 
.36 
(.17) 
.26 
(.18) 
FAR .10 
(.10) 
.34 
(.12) 
.40 
(.15) 
.16 
(.14) 
.16 
(.13) 
.39 
(.17) 
.39 
(.16) 
.11 
(.09) 
.12 
(.11) 
.36 
(.11) 
.38 
(.12) 
.17 
(.11) 
G¶ .23 
(.44) 
0 
(.39) 
.08 
(.49) 
.78 
(.65) 
.31 
(.42) 
-.17 
(.35) 
-.07 
(.47) 
.72 
(.72) 
.18 
(.42) 
-.01 
(.28) 
-.08 
(.45) 
.33 
(.59) 
t 2.92** .02 .87 6.59*** 3.97*** -2.75* -.85 5.49*** 2.32* -.26 -.96 3.04** 
Note: S1, 2, 3, 4 = Scale 1, Scale 2, Scale 3, and Scale 4. Three groups (n = 30 in each) of perceivers viewed 
targets in one of three scenarios (Conversation, Joke, Screen Test). *. p < .05, **.p < .01, & ***. p < .001; two-
tailed.    
 
 
Fig. 3.3.  Mean d-prime of each scale in each scenario (Conversation, Joke, & Screen Test) in Study 2. 
Error bars represent standard error of the mean.  
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  To examine whether the perceivers differed across scales and scenarios in 
guessing EQ, a 4 × 3 mixed design ANOVA was computed, with the accuracy in the 
four scales as the within-subjects factor and the three scenarios as the between-
VXEMHFWV IDFWRU WKHGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHZDVG¶7KHUHZDV DPDLQ HIIHFW DVVRFLDWHG
with the scales, F (3, 261) = 43.39, p < .001, an interaction between the scales and 
the scenarios, F (6, 261) = 2.64, p = .017, but no main effect of scenario, F (2, 87) = 
2.44, p = .09. Simple effects analyses revealed two things. First, there was a 
significant difference among the three scenarios only on Scale 4, F (2, 87) = 4.18, p 
 $VZHFDQVHHLQ7DEOHDQG)LJG¶YDOXHVZHUHORZHULQWKH6FUHHQ
Test than in the other two scenarios in Scale 4, and this was confirmed by post hoc 
LSD tests: There were significant differences between the Screen Test and the 
Conversation Scenario (p = .009), and between the Screen Test and Joke Scenarios 
(p = .023), but not between the Conversation and Joke Scenarios (p = .74). 
Considering the fact that the Joke Scenario was much shorter than the scenarios of 
Conversation and Screen Test while the latter two scenarios were similar in length, it 
seems that the contents instead of the quantity of the scenario had an effect on 
SHUFHLYHUV¶SHUIRUPDQFHLQJXHVVLQJWDUJHWVZKRVH(4IHOOLQWR6FDOH 
Second, as with Study 1, there were significant differences among the four 
scales and this trend was apparent for each scenario: (Conversation: F (3, 87) = 17.73, 
p < .001; Joke: F (3, 87) = 22.79, p <. 001; Screen Test: F (3, 87) = 6.02, p = .001). 
Post hoc LSD analyVHVFRQILUPHGKLJKHUG¶YDOXHVLQ6FDOHVDQGFRPSDUHGZLWK
Scales 2 and 3 in each of the three scenarios in the following. In the Conversation, 
WKHUH ZDV D PDUJLQDOO\ JUHDWHU G¶ LQ 6FDOH  WKDQ LQ 6FDOH  p = .05) but no 
GLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHG¶LQ6cale 1 and Scale 3, nor between Scale 2 and Scale 3; 
WKHG¶LQ6FDOHZDVVLJQLILFDQWO\JUHDWHUWKDQLQWKHRWKHUWKUHHVFDOHVps < .001). In 
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WKH-RNHWKHG¶LQ6FDOHZDVJUHDWHUWKDQLQ6FDOHp < .001) and Scale 3 (p =. 
WKHG¶LQ6FDOHZDV significantly greater than in Scale 1 (p = .007), Scale 2 (p 
< .001) and Scale 3 (p EXWWKHUHZDVQRGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHG¶LQ6FDOH
DQG 6FDOH  ,Q WKH 6FUHHQ 7HVW WKH G¶ LQ 6FDOH  ZDV JUHDWHU WKDQ LQ 6FDOH  p 
= .037) and Scale 3 (p  EXWWKHUHZDVQRGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHG¶LQ6FDOH
DQG6FDOHWKHG¶LQ6FDOHZDVJUHDWHUWKDQLQ6FDOHp = .005) and Scale 3 (p 
= .003) but there was no difference between Scale 1 and Scale 4.  
In summary, in Study 2, perceivers made systemically accurate judgments of 
EQ of the targets across different situations. As such, it seems that perceivers have 
WKHDELOLW\ WR LGHQWLI\RWKHUV¶HPSDWKLF WUDLW WKH\DUHHVSHFLDOO\JRRGDW LGHQWLI\LQJ
those wKRKDYHH[WUHPH(4IURPWKRVHZKRKDYHDYHUDJH(4*HQHUDOO\SHUFHLYHUV¶
performance was not influenced by the situations of the targets (Conversation, Joke, 
Screen Test) though they performed better in Scale 4 in the Conversation and Joke 
Scenarios than in the Screen Test Scenario.  
3.4 General Discussion  
3.4.1 How Well Can People Form a )LUVW,PSUHVVLRQRI2WKHUV¶(PSDWKLF7UDLWV
after Watching a Short Video? 
 Overall, the two studies have revealed the following results. First, after 
watching a video clip lasting between three and thirty seconds, either with sound or 
without sound, perceivers demonstrated above-chance accuracy in making a first-
impression judgment on how empathizing a target person was by identifying the 
WDUJHW¶V (4 6HFRQG SHUFHLYHUV Zere especially accurate in identifying the targets 
who either had low or high EQ, but in most cases failed to recognize the targets with 
an average EQ (Scales 2 & 3). Study 2 further confirmed that accuracy of the 
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MXGJPHQWVRIWKH(4UHIOHFWVSHUFHLYHUV¶Dbility to infer stable empathic traits rather 
than a temporary empathic state. In addition, Study 2 revealed no difference in 
overall accuracy across the situations experienced by each target, but displayed 
worse performance in the scenario of Screen Test when perceivers guessed the 
targets with an EQ within Scale 4, though judgmental accuracy in Scale 4 in the 
Screen Test Scenario was still well above chance.  
Previous studies on mentalising have shown that people are capable of 
identifying empathic states of another person: Based on thin slices of observable 
behaviour, they can infer the contents of thoughts, feelings and emotions that another 
person experienced (e.g., Ickes, et al., 1990; Ickes et al., 2000, for a review, Hall & 
Mast, 2007; Zaki et al., 2008; 2009), and retrodict what had happened to another 
person (Pillai, et al., 2012) or what gift had been received by the other person 
(Cassidy et al., in press). The findings of the present two studies have extended these 
ILQGLQJVE\VKRZLQJSHRSOH¶VVXFcess in inferring empathy as a stable psychological 
trait measurable with the EQ. The research presented here empirically links 
judgmental accuracy of empathic traits with research into mentalising using a novel 
methodology with high ecological validity. Unlike laboratory-based behaviours, such 
as actions depicted in sentences, posed facial expressions, or deliberate performance, 
the behaviouU VDPSOHVXVHG LQ6WXGLHVDQGZHUHJDWKHUHG IURP WDUJHWV¶QDWXUDO
behaviours that were observed under various naturalistic circumstances. Thus, we 
can assume that these behaviouU VDPSOHV ZHUH UHSUHVHQWDWLYH RI WDUJHWV¶ RUGLQDU\
behaviour patterns in everyday life. That is, instead of using artificial trait-implying 
behaviour, the behaviour samples in the two studies reflect relatively mundane 
events that might happen to everybody in the real world. In addition, by asking 
perceivers to directly guess how empathizing they thought the target was, the 
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procedure allows perceivers to make their own judgments about the targeW¶V(4EXW
DOVRSHUPLWVDGLUHFWFRPSDULVRQEHWZHHQWKHSHUFHLYHUV¶MXGJPHQWVDQGWKHWDUJHWV¶
actual EQs. This procedure closely resembles the way in which ordinary people 
make judgments about psychological traits of one another in real life.  
 Although previous studies on accuracy in personality judgments offered 
evidence for an overall level of accuracy in some personality dimensions, they have 
SURYLGHG QR H[DPLQDWLRQ IRU SHRSOH¶V ILQH-grained abilities to identify different 
levels (e.g., low, average, & high) of the same trait. Instead of using correlation 
analysis, this research adopted a more sensitive and powerful SDT method to analyze 
WKHSHUFHLYHUV¶ MXGJPHQWDODFFXUDF\DQG IRXQG WKDW SHUFHLYHUV FRXOGQRWJXHVV
the targets who had average EQ falling into Scales 2 and 3, and (2) perceivers 
seemed well-adapted to detecting the targets whose EQ was low or high. 
 Why did perceivers fail to identify the targets within Scale 2 and Scale 3? Is 
this result caused by artifact in the way Scale 2 and Scale 3 were derived from but a 
VLQJOH(4FDWHJRU\RUGRHVLWJHQXLQHO\UHIOHFWSHUFHLYHUV¶OLPLWDWLRQVLQUHFRJQL]LQJ
the targets who have average empathic ability? As reported in the method section of 
Study 1, in order to maintain a four-point scale, we split the original average EQ 
scale into Scale 2 and Scale 3; is there a possibility that such a sub-categorization has 
no psychological value and that perceivers are thus unable to make a distinction 
(between Scale 2 and Scale 3) that does not really exist? If this explanation is correct, 
then perceivers should be able to detect the average EQ when combing Scale 2 and 
Scale 3 to a single average EQ scale. To examine this possibility, we combined the 
performance in Scales 2 and 3 in Studies 1 and 2 respectively WKHPHDQFRPELQHGG¶
M = .04, SD = .70 for Study 1; M = -.07, SD = .34 for Study 2). One-sample t tests 
GLG QRW VKRZ VLJQLILFDQW GLIIHUHQFHV EHWZHHQ WKH FRPELQHG G¶ YDOXH DQG ]HUR LQ
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either of study (Study 1: t (59) = .42, p = .68; Study 2: t (89) = -1.78, p = .08). In the 
case of Study 2, p value approaches significance but the trend is in the wrong 
direction. In other words, the trend was for participants to perform below chance in 
Study 2 for the combined middle scale. Thus, the findings in Studies 1 and 2 indeed 
have revealed that perceivers were limited in guessing the targets who were average 
in empathizing.  
 Perceivers seemed to be good at identifying who lacks capacity for 
empathizing and who is more capacity for empathizing. Why would this pattern 
occur in forming a first impression of empathy? There might be two potential 
explanations. First, targets who had a strong or weak empathizing trait might 
correspondingly demonstrate more overt behaviour signs. For example, a low 
empathic target might show a less expressive face, less bodily movements, and weak 
vocalization. In contrast, a high empathic target might give a happy smiling face 
after hearing a joke, make more bodily gestures and generally be more demonstrative. 
Observing these signs, perceiveUV FRXOG ³VHH´ZKRKDVKLJKHPSDWK\DQGZKRKDV
low empathy. For example, in hearing the empathizing story described in Study 1, an 
empathic target might show a sympathetic face while a less empathic target might 
demonstrate negative facial expressions; based on such conspicuous behavioral cues 
from the targets, perceivers could stand a chance of distinguishing the targets who 
had unusual empathic traits from ordinary persons.  
 Meanwhile, it is worthy to note that the present studies involved emotion-
eliciting scenarios (such as hearing an empathizing story or telling a joke) but also 
low emotion situations, such as a mundane conversation or reading a standard text 
for the screen test. Even in these less emotionally arousing situations, perceivers still 
were effective in recognizing those who were high or low in empathy. Nevertheless, 
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something about those with low and high empathy might reveal itself to the 
perceivers. 
An alternative possibility is that even if those with low and high empathy do 
not give any more clues to observers about their empathic status, compared with 
those with average empathy, perceivers are nevertheless perhaps especially well 
adapted to detecting high and low empathy. Imagine you were traveling in an 
unfamiliar place where people speak their native languages and have their own 
customs and cultures. If you were good at recognizing who is empathic and who is 
not, then you would probably know who you should ask for help and who you should 
avoid, and thus you might have more chance to survive when facing difficulties. 
Researchers have argued that a capacity for empathy is associated with moral 
development (Hoffman, 2000; Batson, Lishner, Carpenter, Dulin, Harjusola-Wevv, 
Stocks et al., 2003); moreover, a capacity for empathy predicts peoSOH¶V SURVRFLDO
behaviors, such as altruism (Hoffman, 1984; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990; Batson, 
1991), helping (Batson, O'Quin, Fultz, Vanderplas, & Isen, 1983) and cooperation 
(Rumble et al., 2010). Taking these factors into consideration, perhaps it is plausible 
to suppose that people might have evolved to be able to recognize those who have 
either strong or weak empathizing in the social life.  
3.4.2 Assumed Similarity  
 According to simulation theory, people engage in reasoning about the minds 
of others by PHQWDOO\ VLPXODWLQJRWKHUV¶PHQWDO VWDWHV DQGE\SURMHFWLQJ WKHLURZQ
mental states into others. For example, people predict how other people feel in 
emotionally arousing situations usually based on their predictions of how they 
themselves would feel in the same situations (Boven & Loewenstein, 2003). 
Generally it seems that perceivers presume others have similar personalities to 
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WKHPVHOYHVDVVXJJHVWHGE\FRUUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQSHUFHLYHUV¶VHOI-report personalities 
and their ratings on the corresponding personalities of others (e.g., Cronbach, 1955). 
When information about another person is insufficient and limited, perceivers may 
XWLOL]HWKHLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHPVHOYHVWR³ILOOLQWKHJDSV´5HDG\&ODUN:DWVRQ
& Wsterhouse, 2000) and project their own traits onto the other person.  
The results of the two studies seemed to reveal an effect of assumed 
similarity when forming a first impression of empathy. In study 1, this projection 
HIIHFWZDVLQGLFDWHGDVDFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQSHUFHLYHUV¶UDWLQJVRIWKH WDUJHWV¶(4V
DQGSHUFHLYHUV¶DFWXDO(4VZKHUHDVLQ6WXG\WKH(4VWKDWSHUFHLYHUVMXGJHGDERXW
the targets were associated with the EQs that perceivers guessed about themselves. In 
other words, Study 2 shows that how perceivers think of themselves as an 
empathizing person affects how they perceive other people in terms of empathizing. 
If a perceiver believes he is high in empathic capacity, then he tends to judge other 
people to be high also; if a perceiver thinks he is low, then he is prone to evaluate 
other people as having low empathy as well.  
3.4.3 Confidence and the Judgment of EQ    
How confident do you think you have formed an accurate first impression of 
someone else? This question is important and likely adaptive in that judgmental 
confidence would influence the consequential effects of judgmental accuracy, such 
as in effective interpersonal functioning (Carlson, Furr, & Vazire, 2010). For 
example, if you were confident in your intuition of someone and it proved to be 
inaccurate, you might make the mistake of trusting the wrong person; if an employer 
were confident of his judgment of a candidate but that judgment was in fact incorrect, 
then he might have made the mistake of recruiting an inappropriate employee. 
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In a study by Carlson and colleagues (2010), after engaging in a 5-minute 
conversation, two unacquainted participants were asked to evaluate the Big Five 
personality traits of their partner and themselves, and then were asked to rate 
confidence in their first impressions of the partner using a 7-point scale. The results 
showed that perceivers who had more confidence in the accuracy of their first 
impressions of others were actually more accurate. However, Study 2 reported here 
VKRZV WKDW WKH RYHUDOO DFFXUDF\ RI SHUFHLYHUV¶ ILUVW-impression judgments of the 
WDUJHWV¶ (4V ZDV QRW VLJQLILFDQWO\ FRUUHODWHG ZLWK SHUFHLYHUV¶ FRQILGHQFH LQ VXFK
judgments. The inconsistency between this study and Carlson et al. (2010) may result 
from a different calculation of accuracy in personality judgments: Carlson et al. 
indexed accuracy using a Pearson correlation while the current study used the more 
sensitive SDT method to indicate accuracy.  
On the other hand, Ames, Kammrath, Suppes, and Bolger (2010) suggest a 
dissociation between accuracy and confidence in thin-slice impressions: In three 
studies of first impressions based on photos and videos, they examined the accuracy 
of first impressions of the Big Five personalities as well as corresponding reports of 
confidence, and found that perceivers showed a limited ability to intuit which of their 
first impressions were more accurate than others. These results are consistent with 
our findings in Study 2, both of which tend to support the conclusion drawn from the 
study by Realo et al. (2003), suggesting that self-reported mindreading ability is not 
associated with actual performance in the mindreading tasks. Those who believe that 
they are good at mindreading are generally neither significantly better than others in 
the recognition of emotions expressed in face or speech, nor superior in their 
estimation of personality traits of a stranger (Realo et al., 2003).  
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In addition, the results in Study 2 demonstrated that perceivers were inclined 
to trust their beliefs about first impressions of empathizing they made and also have 
fairly high confidence in the self-ratings of their own empathizing; indeed, they 
WHQGHGWREHPRUHFRQILGHQWRIJXHVVLQJWKHLURZQ(4WKDQJXHVVLQJWKHWDUJHWV¶(4
These findings seem to confirm some of our intuitive impressions of how people 
perceive others in the social world. First, people generally believe they know 
themselves better than others; second, once a judgment is made, either about the self 
or about others, people to some extent tend to trust the judgments even when these 
judgments are only based on thin slices of observable behaviour. 
3.5 Conclusion  
 In conclusion, this chapter reported two studies based on a large sample of 
video stimuli, demonstrating that people can guess how empathizing another person 
is after viewing a short video spanning from several seconds to thirty seconds, and 
they are especially effective in guessing those who are either low or high in empathic 
capacity. In addition, how people perceive themselves as empathizing has an effect 
on their judgments of the empathy of another person. Finally, people generally are 
aware of their perception of themselves and others when it comes to making 
judgments about empathic traits, though they are more confident of self-perception 
than other-perception. Meanwhile, their judgmental confidence does not predict their 
judgmental accuracy of empathic traits.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Guessing Empathy After Brief Exposure to Photographs or 
a Brief Sample of Sound       
4.1 Introduction   
 In the social world, we often form an intuitive impression on other people in 
many ways. We might happen to encounter and communicate with a person; we 
might happen to catch thin slices of behaviour; we might also happen to spot a 
photograph or hear snippets of the voice of someone else as in a telephone 
conversation. From whatever channels we get information of other people, we would 
probably have formed an impression on them. Some of our intuitions based on such 
sparse information may be reliable while others may be inaccurate (Ames et al., 
2010).  
In Chapter 3, based on two studies investigating first impressions of empathic 
traits, it has been suggested that perceivers can to some degree guess the EQs of the 
targets after watching a sample of behaviour lasting only a few seconds, and they are 
especially good at identifying the targets who were low or high in empathic capacity. 
How did perceivers infer the empathic capacity of the targets? Perhaps it is necessary 
for perceivers to see an animation of the behaviour of the target. Another possibility 
is that perceivers can make accurate assessments even in the absence of seeing an 
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DQLPDWLRQ,WVHHPVIDLUWRDVVXPHWKDWWKHWDUJHW¶VEHKDYLRur reveals their empathic 
capacity but a still photograph of the target engaging in some kind of behaviour 
might be sufficient for perceivers to make inferences accurately.  
If animation of the behaviour is necessary for making an accurate judgment 
of the EQ, then perceivers should not be able to accurately guess the EQs of the 
targets when the actions are presented in static form, such as the still photographs of 
a target performing a certain activity. If behaviour of the target (whether or not 
animated) plays an essential role in allowing the perceiver to form an accurate 
impression of empathy, then perceivers should be equally good at guessing the EQs 
of the targets whether the behaviour is presented in dynamic or static form. 
Conversely, if still images of the targets not engaged in some kind of behaviour 
provide sufficient information, then perceives should be able to draw inferences 
about empathic traits even when the image does not give any information about 
behaviour (as in a passport photograph). Study 3 and Study 4 were designed to 
explore these possibilities, and examine how well perceivers can guess the EQ after 
viewing pictures for several seconds.  
Finally, how important is sound? Would perceivers be able to guess the 
empathic capacity of the target merely after hearing the target speaking for a few 
seconds? Study 5 addressed this question. 
4.2 Study 3 
 ,QRUGHUWRH[DPLQHZKHWKHUSHUFHLYHUV¶FDSDELOLW\RILQIHUULQJHPSDWKLFWUDLWV
is based on the animation of the stimuli or the actions of the targets, perceivers were 
DVNHGWRJXHVVWKHWDUJHW¶V(4ZKLOHHLWKHUYLHZLQJDVKRUWYLGHRRUZDWFKLQJWKUHH
sequential photographs taken from the same video. If the animation was critical and 
sufficient for making an accurate judgment of the EQ, then perceivers should have 
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difficulty in guessing the EQs of the targets while having access to only static 
photographs.   
4.2.1 Method 
Summary  
For the sake of simplicity we only used the Joke Scenario in the present study 
because the results in Study 2 were very clear despite the fact that the video clips of 
target behaviour for the Joke Scenario were much shorter than for the other two 
scenarios. A 2 × 4 mixed design was adopted, with the two information channels 
(video & picture) as the between-subjects factor and the four EQ scales (based on 
WDUJHWV¶UHVSRQVHVWRWKH(4TXHVWLRQQDLUHDVWKHZLWKLQ-subjects factor. After either 
viewing the video clip or the three sequential photographs taken from the video clip, 
the perceiver was required to guess the EQ of the target.  
Participants 
Sixty students (27 females and 33 males) aged 19 to 27 years (mean age 21 
years, SD = 2.08) were recruited from the University of Nottingham Malaysia 
Campus. To ensure that the perceivers were unacquainted with the targets, they were 
shown photographs of the targets (taken from the videos) and asked if they knew any 
of them before proceeding to the task of empathic trait judgments. Sixteen additional 
participants who declared that they did were excluded. Perceivers were randomly 
divided into two groups of 30 to view either video clips or photographs.   
Materials and procedure 
The 47 video clips in the Joke Scenario taken from Study 2 (see Chapter 3) 
were used with sound muted. The set of photographs was derived from these same 
videos. For each target, three photographs were extracted from his/her video clip, 
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with each photograph corresponding to the beginning, the middle and the end of the 
joke video. Each photograph was trimmed in the software Drawing to standardize the 
VL]H 8VLQJ WKH VRIWZDUH :LQGRZV 0RYLH 0DNHU HDFK WDUJHW¶V WKUHH SKRWRJUDSKV
were combined into one single video in which the three pictures were presented 
sequentially for three seconds each. Thirty perceivers viewed 47 animated video 
clips (the video condition) and another 30 perceivers viewed 47 photograph video 
clips (the photograph condition). All the video stimuli were displayed in 800 × 650 
pixels on the HP ElieBook 8460p laptop using the software PsychoPy (1.74.00 
windows version). The procedure was the same as that in Study 1 (see Chapter 3) 
except that the perceivers did not receive any feedback of their own EQ.  
4.2.2 Results and Discussion  
Preliminary Analysis ± The EQ Scores of the Perceivers and the Targets 
7KHSHUFHLYHUV¶DYHUDJH(4VZHUHLQWKHYLGHRFRQGLWLRQSD = 10.66, 
ranging from 19 to 68) and 39.66 in the picture condition (SD = 11.03, ranging from 
14 to 57). Preliminary analyses did not identify any differences between the average 
EQs of the targets (M = 38.43, SD = 9.13, ranging from 19 to 58) and the perceivers 
and neither was there any evidence of difference between the two groups of 
perceivers in their average EQ scores. 
Main Analysis ± Guessing the EQ of the Target  
$VZLWKWKHSUHYLRXVVWXGLHVUHSRUWHGLQ&KDSWHUSHUFHLYHUV¶JXHVVHVRIWKH
WDUJHWV¶(4VZHUHFRGHGXVLQJVLJQDOGHWHFWLRQ7DEOHGLVSOD\VWKHPHDQVRIWKH
hit rates, false alarPUDWHVG¶YDOXHVLQHDFKFDWHJRU\RIWKHIRXU-point scale in each 
condition, and t values of one-sample t WHVWVIRUHDFKG¶7KHDYHUDJHG¶DFURVVVFDOHV
in the video condition was .22 (SD = .28) and the average in the picture condition 
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was .15 (SD = .22). Both values were significantly higher than zero, suggesting that 
overall perceivers could systematically estimate the EQs of the targets: Video: t (29) 
= 4.24, p < .001; Picture: t (29) = 3.71, p = .001. Table 4.1 shows a pattern of 
performance that is consistent with the previous two studies, where perceivers made 
systematically accurate judgments in the cases of low (Scale 1) and high (Scale 4) 
EQ. This pattern maintained for the picture as well as the video conditions. There 
was no evidence of perceivers systematically estimating the EQs of targets who were 
in the middle ranges (Scales 2 and 3) except in one case (scale 2 in the picture 
condition). These results were also quite clear from Fig.4.1, which depicts the 
distribution of accuracy in the conditions of video and photograph across the four 
scales, demonstrating U- shaped trends, like Fig.3.3 in Study 2 (see Chapter 3).  
 
Table 4.1. Means (and standard deviations) of hit rates (HR), false alarm rates (FAR), d-SULPHG¶LQ
each EQ scale, and t values of one-VDPSOHWWHVWVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKHDFKG¶LQ6WXG\ 
 Video Picture 
 Scale 1 Scale 2 Scale 3 Scale 4 Scale 1 Scale 2 Scale 3 Scale 4 
HR .34 
(.19) 
.36 
(.14) 
.30 
(.16) 
.25 
(.21) 
.34 
(.19) 
.31 
(.14) 
.29 
(.12) 
.25 
(.15) 
FAR .19 
(.09) 
.39 
(.10) 
.33 
(.11) 
.10 
(.07) 
.21 
(.11) 
.37 
(.11) 
.32 
(.10) 
.13 
(.09) 
G¶ .44 
(.47) 
-.09 
(.41) 
-.12 
(.48) 
.63 
(.58) 
.41 
(.42) 
-.19 
(.43) 
-.12 
(.47) 
.52 
(.43) 
t 5.06** -1.18 -.1.30 5.94** 5.32** -2.44* -1.42 6.59** 
Note: Two groups (n=30 in each group) of perceivers each viewed targets in one of two conditions (Video, 
Picture); *.p < .05, & **. p < .001, two-tailed.     
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Fig. 4.1.  Mean d-prime of each scale in each condition (Video ± Picture) in Study 3. Error bars 
represent standard error of the mean.  
 
To examine whether perceivers performed differently across EQ scales and 
conditions in guessing the EQs of the targets, a 2 × 4 mixed design ANOVA was 
computed, with the two conditions (Video ± Picture) as the between-subjects factor 
and the four EQ scales as the within-VXEMHFWVIDFWRUWKHGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHZDVG¶
There was a main effect associated with the scales, F (3, 261) = 37.84, p < .001, but 
neither a main effect of condition, F (1, 58) = 1.08, p = .30, nor an interaction 
between the scales and the conditions, F (3, 174) = .20, p = .90. Post hoc LSD tests 
RIWKHPDLQHIIHFWDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHVFDOHVUHYHDOHGKLJKHUG¶YDOXHVLQ6FDOHWKDQ
in Scale 2 (p < .001) and Scale 3 (p $OVRG¶YDOXHVZHUHKLJKHULQ6FDOH
than in Scale 2 (p < .001) and Scale 3 (p < .001); there was no difference between 
Scale 1 and Scale 4 and neither was there a difference between Scale 2 and Scale 3. 
In summary, Study 3 replicated the results of the earlier two studies: The 
perceivers generally performed well above-chance in guessing the EQs of the targets, 
and were especially effective in making judgments about the targets who had high or 
low EQ. These basic findings were supplemented with a surprising new result. 
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Namely, perceivers were also able to correctly guess the EQs of the targets while 
merely viewing three photographs of each target for several seconds. Indeed, there 
was no evidence suggesting that perceivers performed any better in the video than in 
the picture condition. In other words, observing limited information based on 
pictures seems sufficient for perceivers to accurately form a first impression on how 
empathizing another person is. Granted, the still photographs suggested behaviour in 
VRIDUDVWKH\ZHUHFDSWXUHGIURPWKUHHPRPHQWVRIWKHWDUJHWV¶DFWLYHO\HQJDJLQJLQ
a task of telling a joke, which may be quite different from what we might see in a 
passport photograph. Perhaps the latter would not provide sufficient information for 
a perceiver to successfully estimate EQ, raising a question that needs to be addressed 
in future research. In contrast, the photographs taken from the Joke Scenario might 
have conveyed some revealing behaviours of the targets, such as facial expressions 
and bodily gestures. These findings thus raise the possibility that it is the behaviour 
UDWKHUWKDQWKHDQLPDWLRQWKDWOHGWRSHUFHLYHUV¶DFFXUDF\LQPDNLQJMXGJPHQWVRI(4
whether the behaviour is presented in dynamic streams or in still photographs.  
4.3 Study 4 
The results of Study 3 were surprising in suggesting that perceivers were 
systematically able to identify targets with high and low EQ after looking for a few 
seconds at three still pictures taken from video clips. On what basis were perceivers 
able to make correct judgments? Is it that a still image of the target in any pose, 
including a neutral pose, providing sufficient information to identify high and low 
EQ? In other words, is it possible that perceivers made accurate judgments of EQ 
based only on the facial appearance of the target instead of behavioral cues suggested 
by the facial expressions of the target? Alternatively, is it that a photograph capturing 
WKH DSH[ RI WKH WDUJHW¶V H[SUHVVLRQ DV Ke or she delivers the punch line of a joke 
  96 
uniquely revealed those who had high and low EQ? If the former, then perceivers 
should perform well in identifying targets with high and low EQ whether the still 
picture was at a point when the target delivered the punch line or at an earlier point 
in the video when we might suppose the target was less expressive. If the latter, then 
perceivers should be able to identify cases of high and low EQ on condition that the 
still photograph was at a point when the punch line was delivered but not at any other 
point. The purpose of Study 4 was to clarify this matter. 
4.3.1 Method  
Summary 
Two sets of photographs drawn from the joke video clips were created, 
corresponding to the first and the last moments of each video clip of each target 
when they read the joke. A 2 × 4 mixed design was adopted, with the two conditions 
(first and last photographs) as the between-subjects factor and the four EQ scales as 
the within-subjects factor. Perceivers were randomly assigned to view the first 
photograph or the last photograph, and then were asked to judge the EQ of the target.  
Participants 
Sixty students (27 females and 33 males) between 18 years old and 25 years 
old (mean age 21 years, SD = 1.37) were recruited from the University of Monash 
Sunway Campus. Perceivers were randomly assigned to two groups of 30 to view an 
array of photographs either in the first or the last photograph condition. After 
completing the task, the perceivers were asked whether they had previously met any 
of the targets. All the perceivers reported no prior acquaintance with any targets.    
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Materials and Procedure 
Two groups of 47 photographs were taken from the videos in the Joke 
Scenario. For each target, two photographs were extracted, in each of which the 
target was either in the beginning of reading the joke or at the end of the joke (the 
punch line) (see Fig. 4.2). To match the endurance of the joke videos, the two 
photographs in each condition appeared for 9 seconds in total. All the picture stimuli 
were displayed in full colour on the 14-inch HP laptop using the software PsychoPy 
(1.74.00 windows version). The procedure was similar to that in Study 3. 
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The first photograph  
 
The last photograph 
Fig. 4.2. An example of the first and the last pictures in Study 4.  
 
4.3.2 Results and Discussion   
Preliminary Analysis ± The EQ Scores of the Perceivers and the Targets 
The perceivers assigned to the first photograph condition had a mean EQ of 
38.17 (SD = 10.73, ranging from 19 to 54) while those assigned to the last 
photograph condition had a mean of 35.13 (SD = 8.90, ranging from 18 to 54). 
Preliminary analyses did not reveal any differences between the mean EQs of the 
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targets and the perceivers and neither was there any evidence of difference between 
the two groups of perceivers in their mean EQ scores.   
Main Analysis ± Guessing the EQ of the Target  
The procedure of coding based on signal detection was the same as that used 
in the previous studies. Table 4.2 presents the means of the hit rates, false alarm rates, 
G¶YDOXHVLQHDFKFDWHJRU\RIWKHIRXU-point scale in each condition, and t values of 
one-sample t WHVWV IRUHDFKG¶7KHDYHUDJHG¶DFURVVVFDOHV LQ WKHILUVWSKRWRJUDSK
condition was .06 (SD = .25) ± not significantly above chance; in the last 
SKRWRJUDSKV FRQGLWLRQ WKH DYHUDJH G¶ ZDV  SD = .25) and this value was 
significantly above chance according to a one-sample t test (t (29) = 3.82, p = .001). 
As we can see from Table 4.2 and Fig. 4.3, perceivers were better at identifying the 
targets with low (Scale 1) or high EQ (Scale 4) than those with average EQ in the 
last photograph condition. In the first photograph condition, where perceivers viewed 
the photograph capturing the beginning moment of the target reading the joke, this 
pattern was diminished. 
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Table 4.2. Means (and standard deviations) of hit rates (HR), false alarm rates (FAR), d-SULPHG¶LQ
each EQ scale, along with t values of one-VDPSOHWWHVWVRIHDFKG¶LQ6WXG\ 
 First Photograph Condition Last Photograph Condition 
Scale 1 Scale 2 Scale 3 Scale 4 Scale 1 Scale 2 Scale 3 Scale 4 
HR .15 
(.13) 
.40 
(.15) 
.37 
(.15) 
.17 
(.11) 
.28 
(.22) 
.33 
(.14) 
.35 
(.17) 
.24 
(.15) 
FAR .14 
(.10) 
.40 
(.10) 
.36 
(.12) 
.13 
(.08) 
.15 
(.11) 
.39 
(.12) 
.35 
(.12) 
.13 
(.08) 
G¶ .09 
(.35) 
-.03 
(.36) 
-.01 
(.38) 
.19 
(.54) 
.44 
(.40) 
-.19 
(.39) 
-.04 
(.42) 
.47 
(.42) 
t 1.44 -.39 -.18 1.97 6.02** -2.64* -.56 6.20** 
Note: Two groups (n=30 in each group) of perceivers each viewed targets in one of two conditions; *.p = .01,   
**. p < .001; two-tailed.      
 
 
 
Fig. 4.3.  Mean d-prime of each scale in each condition in Study 4. Error bars represent standard error 
of the mean.  
 
A 2 × 4 mixed design ANOVA was carried out, with the two photograph 
conditions as the between-subjects factor and the four EQ scales as the within-
VXEMHFWV IDFWRU WKHGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHZDVG¶7KHUHZDV DPDLQ HIIHFW DVVRFLDWHG
with the scales, F (3, 174) = 19.64, p < .001, a main effect of condition, F (1, 58) = 
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13.35, p = .001, and an interaction between the scales and the conditions, F (3, 174) 
= 6.31, p < .001. Simple-effects analyses revealed the following. First, the significant 
effect associated with the four EQ scales was only found in the last photograph 
condition, F (3, 87) = 24.02, p < .001. Post hoc LSD analyses in the last photograph 
condition confirmed greater accuracy in Scales 1 and 4 as opposed to Scales 2 and 3 
(ps DQGWKHUHZDVQRHYLGHQFHRIGLIIHUHQFHLQG¶EHWZHHQ6FDOHVDQGp 
= .60) nor was there any evidence of difference between Scale 2 and Scale 3 (p 
 6HFRQGDVVKRZQLQ7DEOHDQG)LJWKHG¶YDOXHVZHUHPXFKKLJKHULQ
the last photograph condition than in the first photograph condition in Scale 1 (t (58) 
= 3.59, p = .001) and Scale 4 (t (58) = 2.27, p = .027); there was no difference 
between the two conditions in Scale 2 and Scale 3.   
In summary, the results in the last photograph condition replicated the same 
U-shaped pattern we found in the previous studies. However, the evidence for such a 
U-shaped pattern was not compelling for the first photograph condition. It seems 
therefore that LQIRUPDWLRQIURPWKHWDUJHW¶VGHOLYHU\RIWKHSXQFKOLQHRIWKHMRNHZDV
sufficient for perceivers to infer high and low EQ; information of a neutral kind from 
a photograph where the target was merely reading text before he or she reached the 
punch line aSSDUHQWO\ ZDV QRW UHYHDOLQJ RI WKH WDUJHW¶V (4 VWDWXV ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV
ZKHQDVWDWLFSLFWXUHLQYROYHVDWDVNSHUIRUPHGE\DSHUVRQDQGGHSLFWVWKHSHUVRQ¶V
actions such as facial expressions and bodily movements, perceivers have an 
opportunity to be able to guess the empathic capacity of the person, whether it is high 
or low. In comparison, in observing a picture that is less related to any activity or 
demonstrates only neutral poses, such as a passport photograph, or the photograph 
capturing the very first moment of telling a joke, perceivers have little access to 
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behavioral cues and can not determine who is more empathising and who is less 
empathising.  
Taken together, Study 3 and Study 4 demonstrate that perceivers can 
accurately make judgments of targets who were low or high in empathy after briefly 
observing behaviour, and performance is equally good whether the visual cues are 
still or animated. These results help us to rule out an alternative explanation of the 
successful performance of perceivers. It could have been that people construct their 
images and create their persona such that they were perceived as either strong or 
weak in empathizing. If so, perceivers should still be able to detect who has high EQ 
and who has low EQ after being exposed to still images that do not suggest 
behaviour. However, the data in Study 4 do not support this explanation. Instead, it 
VHHPV WKDW SHUFHLYHUV UHO\ RQ LQIRUPDWLRQ DERXW WKH WDUJHW¶V EHKDYLRur when 
estimating empathic capacity.  
4.4 Study 5 
The previous four stuGLHV GHPRQVWUDWHG SHUFHLYHUV¶ FDSDFLW\ IRU LQIHUULQJ
empathic traits on the basis of visual behaviour cues. Would perceivers also be able 
to identify who has high EQ and who has low EQ after listening to the target talking 
for a few seconds? Previous studies have indicated that people can sometimes predict 
RWKHUV¶ GDLO\ EHKDYLRurs after hearing fragments of sound unobtrusively recording 
WKHLU GDLO\ OLYHV +ROOHUDQ 0HKO 	 /HYLWW  SHRSOH FDQ DOVR LQIHU RWKHUV¶
emotions while hearing them talking about their life experiences (Zaki, Bolger, & 
2FKVQHU+RZHYHU LI WKH WDONLQJGRHVQRW UHODWH WRDQ LQGLYLGXDO¶VSHUVRQDO
life but is merely reading aloud a couple of lines, as in the case of the Joke Scenario, 
would perceivers be able to make an accurate judgment of the EQ of the target? The 
objective of this study was to tackle this question. 
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4.4.1 Method 
 ,Q WKH DWWHPSW WR LGHQWLI\ WKH VFRSH RI HYLGHQFH RI SHUFHLYHUV¶ DELOLW\ WR
estimate the EQ of targets, Study 5 presented a new condition in which perceivers 
could only hear the soundtrack of the Joke Scenario. Is it the case that being able to 
perceive EQ depends on having visual access to the target or is auditory evidence 
sufficient? Some researchers have insisted that the face, especially the eyes, is the 
principal source of psychological information (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, 
Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997). If they are right, then we should expect perceivers 
to be much more accurate in the video than in the auditory conditions that are 
described below. 
Summary 
The video stimuli (Joke Scenario without sound) were those used in Study 2. 
Sound tracks were extracted from these same videos for presentation in the audio 
condition. A 2 × 4 mixed design was adopted, with the two information channels 
(video & audio) as the between-subjects factor and the four EQ scales as the within-
subjects factor. After either viewing the video clip or listening to the target telling a 
joke, the perceiver was required to guess the EQ of the target.  
Participants  
Sixty students (28 females & 32 males) aged 18 to 23 years (mean age 20 
years, SD = 1.60) were recruited from the University of Nottingham Malaysia 
Campus. To ensure that the perceivers were unacquainted with the targets, they were 
shown photographs of the targets and asked if they knew any of them. Twelve who 
responded positively were excluded and replaced by a further 12 who did not know 
the targets, thus giving a working sample of 60. Perceivers were randomly divided 
into two groups of 30 to either view video clips or listen to targets telling a joke.   
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Materials and Procedure  
The 47 video clips in the Joke Scenario of Study 2 were used as the set of 
visual stimuli. The auditory stimuli were separated from the same video clips using 
the MacBook Pro laptop with the software Total Video Converter Pro 3.1.8, thus 
yielding 47 samples of audio stimuli. Thirty perceivers viewed 47 video clips (Video 
Condition) and another 30 heard 47 audio tracks (Audio Condition). The video 
stimuli were displayed in the size of 800 × 650 pixels on the 14-inch HP ElieBook 
8460p laptop using PsychoPy 1.74.00 windows version, and the audio stimuli were 
presented on the 13-inch MacBook Pro laptop using PsychoPy 1.70.00 OSX version. 
The procedure was similar to that in the previous studies. 
4.4.2 Results and Discussion   
Preliminary Analysis ± The EQ Scores of the Perceivers and the Targets 
7KH SHUFHLYHUV¶ DYHUDJH (4 ZDV  LQ WKH YLGHR FRQGLWLRQ SD = 8.30, 
ranging from 22 to 54) and 36.60 in the audio condition (SD = 9.11, ranging from 22 
to 54). Preliminary analyses did not identify any differences between the average 
EQs of the targets and the perceivers and neither was there any evidence of 
difference between the two groups of perceivers in their average EQ scores.  
Main Analysis ± Guessing the EQ of the Target  
$VZLWKWKHFDOFXODWLRQRISUHYLRXVVWXGLHVSHUFHLYHUV¶JXHVVHVRIWKHWDUJHWV¶
EQs were coded using signal detection. Table 4.3 displays the means of the hit rates, 
fDOVHDODUPUDWHVG¶ LQHDFKFDWHJRU\RI WKHIRXU-point scale in each condition, and 
values of one-sample t WHVWV IRUHDFKG¶7KHDYHUDJHG¶DFURVV VFDOHVZDV  SD 
= .23) in the video condition and was .14 (SD = .25) in the audio condition, both of 
which were significantly above chance according to one-sample t tests (Video, t (29) 
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= 6.40, p < .001; Audio, t (29) = 3.14, p = .004), suggesting that in either condition, 
perceivers can make an overall accurate judgment on the EQs of the targets. 
Furthermore, perceivers made systematically correct judgments in the case of low 
(Scale 1) and high (Scale 4) EQ in the video condition, whereas in the audio 
condition perceivers systemically estimated the EQs of targets only in the case of 
high EQ (Scale 4). There was no evidence in either group of perceivers 
systematically estimating the EQ of targets who were in the middle categories 
6FDOHVDQG$VVKRZQLQ)LJRQO\G¶YDOXHVLQWKHYLGHRFRQGLWLRQ\LHOGHG
an apparent U-VKDSHGFXUYHZKLOHG¶YDOXHV LQ the audio condition presented a flat 
horizontal line close to chance level from Scales 1 to 3 and sharply increased in 
Scale 4.  
 
Table 4.3. Means (and standard deviations) of hit rates (HR), false alarm rates (FAR), d-SULPHG¶LQ
each EQ scale, along with t values of one-VDPSOHWWHVWVRIHDFKG¶LQ6WXG\ 
 Video Audio 
Scale 1 Scale 2 Scale 3 Scale 4 Scale 1 Scale 2 Scale 3 Scale 4 
HR .33 
(.24) 
.34 
(.14) 
.33 
(.18) 
.29 
(.17) 
.22 
(.13) 
.34 
(.12) 
.32 
(.14) 
.31 
(.22) 
FAR .16 
(.12) 
.37 
(.11) 
.34 
(.12) 
.12 
(.09) 
.21 
(.13) 
.35 
(.13) 
.30 
(.09) 
.15 
(.11) 
G¶ .54 
(.46) 
-.11 
(.44) 
-.08 
(.50) 
.71 
(.52) 
.0 
(.48) 
-.02 
(.37) 
.01 
(.44) 
.57 
(.55) 
t 6.44* -1.34 -.94 7.52* .01 -.30 .16 5.74* 
Note: Two groups (n=30 in each group) of perceivers each viewed targets in one of two conditions (Video, 
Audio); *. p < .001, two-tailed.      
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Fig. 4.4.  Mean d-prime of each scale in each condition (Video, Audio) in Study 5. Error bars 
represent standard error of the mean.  
 
To examine whether the perceivers performed differently across scales and 
conditions in judging the EQ, a 2 × 4 mixed design ANOVA was computed, with the 
two conditions (Video ± Audio) as the between-subjects factor and the four EQ 
scales as the within-VXEMHFWVIDFWRUWKHGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHZDVG¶7KHUHZDVDPDLQ
effect associated with the scales, F (3, 174) = 29.61, p < .001, a marginally 
significant main effect of condition, F (1, 58) = 4.16, p = .05, and an interaction 
between the scales and the conditions, F (3, 174) = 6.10, p = .001. Simple effects 
analyses revealed two things. First, as with the previous studies, there were 
significant differences among the four scales and this trend was evident for each 
condition: Video Condition, F (3, 87) = 22.73, p < .001; Audio Condition, F (3, 87) 
= 12.17, p 3RVWKRF/6'DQDO\VHVFRQILUPHGKLJKHUG¶YDOXHVLQ6FDOHDQG 
Scale 4 compared with Scales 2 and 3 in the video condition (ps EXWKLJKHUG¶
values only in Scale 4 in the audio condition (ps < .001). Second, as seen in Table 
DQG)LJWKHG¶YDOXHLQ6FDOHZDVPXFKKLJKHULQWKHYLGHRFRQGLWLRQWKDQ
in the audio condition, and an independent-samples t test provided confirmation, t 
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(58) = 4.46, p < .001; there was no difference between video and audio conditions in 
Scale 4. 
7RVXPPDUL]H6WXG\SURYLGHGQHZHYLGHQFHIRUSHUFHLYHUV¶DELOLW\WRPDNH
judgments of empathic traits: Perceivers also systematically identified targets with 
KLJK(4EXWQRWZLWKORZRUPLGGOH(4RQPHUHO\OLVWHQLQJWRWKHWDUJHW¶VYRLFHIRU
about 9 seconds as he or she read aloud a joke. Evidently, perceivers stood a better 
chaQFHRIHVWLPDWLQJ(4LQWKHYLGHRFRQGLWLRQHVSHFLDOO\ZKHQWKHWDUJHW¶V(4ZDV
low.  
How could perceivers form accurate impressions of empathic traits even if 
they only heard a soundtrack spanning less than ten seconds? In the audio condition, 
the contenWRI WKHYHUEDO LQIRUPDWLRQLVQRWDERXW WKHWDUJHWV¶SHUVRQDO OLYHVDQGLV
merely several lines of a joke. Hence, there was no possibility for perceivers to 
obtain information about the life of the targets in making judgments of their EQ; 
instead, the onO\DYDLODEOHLQIRUPDWLRQZDVWKHWDUJHW¶VYRLFHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVVXFKDV
tone pitch, as well as mannerisms, such as laughing. Even based on this scant 
auditory information, overall accuracy of the EQ judgments was still significantly 
above chance though it was slightly lower than the accuracy in the video condition. 
Moreover, on hearing the soundtrack, perceivers performed as well as in the video 
condition when judging the targets with high EQ. These results hence suggest that 
visual information is not the only channel that perceivers might utilize in making 
psychological inferences, and auditory cues can also play a key role in forming an 
accurate first impression of empathic traits, especially in the case of high empathy.  
Why were perceivers able to guess the low empathic targets in the video 
condition but not in the audio condition? In comparison with auditory cues, it seems 
visual cues provided better information, enabling the perceiver to identify the targets 
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who had low empathic capacity. Table 4.4 summarizes the behaviour of the 12 
targets who were deemed to have low EQ and shows how many perceivers correctly 
identified these targets as having low EQ. It seems that targets who smiled 
infrequently, who had few bodily movements and who seldom looked at the camera 
were likely to be accurately perceived as having low EQ, whereas those who 
performed in more positive ways while reading the joke, such as looking at the 
camera, responding to the punch lines of the joke (smiling), and showing more 
bodily gestures, were less likely to be accurately judged as having low empathising 
capacity. Such telltale behaviour would not have been apparent in the audio 
condition and perhaps this is the reason why perceivers were unable to reliably 
estimate low empathising capacity in this condition.    
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7DEOH7KHQXPEHURISHUFHLYHUV¶FRUUHFWMXGJPHQWVRIWKHORZ(4WDUJHWVDQGWKHFRGLQJRIWKH
WDUJHWV¶YLVXDOEHKDYLRUDOFXHVLQWKHYLGHRFRQGLWLRQZLWKRXWVRXQGLQ6Wudy 5 
Target No. Number 
correct out 
of 30 (%) 
Visual behavioral cues 
Look at the 
camera 
Smiling 
while 
telling the 
joke 
Smiling 
after the 
joke 
A expressive 
face 
Bodily 
movements 
16 16 (53.33) No No No Less No 
25 15 (50.00) No No No Less No 
15 13 (43.33) Yes No A little Less No 
33 12 (40.00) Yes No A little Middle No 
1 11 (36.67) No No A little Less No 
14 10 (33.33) No No No Less Middle 
9 9 (30.00) Yes No A little Less No 
39 8 (26.67) Yes Yes A Little Middle Less 
42 7 (23.33) Yes Yes Middle Middle Middle 
31 6 (20) Yes Yes A Little Middle Middle 
17 5 (16.67) Yes Yes More Middle Less 
7 2 (0.06) No No More Less Middle 
 
4. 5 General Discussion  
 The three studies replicated and extended our previous findings of empathic 
trait judgments based on short samples of behaviour. The video conditions in Study 3 
and Study 5 replicated the results of Study 1 and Study 2, suggesting that perceivers 
generally could guess EQ, and were especially good at identifying the targets with 
either low or high EQ. Using a variety of different kinds of information, including 
photographs and sound, the research presented in this chapter has extended the 
HYLGHQFHRISHUFHLYHUV¶DELOLW\WRLQIHUHPSDWKLFWUDLWV7KHUHVXOWVRI6WXGLHVDQG
seem to suggest that the capacity to guess the EQ of the target is based on the 
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behaviour of the target. A neutral image that does not give any information about 
DFWLYLW\GRHVQRWFRQWDLQHQRXJK LQIRUPDWLRQIRU WKHSHUFHLYHU WRJXHVV WKH WDUJHW¶V
EQ. 
 Either visual or auditory informDWLRQRIWKHWDUJHW¶VEHKDYLRur is sufficient for 
perceivers to make an accurate judgment of the EQ though visual information might 
be more effective in helping perceivers to infer which targets have low EQ. How 
could perceivers link the visual and vocal behaviour with empathic traits? According 
to a study by Zaki, Bolger, and Ochsner (2009), perceivers were better at inferring 
WKH WDUJHWV¶DIIHFWZKHQ WKH WDUJHWVZHUHH[SUHVVLYHDQGDOORZHG WKHLU WKRXJKWVDQG
feelings to be read. Is it possible that perceivers linked the observable behaviour cues 
HLWKHUYLVXDORUDXGLWRU\ZLWKWKHWDUJHWV¶H[SUHVVLYLW\DQGDFFRUGLQJO\JXHVVHGWKH
EQ on this basis? To examine this possibility, we carried out two surveys, each 
asking 10 independent judges to evaluate how expressive they thought the target was 
(on a four-point scale, from low expressive to high expressive) after either watching 
the videos of the Joke Scenario (without sound) or hearing the sound extracted from 
the same videos. There was no difference of the HYDOXDWLRQ RI WKH WDUJHWV¶
expressivity between the conditions of video and sound (Video: M = 2.10, SD = .70; 
Audio: M = 2.21, SD = .64). Moreover, there were significant correlations between 
SHUFHLYHUV¶ DYHUDJH DVVHVVPHQWV RI (4 M = 2.38, SD = .34) and jXGJHV¶ PHDQ
ratings of expressivity in the video condition (r = .70, p < .001), and between 
SHUFHLYHUV¶DYHUDJHHYDOXDWLRQRI(4M = 2.41, SD  DQGMXGJHV¶PHDQUDWLQJV
of expressivity in the audio condition (r = .71, p < .001). These preliminary data 
seem to suggest that perceivers indeed judged if the target was expressive by 
observing the visual or auditory behaviour associated with telling a joke; furthermore, 
how they evaluated expressivity of the target was associated with how they guessed 
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the EQ of the target. Those targets who were assessed as having low expressivity 
were more likely to be perceived as having low EQ, while those who were 
considered as having high expressivity were likely to be perceived as having high 
EQ. In other words, it seems that expressivity is an important indicator allowing 
perceivers to form a first impression of empathic traits based on thin slices of 
observable behaviour.  
In conclusion, the phenomenon of being able to guess the EQ, with special 
sensitivity to identifying low and high EQ, is highly replicable and therefore highly 
robust: Perceivers can perform well above chance on the basis of merely 9 seconds 
of evidence. The evidence can be a video with sound, a video without sound or three 
static photographs taken from the videos that sample three different moments in the 
WDUJHW¶V EHKDYLRur. The evidence can be a photograph taken from the videos that 
FDSWXUHV WKH ODVW PRPHQW LQ WKH WDUJHW¶V EHKDYLRur, as well as merely hearing the 
WDUJHW¶VYRLFHIRUDSSUR[LPDWHO\VHFRQGVEXWLQ WKLVFDVHSHUFHLYHUVDUHHIIHFWLYH
only in identifying cases of high EQ).      
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Study 6: The Correlation Between Empathic Trait 
Judgments and Assessments of Expressivity 
5.1 Introduction 
 According to Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004), empathy is the ability to 
VKDUHRWKHUSHRSOH¶VWKRXJKWVDQGHPRWLRQVDOORZLQJXVWRUHVSRQGWRWKHLUHPRWLRQV
appropriately. Further, it is proposed that thought or emotion experienced by a target 
resonates in the observer. This definition suggests that capacity for empathizing is 
determined by the way in which we react to what someone else might be thinking 
and feeling. For this to be possible we would need to sense what the target is 
thinking or feeling and what would in turn depend on these states leaking out in the 
behaviour of the target. Hence, we might suppose that a state of empathy is more or 
OHVV³YLVLEOH´ ,QVRFLDO OLIH LIDSHUVRQVKRZVVHOGRPDFWV in an empathic way, for 
example, consoling a friend on her difficult day or expressing sympathy for someone 
who is suffering, then the person would be probably perceived as less empathising. 
In contrast, an empathic person would be expected to demonstrate empathy-related 
responding, such as having a sympathetic facial expression, giving an understanding 
eye gaze, offering helps for those in need, and so forth.  
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Different social situations might induce different experiences of empathy. For 
example, people might be more likely to demonstrate empathising in a scenario of 
hearing an empathic story than in a scenario of being detained without reason. 
 Researchers have argued that empathy relevant emotions can be determined 
from physiological and facial indexes in some situations. Moreover, it seems that 
other-oriented sympathetic responding is positively related to behaviour of altruism 
(Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990). Besel and Yuille (2010) have also reported a significant 
correlation between individual differences in empathy and accuracy of facial 
expression recognition. Taken together, this evidence indicates that empathic traits 
can be expressive in some social contexts, which can be revealed in behavioral 
evidence including facial reactions, bodily gestures, prosocial actions and so on.  
 =DNL %ROJHU DQG 2FKVQHU  UHSRUWHG FRUUHODWLRQV EHWZHHQ WDUJHWV¶
H[SUHVVLYLW\DQGSHUFHLYHUV¶HPSDWKLFDFFXUDF\DQGWDUJHWV¶EHKDYLRur. Specifically, 
targets completed a questionnaire to measure the trait emotional expressivity, and 
were videotaped while relating emotional autobiographical events. Perceivers were 
randomly assigned to either view the videos with sound, videos only or hear the 
VRXQGRQO\LQHDFKLQIRUPDWLRQFRQGLWLRQWKH\KDGWRLQIHUWKHWDUJHWV¶DIIHFWRQD 9-
SRLQW /LNHUW VFDOH RQ ZKLFK    ³YHU\ QHJDWLYH´ DQG    ³YHU\ SRVLWLYH´ 7KH
HPSDWKLFDFFXUDF\ZDVDVVHVVHGE\WKHFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQSHUFHLYHUV¶LQIHUHQFHDQG
WDUJHWV¶VHOI-UDWLQJV7KHUHVXOWVVKRZWKDWWDUJHWV¶H[SUHVVLYLW\SUHGLFWHGERWKWDUJHWV¶ 
behaviour and empathic accuracy. Expressive targets tended to produce more 
nonverbal negative cues in the process of narrating negative emotional experience 
and to present more positive verbal cues while discussing positive experience. By 
observing this, perceivers were more likely to draw an accurate inference about the 
WDUJHW¶VDIIHFW7KLVVWXG\VXJJHVWVWZRWKLQJV6RPHSHRSOHDUHPRUHH[SUHVVLYH
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than others, and expressivity can be revealed in both visual and verbal behaviours; (2) 
WDUJHWV¶ H[SUHVsivity provides a fairly reliable clue for perceivers to guess their 
emotional sates.       
Across the five studies reported in Chapters 3 and 4, there is consistent 
HYLGHQFH IRU SHRSOH¶V DELOLW\ WR PDNH IDLUO\ DFFXUDWH MXGJPHQWV RI HPSDWKLF WUDLWV
based on a brief sample of behaviour. Intriguingly, according to the exploratory 
DQDO\VLVRIWKHUDWLQJVRIWDUJHWV¶H[SUHVVLYLW\VHH6WXG\&KDSWHUWKHEHKDYLRur 
might have delivered the signals indicating the extent to which the target was 
expressive. After observing either visual or auditory behaviour lasting for several 
seconds, judges were able to assess whether a target was expressive, and these 
DVVHVVPHQWVRIH[SUHVVLYLW\ZHUHVLJQLILFDQWO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKSHUFHLYHUV¶MXGJPHQWV
RI WKHWDUJHWV¶(4V)ollowing this preliminary result, Study 6 aimed to investigate 
ZKHWKHUSHUFHLYHUV¶HPSDWKLFWUDLWMXGJPHQWVDUHFRUUHODWHGZLWKWKHLUUDWLQJVRIWKH
WDUJHWV¶H[SUHVVLYLW\ 
In summary, the main purpose of Study 6 was to investigate the basis on 
which perceivers judge that a target has high or low empathy. We already know from 
Study 5 that targets who are rated by independent judges to be expressive are the 
same who are rated by perceivers as having a high level of empathy; conversely, 
those rated by judges as being less expressive are rated by perceivers as having low 
empathy. Based on that finding, we take a further step in Study 6 by investigating 
whether or not targets who are judged by perceivers to be expressive are also judged 
by perceivers to have a high level of empathising capacity; and conversely we 
investigate whether or not targets who are judged by perceivers to be un-expressive 
are also judged by perceivers to have a low level of empathising capacity. If so, then 
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we should conclude that when perceivers judge that the target has high empathising 
capacity, this is tantamount to the perceiver judging that the target is expressive. 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Summary 
For the sake of simplicity this study only used the videos (with audio) in the 
Joke Scenario (in Study 2) because the results in the previous studies based on this 
scenario were very clear. After completing the self-report EQ questionnaire, the 
perceiver was given brief definitions of empathy, EQ and expressivity. Expressivity 
is defined as the extent to which a person expresses themselves, which can be 
reflected in facial expressions, bodily movements, voice cues and the like. After that, 
the perceiver was asked to evaluate how expressive the target was and guess the EQ 
of the target on two separate four-point scales after viewing the video (see Fig.5.1). 
The responses were automatically recorded by the software PsychoPy for later 
retrieval.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  116 
 
Video presentation screen                        Ð 
 
Response screen  
Fig. 5.1. An example of a trial in Study 6.  
 
5.2.2 Participants 
Thirty students (15 females & 15 males) aged between 19 years and 28 years 
(mean age 21 years, SD = 1.96) were recruited from the University of Monash 
Sunway Campus. To assure that the perceivers were unacquainted with one or more 
targets, they were asked whether they had seen any of the targets and all perceivers 
denied having met any of them.   
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5.2.3 Materials and Procedure 
The 47 video clips with audio in the Joke Scenario taken from Study 2 (see 
Chapter 3) were used as stimuli, presented in 800 × 650 pixels in full colour on the 
14-inch HP laptop with the software PsychoPy (1.74.00 windows version). The 
procedure was similar to that in the earlier studies except that participants were 
required to evaluate expressivity of each target in addition to rating his/her EQ. The 
order of the two categories of ratings was counterbalanced across participants: Half 
the participants first guessed the EQs of the targets and then evaluated the 
expressivity; the remaining participants rated the expressivity and then assessed the 
EQs of the targets.   
5.3 Results  
5.3.1 Preliminary Analysis ± The EQ Scores of the Perceivers and the Targets 
7KHSHUFHLYHUV¶DYHUDJH(4ZDVSD = 12.45, ranging from 16 to 71). 
Preliminary analyses did not find a difference between the average EQs of targets 
and perceivers.  
5.3.2 Accuracy in Guessing the EQ of the Target  
$VZLWKWKHSUHYLRXVVWXGLHVWKHLQGH[RIDFFXUDF\ZDVDVVHVVHGDVG¶LQHDFK
category of the four-point scale: Scale 1: d¶ SD = .46; Scale 2: d¶ -.11, SD 
= .34; Scale 3: d¶ SD = .48; Scale 4: d¶ SD = .73. Averaged across all 
four scales the d¶ ZDV  SD = .32. The results replicated previous studies with 
YLGHRVWLPXOLZKHUHG¶YDOXHVLQ6FDOHV	DQGWKHDYHUDJHG¶ZHUHVLJQLILFDQWO\
above zero according to one-sample t tests (Scale 1: t (29) = 6.00, p < .001; Scale 4: t 
(29) = 4.51, p WKHDYHUDJHG¶t (29) = 4.39, p < .001). A repeated measures 
one-way ANOVA demonstrated a main effect associated to the four EQ scales, F (3, 
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87) = 16.28, p 3RVWKRF/6'WHVWVVKRZHGWKDWG¶YDOXHVZHUHKLJKHULQ6FDOH
1 than in Scale 2 (p < .001) and Scale 3 (p $OVRG¶YDOXHVZHUHKLJKHULQ
Scale 4 than in Scale 2 (p < .001) and Scale 3 (p < .001); there was no difference 
between Scale 1 and Scale 4 and neither was there a difference between Scale 2 and 
Scale 3. In sum, again, this study replicated the earlier findings: Overall, perceivers 
could guess the EQs of the targets, and they were better at judging the targets with 
either high or low EQ than the targets with average EQ.  
5.3.3 The Correlation Between Ratings of EQ and Assessments of Expressivity 
In order to examine whether ratings of EQ related with ratings of expressivity 
for each target, we calculated the average rated EQ (as rated by perceivers) and the 
average assessed expressivity (based on the 4-point scale). The mean of the average 
rated EQ and the average evaluated expressivity was 2.41 (SD = .45) and 2.29 (SD 
= .64) respectively. There was a highly significant association between the ratings of 
EQs and the evaluations of expressivity (r (45) = .85, p < .001) according to a 
Pearson correlation.  
7KH RUGHU EHWZHHQ SHUFHLYHUV¶ UDWLQJV RI WKH (4 DQG WKH H[SUHVsivity was 
FRXQWHUEDODQFHG DQG WKHUH ZDV QHLWKHU DQ RUGHU HIIHFW DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK SHUFHLYHUV¶
UDWLQJVRQWKH(4VRIWDUJHWVQRUDQRUGHUHIIHFWUHODWHGWRSHUFHLYHUV¶DVVHVVPHQWVRI
how expressive each target was according to paired-samples t tests. Having said that, 
to be cautious, we calculated the average rated EQ across the 15 participants who 
first guessed the EQ and the average rated expressivity across the other 15 
participants who first evaluated the expressivity (EQ: M = 2.42, SD = .44; 
Expressivity: M = 2.25, SD = .65). The Pearson correlation between these two 
categories was r (45) = .75, p < .001. Indeed, more than 70 percent of the variance in 
judgments of EQ was accounted for in assessments of expressivity. 
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5. 4 Discussion 
All in all, these results provided compelling evidence for a strong relationship 
between empathic trait judgments and assessments of expressivity: Targets judged to 
be less expressive were also judged to have low EQ; targets judged to be more 
expressive were also judged to have high EQ. Cross contamination from answering 
one question to another cannot explain this high correlation because ratings (of 
expressivity or of EQ) were based on judgments made to the first question (whether 
the question asked for a rating of EQ or expressivity). Still, is it possible that 
perceivers thought that the question about EQ and the question about expressivity 
were for all intents and purpose asking the same thing? If so, then we might expect 
the means of these two scales to be identical but in fact the mean for judged 
expressivity was lower than the mean for the judged EQ, t (46) = 2.38, p = .022. 
Hence, apparently perceivers treated these two questions as being different from each 
other.    
In conclusion, the results seem to suggest that perceivers made judgments of 
EQ based on how expressive they thought the target was. But correlation is not the 
same as causation and an alternative possibility is that perceivers based their 
MXGJPHQW RI H[SUHVVLYLW\ RQ WKHLU MXGJPHQW RI WKH WDUJHW¶V (4 7KLV VHems an 
implausible explanation when considering the results of Study 5. In that, raters who 
were independent of the perceivers assessed the expressivity of the targets and the 
rated expressivity (as determined by these independent raters) correlated strongly 
with the ratings of EQ made by the perceivers. Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose 
that ratings of expressivity made by the perceivers are corroborated by ratings of 
expressivity made by independent judges. Of course, we cannot completely rule out 
the possibility that the independent judges based their ratings of expressivity on their 
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HVWLPDWLRQRI WKH WDUJHWV¶(4EXW LW LV KDUG WR LPDJLQHZK\ WKH\ZRXOGKDYHGRQH
such a thing. The most plausible explanation is that judgments of EQ are based on 
assessments of expressivity. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Can People Guess the Big Five Personality Traits Based on 
Thin Slices of Behaviour? 
6.1 Introduction  
6.1.1 The Big Five Personality Traits  
 The Five-)DFWRU0RGHORISHUVRQDOLW\ RIWHQ WHUPHGWKH³%LJ)LYH´GHSLFWV
WKHIXQGDPHQWDOVWUXFWXUHRIKXPDQEHLQJV¶SHUVRQDOLW\WUDLWV LQ WHUPVRIILYHEDVLF
dimensions: Neuroticism (N), Extraversion (E), Agreeableness (A), 
Conscientiousness (C), and Openness to Experience (O) (McCrae & John, 1992). 
Research using natural language adjectives and theoretically based personality 
questionnaires has supported the comprehensiveness of the model and its 
applicability across observers and cultures (McCrae & John, 1992, for a review; 
Borkenau, 1998; McCrae & Costa, 2004; McCrae, Terracciano, et al., 2005; Schmitt, 
Allik, McCrae, & Benet-Martínez, 2007).  
Several inventories have been developed to measure the Big Five personality 
factors, including the most comprehensive instrument NEO Personality Inventory, 
Revised (NEO-PI-R; Costa & McCrae, 1992) and its corresponding shortened 
version NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 1992). According 
to the manual of NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 2011), the core of the domain N is the 
  122 
general tendency to experience negative affects, such as fear, sadness, 
embarrassment, anger, guilt and disgust; individuals high in N are also prone to have 
irrational ideas, to be less able to control their impulses, and to cope poorly with 
stress compared with others; the dimension E includes traits in the tendency to be 
sociable, assertive, active, talkative, excitement-seeking and to experience positive 
emotions; the elements of O involve imagination, aesthetic sensitivity, attentiveness 
to inner feelings, preference for variety, intellectual curiosity, and independence of 
judgment; the domain A means a tendency to be straightforward, altruistic, 
compliant, modest and tender-minded; the domain C is pertinent to the tendency to 
be purposeful, strong-willed and determined, to act dutifully, strive for achievement, 
and to be orderly rather than disorganized.  
6.1.2 How Well Can We Form First Impressions of the Big Five Traits? 
 In daily life, we have many opportunities to meet people we are unacquainted 
with. How well can we form a first impression of the Big Five personality traits of 
them? Norman and Goldberg (1966) reported the first major study of zero 
acquaintance to seek for solutions to this question. A sample of college students with 
no prior acquaintance nor any opportunity to interact with one another were 
randomly assigned to a 6- to 9-person group and then they were asked to 
independently evaluate each member of their group and themselves on a set of 20 
bipolar scales measuring the five factors of traits (Extraversion, Agreeableness, 
&RQVFLHQWLRXVQHVV (PRWLRQDO 6WDELOLW\ HTXDO WR µ1¶ DQG &XOWXUH HTXDO WR µ2¶
This study yielded striking results, indicating significant correlations between the 
self-ratings and averaged peer ratings for three of the five personality factors, 
including Extraversion, Conscientiousness and Culture.  
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 Following the same face-to-face procedure of zero acquaintance, a body of 
subsequent research has replicated these initial findings to some extent (e.g., Albright 
et al., 1988; Watson, 1989; Kenny, Horner, Kashy, & Chu, 1992; Kenny et al., 1994): 
Researchers consistently revealed significant self-other agreement and high 
consensus among perceivers on Extraversion and Conscientiousness but the results 
on the dimension of Culture were inconsistent (e.g. Albright et al., 1988; Watson, 
1989).  
Using videotapes recording the targets while performing one or more certain 
activities, Borkenau and colleagues have conducted a series of studies examining 
accuracy (defined as self-other agreement or consensus among judges) in first-
impression formation of personality (Borkenau & Liebler, 1992a; 1992b; 1993; 
Borkenau et al., 2004). In one study (Borkenau & Liebler, 1992b), a sample of 100 
targets was videotaped while entering and walking through a room, sitting down, 
looking into the camera, and reading a standard text, followed by providing self-
ratings of the Big Five personality traits on a set of 20 bipolar scales. Each bipolar 
scale was labeled with two opposite trait-descriptive terms (e.g., talkative vs. silent) 
along with a 7-point rating scale. A sample of 24 perceivers with no prior knowledge 
of WKHWDUJHWVZDVDVNHGWRHYDOXDWHWKHWDUJHWV¶SHUVRQDOLWLHVRQWKHVDPHVHWRI
bipolar scales when given one of four types of information on the targets: (a) sound 
film, (b) silent film, (c) still (a 60s still of each target looking into the camera) or (d) 
audiotape. The results demonstrated that performance in judging the five traits of the 
targets was affected by different types of information ± In the sound film condition, 
there was significant self-other agreement on each of the five traits except for N, in 
the silent film condition, the self-ratings of the targets significantly agreed with the 
judgments by perceivers on three of the five personality traits (E, C and N), in the 
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still condition, self-other agreement was only found on E and C, and in the audiotape 
FRQGLWLRQ WKHUH ZHUH VLJQLILFDQW FRUUHODWLRQV EHWZHHQ WDUJHWV¶ VHOI-ratings and 
SHUFHLYHUV¶UDWLQJVRQ(DQG$ 
Focusing on thin slices of behaviour as cues of personality, Borkenau et al. 
(2004) reported a comprehensive study investigating inter-judge agreement on 
personality judgments, suggesting that trait inferences can be drawn from thin slices 
of behaviour in seemingly trivial scenarios. In particular, after completing self-
ratings of the Big Five personality traits (on the NEO-Five Factor Inventory) and 
intelligence, the targets were individually videotaped while performing 15 different 
tasks lasting from 1 minute to 12 minutes, in which they were asked to introduce 
themselves, tell a joke to an experimenter confederate, introduce a stranger to the 
experimenter, invent a neologism, read newspaper headlines, sing a song and so on. 
These videotapes were later presented to a sample of independent judges who had 
never seen the targets before. Every four independent judges observed each target in 
one of the 15-videotaped episodes only, and then rated the target along the Big Five 
traits on a set of 20 bipolar adjective scales. Results showed that the average 
agreement among judges across the tasks was highest on E and lowest on C and O, 
and personality inferences from thin slices of behaviour were significantly associated 
with the ratings by close acquaintances of the targets and this association became 
stronger when more episodes were included (Borkenau et al., 2004).   
Would perceivers perform better in drawing personality inferences if they had 
a chance to observe a trait-relevant context instead of mundane scenarios? Based on 
carefully structured trait-related situations allowing one or more traits to be 
expressed, McLarney-Vesotski, Bernieri and Rempala (2006) investigated the ability 
to infer the Big Five traits from thin slices of behaviour. Specially, targets were 
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videotaped in five carefully crafted situations, each situation designed to maximally 
induce a dimension of the Big Five traits. Perceivers evaluated the personalities of 
the target using a rating form involving five questions (each along with a 5-point 
rating scale) corresponding to the five personality traits (e.g., (For the trait A) How 
pleasant and positive is the persoQ" 7KH DFFXUDF\ ZDV GHILQHG DV SHUFHLYHUV¶
agreement with the personality assessments of the targets provided by 
knowledgeable informants. Results suggested well-above chance judgmental 
accuracy in each trait except for A, with a strongest correlation of perceiver-
informant agreement on E (r = .57), a relatively weaker correlation on C (r = .25), 
and a weakest correlation on N (r = .12). Apparently, perceivers did not demonstrate 
more accurate performance in making trait inferences compared with the findings of 
prior studies based on mundane situations, such as an unstructured get-acquainted 
conversation, reading the standard text of a weather forecast, or an unstructured 
dyadic interaction.       
To examine a thin slice perspective on the accuracy of first impressions, 
Carney et al. (2007) conducted a study investigating judged construct (the Big Five 
personality traits and other psychological characteristics), exposure time (5, 20, 45, 
60 and 300s) and slice location (beginning, middle, end) using video stimuli (with 
sound) filming a 5-minute unstructured dyadic interaction. Accuracy was indexed as 
self-other agreement on the personality evaluation of the targets. Results indicated 
that judgments of perceivers were moderately correlated with the ratings of the 
targets on E and C after 5s exposures, but N, O and A required more exposure time 
to achieve similar levels of accuracy. Overall, accuracy increased with exposure time, 
personality judgments based on later segments of the 5-minute interaction were more 
accurate, and 60s yielded the optimal correlation between accuracy and slice length 
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(Carnet et al., 2007). Researchers thus conclude that accuracy of first impressions 
relies on the personality factors (N, E, O, A, & C), amount of exposure, and temporal 
location of the slice of observable social behaviour.  
Taken together, the literature on accuracy research of personality judgments 
has suggested that we can form somewhat accurate first impressions on some 
dimensions of the Big Five traits. Overall, perceivers can draw accurate inferences 
about E and C across different contexts but their performance in inferring the other 
three personality dimensions seems to be inconsistent across different studies (e.g., 
Norman & Goldberg, 1966; Watson, 1989; Borkenau & Liebler 1992b; McLarney-
Vesotski et al., 2006; Carney et al., 2007). Furthermore, even with minimal 
EHKDYLRUDO REVHUYDWLRQ DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH UHVHDUFK DGRSWLQJ WKH SDUDGLJP RI µWKLQ
VOLFHV¶SHUFHLYHUVDUH VWLOO DEOH WR IRUPDQDFFXUDWH ILUVW LPSUHVVLRQRQ E and C or 
other traits based on observations of people in either trivial scenarios or crafted trait-
relevant situations (e.g., Borkenau et al., 2004; McLarney-Vesotski et al., 2006; 
Carney et al., 2007).    
6.1.3 The Present Study 
 There are some limitations in the extant research into accuracy in first 
impressions of personalities. First of all, comparison of judgmental accuracy should 
be made with caution due to methodological variations between studies (Hall, 
Andrzejewski, Murphy, Mast, & Feinstein, 2008), such as different indexes of 
accuracy (self-other agreement or peer consensus), diverse measurements of the Big-
Five traits (e.g., a set of 20 bipolar scales or the NEO-Five Factor Inventory) and 
various procedures of zero acquaintance (e.g. face-to-face or video-based contexts). 
Second, in the earlier studies, participants usually had to act as a perceiver and a 
target at the same time. In this case, the accuracy indexed as correlations of self-other 
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DJUHHPHQW PLJKW EH LQIODWHG E\ SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ FRQVLVWent response patterns in the 
personality questionnaires and their shared stereotypes of generalized people. Third, 
judgmental accuracy (self-other agreement or consensus among perceivers) was 
usually calculated based on the ratings from a small group of judges (including 2 to 7 
persons). However, some researchers have suggested that self-other agreement 
correlations tended to rise as the number of peer raters increased; for example, 
ratings of A displayed significant convergent validity when a sufficient number of 
judges rated the target (Watson, 1989). Fourth, there is still controversy about 
SHRSOH¶VDELOLWLHVWRLQIHUVRPHRIWKH%LJ)LYHWUDLWV)RULQVWDQFHHYHQLQDFDUHIXOO\
crafted trait-relevant situation, perceivers failed to make an accurate judgment of A 
(McLarney-Vesotski et al., 2006), whereas in another study (Borkenau et al., 2004), 
after briefly observing trivial scenarios the target experienced, perceivers could 
achieve significant agreement on the evaluation of A. Besides, some researchers 
reported a positive connection between accuracy of personality judgments and 
exposure time of thin slices of behaviour (e.g., Carnet et al., 2007), but a meta-
analysis revealed that studies using longer periods of behaviour observation did not 
differ significantly from predictions based on 4- and 5-minute observations (Ambady 
& Rosenthal, 1992). Finally, accuracy, operationally defined as correlations of self-
other agreement or correlations among perceivers allows examination of an overall 
level of accuracy to some extent but does not always allow us to investigate 
SHUFHLYHUV¶ ILQH-grained abilities to identify different levels (e.g., low, average, & 
high) of the same personality dimension.       
 Considering these factors, it is necessary to confirm how well we can guess 
personalities from thin slices of behaviour in naturalistic social settings using a novel 
method that overcomes some of the limitations identified in the previous research. 
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Due to its high ecological validity, the method we developed for investigating 
accuracy of empathic trait judgments is also well suited for studying accuracy of first 
impressions on the Big Five traits. From Chapters 3 to 5, we already know that 
SHUFHLYHUV FDQ V\VWHPLFDOO\ JXHVV WKH WDUJHWV¶ HPSDWKLF WUDLWV E\ REVHUYLQJ D brief 
sample of behaviour, and performance has a U-shaped pattern in which perceivers 
are more effective in evaluating the targets who had a low or high EQ than the 
targets who had average EQ. Adopting the same accuracy-oriented methodology, we 
aim to find out whether the same U-shaped pattern would be apparent when 
assessing the Big Five personality traits. Thus, the two studies reported in this 
FKDSWHUWULHGWRH[SORUHSHRSOH¶VILQH-grained abilities to make personality inferences 
about others on first meeting.    
6.2 Study 7 
 Apart from the study by Borkenau et al. (2004), previous research on 
accuracy of personality judgments usually examines the capacity to infer the Big 
Five traits on the basis of behaviour observed from only one situation. Nonetheless, 
Borkenau et al (2004) have found that correlations of personality judgments between 
perceivers and knowledgeable informants became stronger when observable actions 
involved more episodes. This implies that it may be more ecologically valid to 
investigatHSHRSOH¶VFDSDFLW\IRUWUDLWLQIHUHQFHVEDVHGRQDEURDGUDQJHRIEHKDYLRur 
cues extracted from more than one situation. In Study 2 (see Chapter 3), after 
watching a sample of video, perceivers were capable of making accurate judgments 
of empathic traits across three scenarios. Using the same video stimuli (involving 
three scenarios), the main goal of Study 7 was to examine how well people could 
guess the Big Five traits of the targets after watching a short video clip.   
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6.2.1 Method 
Summary 
Three sets of video clips (with sound) were derived from Study 2 (see 
Chapter 3), with 47 clips in each set where the targets were recorded during the 
conversation, reading a joke or doing the screen test. A 5 ×3 × 3 mixed design was 
used, with the Big Five traits and the three scales of each trait (low, average, & high) 
as the within-subjects factors and the three scenarios (Conversation, Joke, and Screen 
Test) as the between-subjects factor. The video clips were displayed as with the 
studies on empathic trait judgments. After viewing each video clip, perceivers had to 
guess the Big Five traits of the target. The procedure was scrutinized and approved 
by the Faculty of Science ethics committee in the University of Nottingham Malaysia 
Campus, which was constituted and operated according to guidelines prescribed by 
the British Psychological Society. 
Participants 
The perceivers were ninety students (45 males) aged 18 to 25 years (mean 
age 20 years, SD = 1.59), recruited from the University of Nottingham Malaysia 
campus. To make sure that the perceivers did not know the targets, they were asked 
to identify whether they had met any of the targets after viewing the pictures of them 
(taken from their videos). Another fifteen participants who reported one or more 
acquaintances were replaced. Hence, the sample of 90 perceivers who proceeded to 
the testing phase were assumed to be unacquainted with the targets. Each perceiver 
was randomly assigned to watch the targets either in the Conversation, the Joke or 
the Screen Test Scenario.    
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Materials  
Video stimuli 
One-hundred-and-forty-one video clips were obtained from Study 2, with 47 
clips in each of the three scenarios (the Conversation, the Joke, and the Screen Test 
Scenario). Each target experienced the three scenarios. The details of the stimulus 
video collection and editing appeared in Chapter 3.  
The NEO Five-Factor Inventory-3 (NEO-FFI- DQG WKH 7DUJHWV¶ %LJ )LYH
Personality Traits 
The NEO-FFI-3 is an updated and revised shortened version of the self-report 
form of the NEO Personality Inventory-3 (NEO-PI-R-3), with 12-item scales to 
measure each of the five personality factors, N, E, O, A, and C, providing a 
comprehensive portrait of an individual in respect of global personality with high 
reliability and validity (McCrae & Costa, 2004). Responses were collected on 5-
point Likert scales ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree.  
After recording and a short break for several minutes, the target was asked to 
fill in the NEO-FFI-3 questionnaire (plus the EQ questionnaire but this had no 
relation with the current study). On average it took about 15 minutes to complete the 
NEO-FFI-3. According to the scoring instruction in the manual (Costa & McCrae, 
 WKH WDUJHWV¶ VHOI-report ratings on each of the five personality traits were 
classified into a scale of low, average or high: Eight, 13 and 26 targets respectively 
scored low, average and high on N; 14, 23 and 10 were respectively low, average and 
high in E; 7, 22, and 18 were low, average and high O; 20, 20 and 7 scored low, 
average and high on A; 24, 13 and 10 were low, average and high on C.  
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Procedure  
Perceivers were tested individually. After receiving the instruction 
information sheet and offering consent, the perceiver was given a personality 
information sheet that includes a brief definition of personality along with concise 
explanations of each personality trait in line with the description in the NEO manual 
(Costa & McCrae, 2011). After reading the personality information sheet without 
DQ\ IXUWKHUTXHVWLRQV WKHSHUFHLYHUSURFHHGHG WR WKH WULDOVRIJXHVVLQJ WKH WDUJHWV¶
Big Five traits. Each video clip was displayed (in size of 600 × 400 pixels) to the 
perceiver in full colour with audio in random orders with the software PsychoPy 
(Peirce, 2007) on a laptop. In each trial, following a video presentation screen, a 
response screen appeared showing five 3-point scales (from low to high) as response 
options corresponding to the five traits of N, E, O, A, and C in a fixed order (see 
Fig.6.1). The perceiver guessed the five traits of each target by using the mouse to 
click one of the three scales of each trait. After the perceiver made judgments on all 
the five traits, the screen moved immediately to the next video clip. The procedure 
allowed the perceivers to take as long as they needed to respond. Responses were 
automatically recorded by the software for later retrieval.   
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Video presentation screen                      Ð 
 
Response screen  
Fig. 6.1. An example of a trial in Study 7. 
 
6.2.2 Results and Discussion 
Trends in Judgmental Accuracy of the Big Five Traits in Each Scenario   
 Following the procedure developed in the previous studies examining 
judgmental accuracy of empathic traits, the accuracy of the guesses perceivers made 
about each scale in each of the five traits was calculated using signal detection. This 
method allows an assessment of accuracy that is independent of underlying base 
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UDWHVRIWDUJHWV¶DFWXDOSHUVRQDOLW\VFDOHVLQ HDFKWUDLWDQGSHUFHLYHUV¶UHVSRQVHELDVLQ
a particular scale of each trait. The index of accuracy was computed as d-SULPHG¶
Table 6.1 displa\V WKH PHDQV RI G¶ LQ HDFK VFDOH RI HDFK WUDLW LQ HDFK VFHQDULR
(Conversation, Joke, & Screen Test) and the corresponding results of one-sample t 
WHVWVRIHDFKG¶where the comparison value is zero. If a perceiver guessed at random 
when evaluating the traLWVRIWKHWDUJHWWKLVZRXOG\LHOGDG¶RI]HUR 
 
Table 6.1. Means (and standard deviations) of d-SULPHG¶LQHDFKVFDOHRIHDFKRIWKHILYHWUDLWV1
E, O, A, C) in each scenario (Conversation, Joke, & Screen Test), along with values of one-sample t 
WHVWVRIHDFKG¶LQ6WXG\ 
Trait Scale Scenario  
Conversation Joke Screen Test 
d' (SD) t d' (SD) t d' (SD) t 
N Low .22 (.46) 2.58* .31 (.49) 3.45** .35 (.35) 5.38*** 
Average -.08 (.35) -1.24 .01 (.37) .15 .05 (.44) .59 
High -.05 (.35) -.80 .21 (.42) 2.81** .09 (.39) 1.30 
E Low .17 (.41) 2.24* .21 (.43) 2.64* -.23 (.81) -1.53 
Average .0 (.39) .07 -.09 (.38) -1.34 -.03 (.39) .37 
High .53 (.50) 9.45*** .51 (.37) 7.47*** 1.11 (.69) 8.82*** 
O Low .30 (.39) 4.28*** .54 (.11) 2.81** .42 (.39) 5.88*** 
Average .09 (.33) 1.53 -.05 (.74) -.04 -.04 (.30) -.67 
High .35 (.38) 4.98*** .29 (.82) 1.97 .30 (.38) 4.38*** 
A Low .14 (.38) 2.01 .06 (.54) .64 .15 (.45) 1.87 
Average -.08 (.36) -1.16 -.02 (.47) -.21 .04 (.49) .46 
High .33 (.43) 4.26*** -.10 (.66) -.83 -.06 (.51) -.62 
C Low .26 (.49) 2.97** .07 (.43) .95 .15 (.42) 1.91 
Average -.06 (.31) -.97 -.06 (.45) -.71 .12 (.38) 1.74 
High .24 (.43) 3.11** .04 (.65) .34 .18 (.44) 2.29* 
Note: Three groups (n = 30 in each group) of perceivers each viewed targets in one of the three scenarios; *. p 
< .05, **.p < .01; ***.p < .001, two-tailed.  
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 As shown in Table 6.1 and Fig. 6.2 ± Fig. 6.4, perceivers seemed to 
demonstrate a similar trend of being able to guess the five personality traits in each 
scenario: Perceivers could not make systemically accurate judgments on the average 
scale of each trait, but they were fairly effective in guessing one or both of the two 
extreme scales (low and high) in one or more traits; that is, accuracy of judgments 
about the five traits in each scenario tended to present a U-shaped pattern.  
 
 
Fig. 6.2. Mean d-prime of each scale in each trait in the Conversation Scenario in Study 7. Error bars 
represent standard error of the mean.   
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Fig. 6.3. Mean d-prime of each scale in each trait in the Joke Scenario in Study 7. Error bars represent 
standard error of the mean.  
 
 
Fig. 6.4. Mean d-prime of each scale in each trait in the Screen Test Scenario in Study 7. Error bars 
represent standard error of the mean.  
 
According to Table 6.1 and Fig. 6.2 ± Fig. 6.4, in the Conversation Scenario, 
perceivers were good at identifying the extreme scales of each trait with the 
exception of high N and low A; in the Joke Scenario they were effective in guessing 
low and high N, low and high E and low O. In the Screen Test Scenario they made 
systemically accurate judgments of high N, high E, low and high O, and high C. In 
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other words, the U-shaped curve of each trait might be affected by different 
scenarios ± For example, the curve of E in the Screen Test is rather different from 
that in the other scenarios; meanwhile, the strength of the U-shaped curve might be 
dependent on traits: For instance, in general, the U shape of the curves of O across 
the three scenarios seemed pretty strong while the curves of A appeared rather weak.  
In order to examine these preliminary impressions, we carried out a 5 × 3 × 3 
mixed design ANOVA, with the five traits and the three scales of each trait as the 
within-subjects factors and the three scenarios as the between-subjects factor; the 
GHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHZDVG¶7KHUHZHUHPDLQHIIHFWVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHILYHWUDLWVF 
(4, 348) = 7.88, p < .001) and the three scales (F (2, 174) = 42.33, p < .001), but no 
main effect of scenario (F (8, 348) = 1.55, p = .14). Meanwhile, an interaction 
between the traits and the scales (F (8, 696) = 14.32, p < .001), and an interaction 
among the traits, scales and scenarios (F (16, 696) = 3.69, p < .001) were also 
significant but there was no interaction between the traits and the scenarios (F (8, 
348) = 1.55, p = .14) or between the scales and the scenarios (F (4, 174) = 1.90, p 
= .11).   
 According to Fig. 6.2 ± Fig. 6.4, the three-way interaction among the traits, 
scales and scenarios might result to some extent from a stronger significant 
interaction between the traits and the scales in the scenario of Screen Test. We 
therefore conducted a 5 × 3 repeated measures ANOVA in each scenario to examine 
WKH WUHQGVRISHUFHLYHUV¶SHUIRUPDQFH LQJXHVVLQJ WKH%LJ)LYH WUDLWVZLWK WKH ILYH
traits and the three scales of each trait as the within-subjects factors. As displayed in 
Table 6.2, which reports the results of the ANOVA tests in the three scenarios, there 
ZDVWKHVDPHNLQGRIWUHQGWRZDUGVSHUFHLYHUV¶SHUIRUPDQFHLQHDFKVFHQDULR7KHUH
were main effects related to the traits and the scales as well as an interaction between 
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the traits and the scales. In addition, the interaction in the Screen Test Scenario was 
much stronger than the other scenarios, suggesting that the three-way interaction was 
associated with the interactions between the traits and the scales in different 
scenarios.  
 
Table 6.2.  F values of the repeated measures ANOVA in each of three scenarios (Conversation, Joke, 
& Screen Test) in Study 7   
ANOVA Test Conversation 
 
Joke Screen Test 
 
Main Effect of Traits 
 
F (4, 116) = 2.88* 
 
 
F (4, 116) = 4.45** 
 
F (4, 116) = 3.43** 
 
Main Effect of Scales 
 
F (2, 58) = 38.4*** 
 
 
F (2, 58) = 10.54*** 
 
F (2, 58) = 12.47*** 
 
Interaction (Traits × Scales) 
 
F (8, 232) = 3.69*** 
 
 
F (8, 232) = 2.15* 
 
F (2, 232) = 17.90*** 
Note: * p < .05, ** p 	p < .001 
 
The U-shaped Pattern of Judgmental Accuracy in Each Trait Across the 
Three Scenarios   
 Given no main effect of scenario and given that there was an interaction 
EHWZHHQ7UDLWDQG6FDOHIRUHDFKVFHQDULRZHFDOFXODWHGWKHDYHUDJHG¶RIHDFKVFDOH
in each trait across the three scenarios combined and reported the corresponding t 
values of one-VDPSOH W WHVWV RI HDFK G¶ DV VKRZQ LQ 7DEOH  $GGLWLRQDOO\ WKH
DYHUDJHG¶RIHDFKWUDLWDFURVVWKHVFDOHVDQGWKHVFHQDULRVZDVFRPSXWHGDVRYHUDOO
judgmental accuracy in each trait, and the corresponding results were .12 (SD 
= .30), .24 (SD = .29), .25 (SD = .22), .05 (SD = .35) and .11 (SD = .31) for N, E, O, 
$DQG&UHVSHFWLYHO\ZKLFKZHUHVLJQLILFDQWO\DERYHFKDQFHH[FHSWIRUWKHG¶RI$
according to one-sample t tests (N: t (89) = 3.89, p < .001; E: t (89) = 7.89, p < .001; 
O: t (89) = 10.40, p < .001; A: t (89) = 1.43, p = .16, and C:  t (89) = 3.22, p = .002), 
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indicating that generally perceivers could make an accurate judgment of each of the 
five personality traits except for the trait A.   
 
Table 6.3. Means (and standard deviations) of d-SULPHG¶LQHDFKVFDOHRIHDFKWUDLWDFURVVWKHWKUHH
scenarios combined, along with the corresponding t values of one-VDPSOHWWHVWVIRUHDFKG¶LQ6WXG\ 
 
Trait Scale 
Low Average High 
G¶  (SD) t G¶ (SD) t G¶ (SD) t 
N .29 (.44) 6.33*** 0 (.39) -.17 .09 (.40) 2.03* 
E .05 (.61) .78 -.04 (.38) -1.02 .72 (.60) 11.33*** 
O .42 (.68) 5.83*** 0 (.50) 0 .31 (.56) 5.34*** 
A .12 (.46) 2.45* -.02 (.44) -.38 -.06 (.57) .98 
C .16 (.45) 3.42** 0 (.39) .05 .16 (.52) 2.85** 
1RWHSSS1 WZR-tailed.   
 
However, as we see in Table 6.3, perceivers were not uniformly effective in 
guessing each scale of each trait ± They made systematically accurate judgments 
LQGLFDWHGE\DG¶statistically higher than zero) in the cases of low and high N, low 
and high O, low and high C, high E and low A, but in all there was no evidence 
suggesting systematic judgments when the targets belonged to the middle scale of 
each trait. Fig. 6.5 summarizes these results, demonstrating a U-shaped curve of 
different strengths in each trait. 
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Fig. 6.5. Mean d-prime of each scale in each trait across the three scenarios combined (Conversation, 
Joke, & Screen Test) in Study 7. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
 To examine the U-shaped pattern in the performance of each trait, we 
conducted a one-way repeated measures ANOVA for each trait, with the three scales 
as the within-VXEMHFWV IDFWRU 7KH UHVXOWV VKRZHG WKDW G¶ YDOXHV DPRQJ WKH WKUHH
scales of each trait were significantly different except for A (N: F (2, 178) = 18.27, p 
< .001; E: F (2, 178) = 49.30, p < .001; O:  F (2, 178) = 9.78, p < .001; A: F (2, 178) 
= 2.30, p = .103; C: F (2, 178) = 4.52, p = .012). Post hoc Bonferroni tests for each 
trait (except for A) revealed the following results. For the trait N, perceivers were 
better at detecting the targets with low N than the targets with average N (p < .001) 
or high N (p < .001), but there was no difference between the performance in judging 
the cases of average N and high N. For the trait E, perceivers performed better in 
identifying the targets who were high in E than the targets who fell into either low E 
(p < .001) or average E (p < .001), but they performed similarly in the scales of low 
and average E. For the trait O, perceivers were equally effective in judging the 
targets who had either low O or high O, and the performance in both scales were 
better than the performance in the average O (ps )RUWKHWUDLW&SHUFHLYHUV
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made more accurate judgments of the targets either with low C (p = .009) or high C 
(p = .028) in comparison with the targets who had average C, and the judgmental 
accuracy was not different in the cases of low and high C.  
In summary, accurate judgments that perceivers made about each trait (except 
for the trait of A) presented a similar type of U-shaped pattern, in which accuracy in 
one or both of the extreme scales was greater than that in the average scale. Despite 
the finding that the form of the U-shaped curve of A was relatively flat, according to 
Table 6.3, perceivers were still effective in making judgments about the targets with 
low A.   
6.3 Study 8 
 Study 7 has already revealed that perceivers could make an overall accurate 
judgment of each trait with the exception of the trait A across the three scenarios 
while having access to visual and sound information; moreover, there was the same 
kind of U-shaped pattern for each trait across the scenarios, in which perceivers 
consistently failed to detect the targets who were average but were fairly good at 
identifying the targets who were extreme. Would these principal findings be 
replicated with different types of information channels (sound video, silent video, 
and soundtrack)? Study 8 was conducted in order to gain an insight into this matter.   
6.3.1 Method 
Summary 
For the sake of simplicity the present study only used the scenario of 
Conversation where the targets were unobtrusively filmed while answering some 
questions about themselves ± This scenario might reflect informative spontaneous 
behaviors of the targets, which could explain why some of the strongest U-shaped 
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curves were associated with this scenario. In each trial, perceivers either viewed a 
video with sound, a video without sound, or heard a soundtrack taken from the same 
video clip. Subsequently, the perceiver was asked to make first-impression 
judgments of the Big Five traits of the target.  
Participants 
Ninety students (43 males & 47 females) aged 18 to 27 years (mean age 21 
years, SD = 1.74) from the University of Monash Sunway Campus volunteered to 
participate in the study. There were no participants reporting acquaintanceships with 
one or more targets. Participants were randomly assigned to three groups of 30 in 
each condition (Video & Audio, Video Only, and Audio Only).    
Materials and Procedure 
The 47 video clips in the Conversation Scenario were used with sound or 
without sound. The 47 audio tracks were extracted from the corresponding video 
clips. Thus, 30 perceivers viewed 47 video clips with sound, 30 perceivers viewed 
the same 47 video clips without sound, and 30 perceivers listened to 47 audio tracks. 
The procedure was the same as that in Study 7. After watching an audio video or a 
silent video or hearing a soundtrack, perceivers were asked to guess the Big Five 
traits of each target.  
6.3.2 Results and Discussion 
Trends in Judgmental Accuracy of the Big Five Traits in Each Condition  
 $VZLWK6WXG\ WKH DFFXUDF\RI WKHSHUFHLYHUV¶ UDWLQJVRI WKH WDUJHWV¶ %LJ
)LYH WUDLWVZDVDQDO\]HGXVLQJVLJQDOGHWHFWLRQ LQGH[HGDVG¶7DEOH VKRZV WKH
PHDQVRIG¶ LQHDFKVFDOHRIHDFKWUDLW LQHDFKLQIRUPDWLRQFRQGLWLRQWRJHWKHUZLWK
the corresponding values of one-VDPSOH W WHVWV RI HDFK G¶ ZKHUH WKH FRPSDULVRQ
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value is zero. If a perceiver guessed randomly when assessing the personality traits 
RIWKHWDUJHWWKHFRUUHVSRQGLQJG¶ZRXOGQRWEHVLJQLILFDQWO\DERYH]HUR 
 
Table 6.4. Means (and standard deviations) of d-SULPHG¶LQHDFKVFDOHRIHDFKRIWKHILYHWUDLWV1
E, O, A, C) in each condition (Video & Audio, Video Only, & Audio Only), along with values of one-
VDPSOHWWHVWVRIHDFKG¶LQ6WXG\  
Trait Scale Condition  
Video & Audio Video Only Audio Only 
d' (SD) t d' (SD) t d' (SD) t 
N Low .19 (.43) 2.40* .05 (.39) .74 .13 (.58) 1.26 
Average .08 (.35) 1.32 -.04 (.37) -.54 .01 (.46) .12 
High -.10 (.48) -1.14 -.07 (.41) -.98 .15 (.37) 2.16* 
E Low .24 (.44) 2.94** -.07 (.35) -1.16 .51 (.42) 6.66*** 
Average .07(.42) .87 -.16 (.33) -2.69* .06 (.40) .82 
High .77 (.44) 9.55*** .29 (.48) 3.35** .37 (.50) 4.01*** 
O Low .32 (.59) 2.97** .30 (.53) 3.16** .29 (.42) 3.82*** 
Average .13 (.43) 1.68 0 (.38) .04 .13 (.38) 1.89 
High .32 (.40) 4.29*** .07 (.42) .98 .08 (.41) 1.06 
A Low .05 (.39) .67 .03 (.42) .34 -.05 (.48) -.55 
Average -.10 (.44) -1.26 -.12 (.34) -1.93 -.14 (.78) -1.02 
High .46 (.58) 4.29*** -.09 (.42) -1.15 .36 (.54) 3.72*** 
C Low .30 (.50) 3.30** -.04 (.28) -.71 -.07 (.45) -.81 
Average -.06 (.47) -.71 -.27 (.44) -3.32** -.04 (.37) -.65 
High .51(.51) 5.47*** -.06 (.43) -.72 -.07 (.42) -.96 
Note: Three groups (n = 30 in each) of perceivers viewed or heard targets in one of the three conditions; *. p 
< .05, **.p < .01; ***.p WZR-tailed.     
 
As we can see in Table 6.4 and Fig. 6.6 ± Fig. 6.8, similar to Study 7, 
perceivers seemed to demonstrate a U-shaped trend in being able to make an 
accurate judgment of the Big Five traits in each condition. That is, when judging the 
targets with an average trait, perceivers generally demonstrated accuracy of chance 
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and accuracy even worse than chance in the judgments of E and C in the Video Only 
Condition, but they could systemically identify the targets who had a low or high 
scale in one or more traits in each condition. Furthermore, this U-shaped pattern 
seemed to be influenced by information conditions ± The trends seemed strongest in 
the condition of Video and Audio where perceivers could guess the extreme scales in 
more types of traits than the other information conditions; also, the strength of the U 
shape varied depending on traits ± The U shape of the curves of E and O across the 
three conditions appeared relatively strong as opposed to the curves of N and A, for 
example.  
 
 
Fig. 6.6. Mean d-prime of each scale in each trait in the Video and Audio Condition in Study 8. Error 
bars represent standard error of the mean.  
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Fig. 6.7. Mean d-prime of each scale in each trait in the Video Only Condition in Study 8. Error bars 
represent standard error of the mean.    
 
 
Fig. 6.8. Mean d-prime of each scale in each trait in the Audio Only Condition in Study 8. Error bars 
represent standard error of the mean.  
  
To confirm these findings reported in Table 6.4 as well as Fig. 6.6 ± Fig. 6.8, 
we conducted a 5 × 3 × 3 mixed design ANOVA, with the five traits and the three 
scales of each trait as the within-subjects factors and the three conditions as the 
between-VXEMHFWV IDFWRU WKH GHSHQGHQW YDULDEOH ZDV G¶ 7KH UHVXOWV UHYHDOHG PDLQ
effects associated with the traits (F (4, 348) = 8.19, p < .001), the scales (F (2, 174) = 
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42.17, p < .001), and the conditions (F (2, 87) = 15.37, p < .001); additionally, there 
were interactions between the traits and the conditions (F (8, 348) = 2.19, p = .027), 
between the scales and the conditions (F (4, 174) = 4.14, p = .003), between the traits 
and the scales (F (8, 696) = 8.75, p < .001), and an interaction among the traits, the 
scales and the conditions (F (16, 696) = 4.12, p < .001).   
For the main effect of condition, we carried out post hoc Bonferroni tests to 
examine the differences of judgmental accuracy among the three conditions. The 
findings revealed that overall perceivers performed best in the condition of Video 
and Audio and worst in the condition of Video Only (Video & Audio > Video Only, 
p < .001; Audio Only > Video Only, p = .007; Video & Audio  > Audio Only, p 
= .056). These data suggest that perceivers were generally most effective in making 
trait inferences of the targets while having access to both visual and auditory 
information of the targets, and less effective while having access to only visual 
information.   
As with Study 7, to examine whether there was a similar type of trend in 
judgmental accuracy of the Big Five traits for each type of information, we carried 
out a 5 × 3 repeated measures ANOVA in each condition, with the five traits and the 
three scales as the within-subjects factors. As demonstrated in Table 6.5, which 
reports the corresponding results of the ANOVA tests in the three conditions, there 
was the same kind of trend in judgmental accuracy in each condition ± a main effect 
of traits, a main effect of scales as well as an interaction between the traits and the 
scales. Additionally, the main effect associated with the scales and the interaction 
between the traits and the scales were strongest in the Video and Audio Condition.   
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Table 6.5.  F values of the repeated measures ANOVA in each information condition (Video & Audio, 
Video Only, and Audio Only) in Study 8 
ANOVA Test Video & Audio 
Condition 
 
Video Only 
Condition 
Audio Only condition 
 
Main Effect of Traits 
 
F (4, 116) = 3.90* 
 
 
F (4, 116) = 3.41* 
 
F (4, 116) = 4.95** 
 
Main Effect of Scales 
 
F (2, 58) = 40.87** 
 
 
F (2, 58) = 9.34** 
 
F (2, 58) = 7.10* 
 
Interaction (Traits × Scales) 
 
F (8, 232) = 7.83** 
 
 
F (8, 232) = 3.83** 
 
F (2, 232) = 4.95** 
Note: * p p  
 
The U-shaped Pattern of Judgmental Accuracy in Each Trait in Each 
Condition    
Video & Audio Condition 
In accordance with Study 7, we have already know that perceivers could 
make above-chance accurate judgments about the Big Five traits (except for A) 
based on a series of videos with sound across different scenarios, and the 
performance of guessing each trait formed a U-shaped pattern. Would these findings 
be replicated based on the Conversation Scenario only?  
 ,Q WKH 9LGHR DQG $XGLR &RQGLWLRQ WKH DYHUDJH G¶ RI HDFK WUDLW DFURVV WKH
three scales was calculated as overall judgmental accuracy in each trait; the average 
G¶ZDV  SD = .29), .36 (SD = .36), .26 (SD = .37), .14 (SD = .32) and .25 (SD 
= .33) for N, E, O, A, and C respectively. These values were significantly above 
FKDQFHH[FHSW IRU WKHG¶RI1 DFFRUGLQJ WRRQH-sample t tests (N: t (29) = 1.07, p 
= .295; E: t (29) = 5.37, p < .001; O: t (29) = 3.76, p = .001; A: t (29) = 2.30, p 
= .029, and C:  t (29) = 4.17, p < .001), suggesting that perceivers could correctly 
guess the five traits except for N after viewing a short video with sound in the 
Conversation Scenario. Table 6.4 and Fig. 6.6 show that, as with Study 7, perceivers 
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did not uniformly make accurate judgments of each scale in each trait: There was no 
evidence of systematic judging for the targets who were in the middle of each trait, 
but perceivers were effective in judging the cases of low and high E, low and high O, 
low and high C, as well as low N and high A.   
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for each trait, with the 
three scales as the within-subjects factor. The results UHYHDOHG WKDW WKH G¶ YDOXHV
across the three scales in each trait were significantly different except for the trait O 
(N: F (2, 58) = 4.65, p = .013; E: F (2, 58) = 46.80, p < .001; O:  F (2, 58) = 2.52, p 
= .089; A: F (2, 58) = 13.23, p < .001; C: F (2, 58) = 12.17, p < .001). Post hoc 
Bonferroni tests for each trait (except for O) revealed the following results. For the 
trait N, performance in guessing the targets with low N was greater than the targets 
with high N (p = .032); there were no differences between the judgments of the other 
scales. For the trait E, perceivers were most effective in making judgments about the 
targets with high E than the targets who either had low E (p < .001) or average E (p 
< .001), and they performed slightly better in judging the targets with low E than the 
targets with average E (p = .056). For the trait A, perceivers were better at 
identifying the targets with high A than targets who were low (p = .012) or average 
(p < .001) in A, but there was no difference between performance in low N and 
average N. For the trait C, perceivers performed equally well in identifying the 
targets in the two extreme scales, which was better than guessing the targets within 
the average scale (ps = .001). 
Overall, perceivers were able to make accurate judgments of each trait except 
for N, and the accuracy in judging these traits formed the same kind of U-shaped 
trend as found in Study 7. Though U-shape curve for N was absent (see Fig. 6.6), 
perceivers were still relatively good at guessing the targets with low N. The 
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inconsistencies in the inferences of N and A between Study 8 and Study 7 might be 
because the current study was based only on the Conversation Scenario whereas 
Study 7 calculated the aggregate accuracy across the three scenarios.  
Video Only Condition 
 Would the findings in the Video and Audio Condition be generalized to the 
RWKHU LQIRUPDWLRQFRQGLWLRQV" ,Q WKH9LGHR2QO\&RQGLWLRQ WKHDYHUDJHG¶RIHDFK
trait across the scales was -.02 (SD = .26), .02 (SD = .30), .13 (SD = .29), -.06 (SD 
= .25) and -.12 (SD = .26) for N, E, O, A, and C respectively, among which only the 
G¶RI2ZDVVLJQLILFDQWO\DERYHFKDQFHt (29) = 2.39, p  ZKLOHWKHG¶RI&ZDV
worse than chance (t (29) = -2.55, p = .016) according to one-sample t tests of each 
G¶VXJJHVWLQJWKDWSHUFHLYHUVFRXOGRQO\FRUUHFWO\JXHVVWKHWUDLW2DQGKDGVSHFLDO
difficulty guessing the trait C after observing the target in a silent video. According 
to Table 6.4 and Fig. 6.7, perceivers were merely effective in guessing the cases of 
high E and low O and were rather poor at guessing the cases of average E and 
average C.  
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for each trait, with the 
three scales as the within-VXEMHFWV IDFWRU 7KH UHVXOWV UHYHDOHG WKDW WKH G¶ YDOXHV
across the three scales of each trait were significantly different except for the traits N 
and A (N: F (2, 58) = .98, p = .382; E: F (2, 58) = 18.06, p < .001; O:  F (2, 58) = 
4.39, p = .017; A: F (2, 58) = 1.29, p = .284; C: F (2, 58) = 3.70, p = .031). Post hoc 
Bonferroni tests for each trait (except for N and A) revealed the following things. For 
the trait E, perceivers were better at judging the targets with high E than the targets 
who either had low E (p = .002) or average E (p < .001), and they performed equally 
in judging the targets who were low or average in E. For the trait O, perceivers were 
only more effective in identifying the targets with low O than the targets with 
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average O (p = .035). For the trait C, perceivers were better at identifying the low C 
than the average C (p = .035) though they were generally poor at guessing the trait C.  
In summary, when only visual information of the target was available, overall, 
perceivers could only guess the trait O; the performance in judging the traits E, O 
and C demonstrated a U-shaped trend where judgmental accuracy was greater at the 
extremes (low or high) than in the middle.   
Audio Only Condition  
 ,Q WKH $XGLR2QO\&RQGLWLRQ WKH DYHUDJHG¶RI HDFK WUDLW DFURVV WKH VFDOHV
was .10 (SD = .35), .31 (SD = .33), .17 (SD = .30), .06 (SD = .44) and -.06 (SD = .30) 
IRU1(2$DQG&UHVSHFWLYHO\H[FHSWIRUWKHG¶RI(t (29) = 5.10, p < .001) and 
O (t (29) = 2.39, p   WKHG¶YDOXHVRIWKHRWKHUWUDLWVZHUHQRWDERYHFKDQFH
according to one-sample t tests, suggesting that perceivers could only correctly guess 
E and O while having access specifically to auditory information of the target. As 
displayed in Table 6.4 and Fig. 6.8, perceivers were good at identifying the cases of 
low and high E, high N, low O as well as high A but consistently failed to guess the 
targets who were in the average scale of any trait.  
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for each trait, with the 
three scales as the within-subjects factor. The results VKRZHGWKDWWKHG¶YDOXHVDFURVV
the scales of each trait were significantly different except for N and C (N: F (2, 58) = 
1.10, p = .341; E: F (2, 58) = 12.60, p < .001; O:  F (2, 58) = 3.22, p = .047; A: F (2, 
58) = 8.00, p < .001; C: F (2, 58) = .06, p = .939). The results of post hoc Bonferroni 
tests for each trait (except for N and C) were as follows. For the trait E, perceivers 
were equally good at guessing the targets within low and high E, and the 
performance in both cases was better than that in average E (low E > average E, p 
< .001; high E > average E, p = .022). For the trait O, there was no difference 
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between each pairwise comparison. For the trait A, perceivers were better at judging 
the targets with high A than the targets who had low (p = .004) or average A (p 
= .002).  
In summary, in the Audio Only Condition, perceivers were generally able to 
guess the traits E and O, and the performance in judging E formed a typical U-
shaped pattern where the accuracy in the average scale was not above chance but the 
accuracy in both extreme scales was greater than chance and better than that in the 
average scale. In contrast, although the trends in the traits N, O, and A were not as 
strong as E, perceivers still demonstrated effective performance in the cases of high 
N, low O and high A.  
6.4 General Discussion  
6.4.1 How Well Can Perceivers Form a First Impression of the Big Five Traits 
From Thin Slices of Behavior?  
 As demonstrated in Study 7, after watching a brief video with sound, 
perceivers were generally capable to form an accurate first impression on each of the 
Big Five traits with the exception of A. Using the video with sound in the 
Conversation Scenario, Study 8 generally replicated these results but with a few 
small exceptions.  
 These findings are consistent with the previous accuracy research of 
SHUVRQDOLW\ MXGJPHQWV UHYHDOLQJ SHUFHLYHUV¶ DELOLWLHV WR HYDOXDWH ( DQG & E\
observing thin slices of behaviour (e.g., McLarney-Vesotski et al., 2006; Carnet et al., 
2007). Moreover, the present study suggests that perceives could even make an 
accurate inference about the other three traits, which has not been inconsistently 
demonstrated in the extant literature on accuracy of first impressions of personalities 
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(e.g., Albright et al., 1988; Watson, 1989; Brokenau et al., 2004; McLarney-Vesotski 
et al., 2006; Carnet et al., 2007).  
:K\ LV SHUFHLYHUV¶ FDSDFLW\ IRU MXGJLQJ ( DQG & FRQVLVWHQWO\ UHSOLFDWHG
whereas their ability to infer the other traits tends to be inconsistent depending on the 
combination of visual and auditory information across various studies? According to 
)XQGHU¶V 5HDOLVWLF $FFXUDF\ 0RGHO 5$0  DFKLHYHPHQW RI DFFXUDF\ LQ
personality judgments requires, in part, valid and available behavioral cues. In a 
study concerning connections between the Big Five personality traits, the behaviours 
by which they are manifest, and the behaviors by which they are judged, Funder and 
Sneed (1993) suggest that for the traits E, C and A, perceivers draw upon the 
behavioral cues they think they use, and the cues they use the most are those that are 
most likely to be valid, but these conclusions less apply to the traits of N and O. 
Meanwhile, the study reveals that the number of accessible behaviour cues varies 
with different traits: The trait E had the greatest number of valid and available 
behaviour cues followed by the traits C and A while the traits N and O possess 
relatively few or conflicting behaviour cues.  
Given these connections between the five traits and their behavioral 
manifestations, research on accuracy of personality judgments might involve 
situations (which the targets experienced) varying in valid and available behaviour 
cues in relation to different types of traits. Many situations involving visual and 
auditory cues could have offered sufficient information to make an accurate 
judgment of E and C but not necessarily have supplied valid and available cues for 
guessing thHWUDLWV12DQG$)RUH[DPSOHLQ%RUNHQDXHWDO¶VVWXG\RQO\
VRPHRI WKH WDVNV VHHPHG WREH HVSHFLDOO\GLDJQRVWLFRI WKH WUDLW23HUFHLYHUV¶
ratings of O agreed most strongly with self and acquaintance ratings based on the 
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pantomime task where the targets described multiple uses of a brick and 
demonstrated them by pantomime. In the current study, after briefly observing the 
targets in videos with sound, either across the three scenarios or only in the 
Conversation Scenario, perceivers seemed to have access to sufficient behavioral 
cues of each trait (except for A across the three scenarios and N in the Conversation 
Scenario), and were duly able to form an accurate first impression on the Big Five 
traits of the targets. The capacity for personality inferences was investigated in 
GLYHUVH QDWXUDOLVWLF VRFLDO FRQWH[WV DQG PHDVXUHG ZLWK G¶ YDOXHV XVLQJ WKH PRUH
sensitive and powerful signal detection method, thus offering compelling ecological 
validity.   
In addition, based on the Conversation Scenario, Study 8 extended the 
findings with new evidence suggesting that perceivers could correctly judge the trait 
O while having access to visual only information and could accurately identify the 
traits E and O after hearing the target speaking in the conversation. Furthermore, 
SHUFHLYHUV¶FDSDFLW\IRULQIHUHQFHVRIWKHILYHWUDLWVZDVEHVWLQWKH9LGHRDQG$XGLR
Condition and worst in the Video Only Condition. In other words, it seems that a 
video with sound provided informative visual and auditory behaviour cues by which 
perceivers were able to form a first impression on the Big Five traits (except for N) 
of the targets. However, why did perceivers demonstrate fewer abilities to infer the 
five traits while viewing the same video without sound than hearing only the sound 
of the video?  
In the Conversation Scenario, the targets were covertly videoed while having 
a brief conversation with the researcher by answering some questions about 
WKHPVHOYHVVXFKDV³ZKHUHDUH\RXIURP´³ZKDWDUH\RXVWXG\LQJ´³ZKDW do you 
XVXDOO\GRDWZHHNHQGV´³ZK\GLG\RXFKRRVHWRVWXG\LQWKHXQLYHUVLW\´³ZKDWGR
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\RXWKLQNRIWKHIRRGDWWKHFDIHWHULD´DQGVRRQ$FFRUGLQJO\DVRXQGYLGHRFRXOG
contain plenty of behaviour cues, either visually or audibly observable actions like 
facial expressions, bodily gestures, loudness of the voice, along with everyday 
behaviours expressed in the verbal contents. Hence, while viewing a video with 
sound, perceivers could not only observe visual and auditory behaviours but also had 
a chance WR SHUFHLYH WKH WDUJHW¶V GDLO\ EHKDYLRur and even to link the observable 
behaviour with the verbal contents. For example, if watching a video where a target 
was very expressive and made many bodily movements while talking about an 
exciting activity he/she H[SHULHQFHG ZH ZRXOG EH OLNHO\ WR DWWULEXWH WKH WDUJHWV¶
actions to signs of being extrovert. By contrast, the visual only behavioral cues might 
be relatively less informative owing to underlying ambiguities of the actions. In the 
above example, if watching the same video without sound, we might perceive the 
same actions in different ways ± -XGJLQJ IURP WKH IUHTXHQF\RI WKH WDUJHW¶VERGLO\
movements, we might regard the target as being nervous (leading to a judgment of 
high N) or being excited (leading to a judgment of high E). In spite of the lack of 
visual cues, auditory information could be less vague and deliver fewer conflicting 
cues as opposed to visual only information in that verbal contents usually involve 
much clearer information, which enables perceivers to make more reliable 
personality judgments of the target. In the above case, even if perceivers could not 
YLVXDOO\ REVHUYH WDUJHWV¶ EHKDYLRur, they would still be able to form somewhat 
accurate impressions of the target by drawing upon the verbal contents such as the 
exciting activity the target related. 
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6.4.2 The U-Shaped Pattern of Judgmental Accuracy in the Big Five Personality 
Traits  
 Apart from examination of overall accuracy for each of the Big Five traits, 
the present study examined the capacity to infer different scales of each trait. 
Generally, there was a similar kind of U-VKDSHGSDWWHUQ LQSHUFHLYHUV¶ DFFXUDF\RI
personality judgments, in which perceivers could not guess the targets who scored 
average on a trait but were relatively good at detecting the targets who scored either 
low or high on one or more traits.  
As shown in Study 7, after watching a short video (with sound) across the 
three scenarios, perceivers were especially effective in guessing the targets who were 
low or high in N, low or high in O, low or high in C, high in E and low in A. Based 
on the videos (with sound) in the scenario of Conversation, Study 8 replicated these 
findings to a large degree: Perceivers demonstrated systemic performance in 
identifying the targets who scored either low or high on the traits of E, O and C and 
the targets who were low in N and high in A. To summarize these data another way: 
,Q WKH YLGHR DQG DXGLR FRQGLWLRQ WKHUH LV WKH VDPH NLQG RI WUHQG LQ SHUFHLYHUV¶
capacity to infer each trait ± with worst performance in the average scale and better 
performance in either one or both of the two extreme scales (low and high). 
Why would this U-shaped trend occur in forming first impressions of the Big 
Five traits? As with the explanation for the U-shaped pattern in the ability to infer 
empathic traits (details appear in Chapter 3), people who have an unusual personality 
might behave in some ways different from the average person; for instance, an 
extravert usually is more talkative while an introvert is rather quiet in social 
interactions, by which perceivers could distinguish them from average persons. An 
alternative possibility is that people could have developed to be able to recognize 
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persons who are low or high in personality dimensions during the everyday practice 
of person perception in their social lives. For example, while communicating with an 
agreeable person, we usually could experience calm and enjoyment; while 
interacting with a person high in neuroticism we might feel stressful and nervous. 
From such experiences of social interactions we might have learned to identify those 
who have unusual personalities.   
Both studies presented in this chapter suggest that the strength of U shape 
differs depending on traits ± For some traits, the U shape is strong with better 
performance in both low and high scales while for the others the U shape is relatively 
weak with effective performance in only one of the extreme scales. Why are some 
traits easier to infer than others? As discussed, the Big Five traits are related to 
different behavioral manifestations (Funder & Sneed, 1993). That is, access to 
sufficient observable behaviour cues may vary across the traits depending on the 
context. In addition, according to previous studies (e.g., Albright et al., 1988; Watson, 
1989; Norman & Goldberg, 1966; Borkenau & Liebler, 1992b; Funder & Sneed, 
1993; Carney et al., 2007), some traits (such as E and C) seem to be relatively easy to 
infer due to being less inward and more visible while other traits (such as N) are 
more difficult to judge because of being more inward and less visible. Taking these 
factors into account, it seems understandable that perceivers did not demonstrate a 
uniform U-shaped pattern in the judgments of each trait.  
 Finally, based on the Conversation Scenario, there was a similar kind of U-
shaped pattern in the Video only Condition where perceivers were better at 
identifying high E and low O and in the Audio Only Condition where perceivers 
made systemically accurate judgments of low and high E, low O and high A. Taken 
together, these results suggest that visual or auditory information is sufficient to 
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make an accurate judgment about high E and low O, but it seems that auditory cues 
(including verbal contents) played a key role in detecting the targets low in E and 
high in A.  
6.5 Conclusion  
 To conclude, this chapter reported two studies based on thin slices of 
behaviour, revealing that perceivers can form well-above chance accurate first 
impressions of the Big Five traits while having access to both visual and sound cues, 
and also can make an accurate judgment of one or more traits while being exposed to 
visual only or audio only information. Moreover, performance of guessing each trait 
demonstrates a similar kind of U-shaped pattern where perceivers could not guess the 
average scale of each trait but were effective in guessing either one or both of the 
extreme scales in one or more traits. Finally, while performance in making 
judgments about personalities was not different across the three scenarios, 
performance was best in the Video and Audio Condition and worst in the Video only 
Condition. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
2UGLQDU\ 3HRSOH¶V &RPPRQVHQVH 9LHZV $ERXW )LUVW
Impressions of Personalities 
 
³7KRXJKWKHIXOOVLJQLILFDQFHRIPDQ¶VUHODWLRQVWRPDQPD\QRWEHGLUHFWO\
evident, the complexity of feelings and actions that can be understood at a glance is 
surprisingly great. It is for this reason that psychology holds a unique position among 
WKH VFLHQFHV ³,QWXLWLYH´ NQRZledge may be remarkably penetrating and can go a 
long way toward the understanding of human behavior, whereas in the physical 
sciences such common-sense knowledge is relatively primitive. If we erased all 
knowledge of scientific physics from our world, not only would we not have cars and 
television sets and atom bombs, we might even find that the ordinary person was 
unable to cope with the fundamental mechanical problems of pulleys and levers. On 
the other hand, if we removed all knowledge of scientific psychology from our world, 
problems in interpersonal relations might easily be coped with and solved much as 
EHIRUH´+HLGHUS 
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7.1 Introduction  
We have a great deal of naïve physics knowledge that enables us to master 
our daily life successfully; likewise, as Heider claimed in the above quotation, we 
also possess a lot of commonsense knowledge about the mind, which allows us to 
perceive the inside of another person that is physically invisible, enabling us to 
navigate our social world smoothly. Psychologists like Hedier (1958), Fletcher 
(1984), and Kelly (1992) have paid much attention to commonsense psychology for 
both theoretical and applied reasons.  
For theoretical considerations, commonsense psychology has been regarded 
as a valuable resource of scientific psychology (Heider, 1958; Fletcher, 1984; Kelly, 
1992). Fletcher (1984) argues that psychological theories at least embrace the class 
of fundamental assumptions including a set of shared basic commonsense knowledge 
about the nature of the social and physical world even in the absence of explicit 
recognition of the fact. Heider (1958) not only debated the importance of 
commonsense psychology in studying person perception, but also proposed an 
elaborate conceptual framework built upon naïve psychology to interpret the 
processes by which people perceive each other in daily life.  
For practical reasons, commonsense psychology guides our everyday actions 
towards other people (Heider, 1958). We talk about other people using everyday 
mentalistic terms and personality labels; we explain what other people did in the past 
and predict what they will do in the future using various strategies of mentalising; we 
form impressions of other people by observing what and how they do in their lives. 
Furthermore, our commonsense views about psychological events seem to be 
DFFXUDWHWRVRPHGHJUHH)RULQVWDQFHWRVWXG\³OD\NQRZOHGJHRIWKHSULQFLSOHVRI
SV\FKRORJ\´+RXVWRQ  LQYHQWHGD TXHVWLRQQDLUH LQFOXGLQJ DQDUUD\RI
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multiple-choice questions about various memory and learning phenomena, with each 
item stated in everyday language. Participants were required to respond to each item 
by picking a choice from the given options. Results show that they answered the 
majority of items more accurately than would be expected by chance. Houston thus 
FODLPHG³$JUHDWPDQ\RISV\FKRORJ\¶VEDVLFSULQFLSOHVDUHVHOI-evident. One gets 
the uneasy feeling that we have often been dealing with the obvious and did not 
NQRZLW´S 
In contrast, some findings are counter-intuitive. In the classic research of 
obedience to authority (Milgram, 1963), participants were asked to obey an authority 
figure who instructed them to give severe electric shocks to a learner each time the 
leaner answered a question incorrectly. Milgram (1963) found that about 65% of 
participants obeyed authority and gave such apparently dangerous shocks, and only 
35% refused. Milgram subsequently investigated whether or not these results are 
intuitively surprising by conducting an attitude scale to examine how people predict 
others would perform when commanded to administer powerful shocks to another 
person. Results demonstrated that respondents underestimate the scale of obedience 
to authority in wrongly predicating that only a small minority would go through to 
the end of the shock series.  
'RSHRSOHKROGDFFXUDWHFRPPRQVHQVHYLHZVDERXWSHRSOH¶VFDSDFLW\WRIRUP
an accurate intuitive impression of personality? Inspired by the ideas of Milgram, we 
created a survey to address this question.      
Chapters 3 to 6 reported a series of studies examining how well people can 
guess personalities of non-acquaintances based on thin slices of behaviour. The 
findings reveal that people are capable of inferring the trait of empathy as well as 
some dimensions of the Big Five traits after observing a brief sample of behaviour, 
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whether the behaviour is visual or auditory, dynamic or static. Moreover, people 
have a great talent for guessing those who have an unusual personality in contrast 
with those who have an average personality. Additionally, Study 2 (see Chapter 3) 
suggests that people are inclined to have confidence in the first impressions that they 
formed of other people even though in fact the level of confidence was not related  
with accuracy in personality judgments. As with Milgram, when designing the 
attitude scale according to the experimental results, we invented a survey in order to 
explore the extent to which people possess accurate commonsense views that are 
consistent with the actual findings we obtained. 
7.2 Method 
7.2.1 Summary 
7KHRQOLQHVXUYH\V\VWHP4XDOWLUFVZDVXVHGWRFDUU\RXWDVXUYH\µ$WWLWXGH
7RZDUGV3HRSOH¶V)LUVW,PSUHVVLRQVRQ3HUVRQDOLW\¶LQFOXGLQJLWHPVGHVLJQHGLQ
accordance with the experimental findings reported in Chapter 3 ± Chapter 6. 
Participants were asked to fill in the survey on the website hosted by Qualtrics. The 
procedure was scrutinized and approved by the Faculty of Science ethics committee 
in the University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus, which was constituted and 
operated according to guidelines prescribed by the British Psychological Society.   
7.2.2 Participants 
Two-hundred and fifty-three participants from the University of Nottingham 
Malaysia Campus were recruited online, but 85 of these responses were incomplete 
and therefore deleted. Thus, there was a valid sample of 168 participants (64 males, 
103 females, & 1 skipping the gender information), with a mean age of 22 years 
(three participants did not provide any information of age).  
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7.2.3 Survey 
The survey µ$WWLWXGH 7RZDUGV 3HRSOH¶V )LUVW ,PSUHVVLRQV RQ 3HUVRQDOLW\¶
consists of 11 items in the form of question, together with a 7-point Liker scale for 
HDFKLWHP7KHLWHPVFRQFHUQHGVHYHUDODVSHFWVRISHRSOH¶VFRPPRQVHQVHYLHZV
about first impressions of personalities, involving the frequency (Item 7) and 
importance (Items 8, 9 & 11) of first-impression formation, and confidence (Item 10) 
and accuracy (Items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) of personality judgments. The 11 questions were 
as follows.      
1. How accurate do yoXWKLQNSHRSOH¶VILUVWLPSUHVVLRQVRISHUVRQDOLWLHV
are? (1 = not accurate at all, 7 = extremely accurate) 
2. People are more accurate in their first impressions of people who have 
unusual personalities than in their first impressions of people who 
have average personalities. Do you agree with this opinion? (1 = 
strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
3. How accurately do you think people can assess personality after 
viewing a 10-second sample of behaviour in a video? (1 = not 
accurate at all, 7 = extremely accurate) 
4. How accurately do you think people can assess personality after 
watching photographs (for ten seconds) of a person taken while 
carrying out some action? (1 = not accurate at all, 7 = extremely 
accurate) 
5. How accurately do you think people can guess personality after 
looking at a passport photograph for ten seconds? (1 = not accurate at 
all, 7 = extremely accurate) 
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6. How accurately do you think people can assess personality after 
hearing a person speak for 10 seconds (in the absence of any visual 
information)? (1 = not accurate at all, 7 = extremely accurate) 
7. How common is it for people to form an impression of personality on 
first meeting someone? (1 = not common at all, 7 = extremely 
common) 
8. How important is it to form an impression of personality on first 
meeting someone? (1 = not important at all, 7 = extremely important) 
9. +RZ LPSRUWDQW LV LW WR PDNH DQ DFFXUDWH DVVHVVPHQW RI VRPHRQH¶V
personality on first meeting? (1 = not important at all, 7 = extremely 
important) 
10. How confident do you think people feel they have made an accurate 
assessment of personality on first meeting someone? (1 = very low 
confidence, 7 = very high confidence) 
11. $ ILUVW LPSUHVVLRQ RI VRPHRQH¶V SHUVRQDOLW\ LV HQGXULQJ UDWKHU WKDQ
being quickly replaced by better informed impression as acquaintance 
grows. Do you agree with this opinion? (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree)  
 
7.2.4 Procedure 
We generated the survey using the online platform Qualtrics, along with an 
LQVWUXFWLRQIRUPSDUWLFLSDQW¶VLQIRUPDWLRQIRUPDQGDFRQVent form.  The 11 items in 
the survey were presented in random order determined by the Qualtirics system. 
After launching the survey on Qualtrics, the link was sent to all students in the 
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University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus by email. All data were collected and 
recorded by Qualtrics.  
7.3 Results and Discussion  
Table 7.1 displays the mean response to each item (according to the 7-point 
scale), along with the values of one-sample t tests comparing each mean score with 
the neutral point (four) of the scale. If the mean is significantly greater than 4, then 
participants hold a positive attitude towards the statement; if the mean is less than 4, 
then participants have a negative view.   
 
Table 7.1. Means (and standard deviations) of responses to each item, along with values of one-
sample t tests (df = 167) of each mean in the survey 
Item No. M (SD) t p 
1 3.74 (1.30) -2.62 .01 
2 4.64 (1.35) 6.17 < .001 
3 3.65 (1.39) -3.29 .001 
4 2.89 (1.40) -10.34 < .001 
5 2.23 (1.33) -17.21 < .001 
6 3.49 (1.53) -4.29 < .001 
7 5.78 (1.16) 19.88 < .001 
8 5.20 (1.33) 11.68 < .001 
9 4.52 (1.45) 4.69 < .001 
10 4.51 (1.33) 4.93 < .001 
11 4.17 (1.51) 1.43 .15 
  
As shown in Table 7.1, participants believed that forming a first impression 
of personality is a very common phenomenon in everyday life (Item 7): t (167) = 
19.88, p < .001. In their opinion, it is of importance to form a first impression of 
personality (Items 8 & 9), whether the impression is accurate or not. And when asked 
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whether a first impression would be quickly replaced by a better-informed 
impression as acquaintance increases (Item 11), they held a neutral attitude (p = .15). 
According to the results of Items 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6, participants held fairly negative 
views about whether people can form an accurate first impression of personality, 
either at an overall level (p = .01) or based on brief exposure at different types of 
cues such as videos, audios and images (ps +RZHYHUWKH\VWURQJO\DJUHHG
that people are more accurate in their first impressions of people who have unusual 
personalities than in their first impressions of people who have average personalities 
(Item 2): t (167) = 6.17, p < .001. Finally, participants agreed that people tend to feel 
confident of being able to form an accurate first impression of personality (Item 10): 
t (167) = 4.93, p < .001.  
To organize these results, Table 7.2 demonstrates the range order of the 
means of the 11 items. Apparently, the means in the items that are relevant to 
accuracy of forming a first impression of personality (Items 1, 3, 4, 5, & 6) ordered 
FORVHO\DWWKHERWWRPRIWKHWDEOHZKLOH,WHPZKLFKUHODWHVWRSHRSOH¶VFDSDFLW\IRU
inferences of unusual personalities) was listed at the top. These results should not be 
explained by an order effect because all 11 items were presented to participants in a 
random order. Even so, given that we do not know the calibration of the 7-point scale, 
to be cautious, we compared related items by conducting correlation analyses and 
paired-samples t tests or a repeated measures one-way ANOVA.  
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Table 7.2. Range order of the means (and standard deviations) of responses to each item, along with 
values of one-sample t tests of each mean (df = 167) in the survey  
Item No. M (SD) t p 
7 5.78 (1.16) 19.88 < .001 
8 5.20 (1.33) 11.68 < .001 
2 4.64 (1.35) 6.17 < .001 
9 4.52 (1.45) 4.69 < .001 
10 4.51 (1.33) 4.93 < .001 
11 4.17 (1.51) 1.43 .15 
1 3.74 (1.30) -2.62 .01 
3 3.65 (1.39) -3.29 .001 
6 3.49 (1.53) -4.29 < .001 
4 2.89 (1.40) -10.34 < .001 
5 2.23 (1.33) -17.21 < .001 
 
 As shown in Table 7.2, Items 8 and 9, both concerning the importance of 
first impression formation, were in close proximity. A Pearson correlation revealed 
media significant association between the two items, r = .51, p < .001, and a paired-
samples t test showed a significant difference (t (167) = 6.35, p < .001), suggesting 
that participants were more positive in response to the question about the importance 
of making a first impression (Item 8) than the question about the importance of 
forming an accurate first impression (Item 9).     
According to Table 7.2, participants seemed to disagree that people can form 
accurate impressions of personality on first meeting (Item 1), but they agreed that 
people are prone to believe that they have formed an accurate first impression of 
another person (Item 10). A paired-samples t test confirmed that participants were 
more positive in response to Item 10 than in response to Item 1 (t (167) = 5.92, p 
< .001). These commonsense views are consistent with the empirical data reported in 
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Study 2 ± Perceivers seemed to be overconfident in their personality judgments even 
though those who were most confident were not necessarily most accurate.  
Participants held a negative attitude towards whether people can form an 
accurate first impression of personality (Item 1), as demonstrated in Table 7.2. 
Nevertheless, they seemed to have strong feelings that people are better at 
identifying extreme personality as opposed to identifying average personality (Item 
2), t (167) = 6.37, p < .001.  
,WHPV    DQG  H[DPLQHG SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ DWWLWXGHV WRZDUGV MXGJPHQWDO
accuracy based on different types of information. Pearson correlations revealed 
significant associations (Items 3 & 4: r = .54, p < .001; Items 3 & 5, r = .40, p < .001; 
Items 3 & 6: r = .45, p < .001; Items 4 & 5: r = .51, p < .001; Items 4 & 6: r = .36, p 
< .001; Items 5 & 6: r = .38, p < .001). In other words, those who thought that it is 
possible to make accurate judgments based on first impressions did so consistently; 
those who thought that it is difficult to make accurate judgments also did so 
consistently. A repeated measures one-way ANOVA showed a significant difference 
among these four items, F (3, 501) = 62.20, p < .001, and post hoc Bonferroni tests 
demonstrated the follRZLQJ UHVXOWV  ,Q SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ YLHZV LW LV OHDVW OLNHO\ WR
form an accurate first impression based on passport photograph (Item 5) (ps < .001); 
(2) accuracy based on the videos and sound (Items 3 & 6) is equally good (ps < .001), 
both of which are better than accuracy related to photographs capturing some action 
(Item 4) (ps < .001). In other words, these results suggest that participants held a 
position suggesting that people form an accurate impression of personality based on 
behaviour, whether the behavior is presented in video, sound, or photograph, but not 
based on still images (such as passport pictures) that are not informative about 
behaviour. In addition, participants seemed to judge that video and audio provide 
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equally useful information for forming an accurate first impression, which is more 
informative than a photograph that captures activity.      
To summarize, the data of the survey suggest that ordinary people hold the 
following commonsense views about first impressions of personalities: (1) People 
believe it is very common to form a first impression of personality in social life, and 
this first impression is very important, whether it is accurate or not; (2) overall, they 
believe that people cannot infer personalities of others very well on first meeting, but 
they believe that people are inclined to have confidence in their first impressions of 
personality; (3) they believe that people are better at identifying those who have 
unusual personalities than those who have average personalities; (4) they believe that 
SHRSOHFDQQRWJXHVVRWKHUV¶SHUVRQDOLWLHVDIWHUYLHZLQJDVKRUWVDPSOHRIYLGHRVRU
hearing snippets of audio, or briefly observing photographs, and that people make 
personality judgments according to the behaviour of others; (5) they believe that 
people can make more accurate first-impression judgments of personalities while 
having access to video or sound information than by observing photographs that are 
related to some action.  
According to these findings, ordinary people apparently tend to underestimate 
the ability to form an accurate first impression of personality from a brief sample of 
behaviour. Apart from this, most of their commonsense views captured by the survey 
are inclined to be consistent with the evidence of actual performance (presented in 
the previous chapters) with the exception that the common sense view is not entirely 
consistent with the kinds of evidence that are more or less informative about 
personality.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
General Discussion and Overall Conclusion  
8.1 Summary of Empirical Studies  
,QUHVSRQGLQJWRWKHTXHVWLRQDVNHGLQ&KDSWHU³KRZZHOOFDQSHRSOHLQIHU
SHUVRQDOLW\ WUDLWV RQ ILUVW PHHWLQJ´ , UHSRUWHG D VHULHV RI VWXGLHV LQ &KDSWHU  WR
Chapter 6 and a survey in Chapter 7. In the following, I will summarize the empirical 
work presented in this thesis.  
 In Chapter 3, two studies were designed to explore whether people can guess 
how empathizing another person is after watching a short video. In Study 1, 
perceivers were asked to guess EQ after viewing a video (without sound) in which 
the target was experiencing one of four given scenarios (the Compliment, the Story, 
the Joke and the Waiting). Results demonstrate that overall perceivers could form an 
accurate first impression of target empathic traits, and they were especially good at 
identifying the targets who either had low or high EQ but were not effective in 
identifying the targets who scored average in EQ. Additionally, Study 1 revealed a 
significant associatiRQEHWZHHQSHUFHLYHUV¶UDWLQJVRIWKHWDUJHWV¶(4VDQGSHUFHLYHUV¶
self-reported EQs (which were fed back to the perceivers before proceeding to guess 
the EQ of the target), suggesting that perceivers to some extent assumed similarity 
when making first-impression judgments of empathic traits based on thin slices of 
behaviour.  
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Given the fact that the EQs of the targets varied according to scenarios 
H[SHULHQFHGE\WKHWDUJHWV WKH(4PLJKWUHIOHFWQRW WKHWDUJHW¶VHQGXULQJHPSDWKLF
WUDLW EXW WKH WDUJHW¶V WHPporary empathic state induced by a certain scenario. The 
purpose of Study 2 was thus to clarify whether or not perceivers genuinely assessed 
empathy as a trait. Three samples of new video clips were collected, each involving 
one of the three scenarios (the Conversation, the Joke, & the Screen Test) 
H[SHULHQFHGE\HDFKWDUJHW3HUFHLYHUVZHUHDVNHGWRPDNHDMXGJPHQWRIWKHWDUJHW¶V
EQ after viewing an audio video of the target either in the Conversation, the Joke or 
the Screen Test Scenario. Unlike Study 1, after completing the EQ questionnaire, 
perceivers were required to guess their own EQ instead of receiving informative 
feedback. In addition, they had to evaluate confidence in the EQ judgments they 
made about the targets and themselves. The results reveal the following things: (1) 
The principal findings reported in Study 1 were replicated; that is, perceivers could 
generally guess the EQs of the targets, and performance in detecting different EQ 
scales formed a U-shaped trend, in which perceivers were better at guessing the 
targets who fell into the extreme EQ scales than the targets who had average EQ; (2) 
there was no difference in the overall accuracy in estimations across the three 
VFHQDULRVSHUFHLYHUV¶HVWLPDWLRQRIWKHWDUJHWV¶(4VVLJQLILFDQWO\ correlated with 
the EQ they guessed about themselves but not their actual EQs as determined by 
their responses to the EQ questionnaire; (4) perceivers generally felt confident in 
their judgments of the EQ about the targets and themselves though they had more 
confidence in self-perception; (5) nevertheless, judgmental accuracy of EQ was not 
associated with confidence in being able to make an accurate judgment. 
Taken together, Studies 1 and 2 suggest that perceivers can form an accurate 
first impression of empathic traits of others after briefly observing them in a video, 
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whether the video is audible or silent. Does this mean that it is necessary for 
perceivers to see an animation of behaviour in inferring the empathic capacity of 
another person? Chapter 4 presented three studies based on the stimuli of the Joke 
Scenario (taken from Study 2) in order to address this question. In Study 3, 
perceivers were asked to guess the EQ of the target either after watching a video 
(without sound) or observing three photographs taken from the same video. The 
perceivers were equally good at guessing EQs of the targets in both conditions, and, 
as with Studies 1 and 2, the data formed the same U-shaped pattern in the sense that 
perceivers were effective in guessing who had extreme EQ but not effective in 
guessing who had average EQ.  
On what basis were perceivers able to infer empathic traits? Did perceivers 
make accurate judgments of EQ based only on the facial appearance of the targets or 
based on the behaviour of targets as sXJJHVWHGE\WKHWDUJHWV¶IDFLDOH[SUHVVLRQV"7R
examine this matter, Study 4 required perceivers to guess the EQ of the target either 
in the first photograph condition or the last photograph condition; the former 
involved a neutral pose before the target stated reading the joke whereas the latter 
FDSWXUHGWKHDSH[RIWKHWDUJHW¶VH[SUHVVLRQDVKHRUVKHGHOLYHUHGWKHSXQFKOLQHRI
the joke. Results show that (1) the U-shaped pattern of judgmental accuracy was only 
replicated in the last photograph condition, (2) performance in the last photograph 
condition was much better than in the first photograph condition, and (3) perceivers 
could not make systemically accurate judgments of EQ in the first photograph 
condition, either at an aggregate level or at a fine-grained level. In summary, Studies 
3 and 4 converge in suggesting that perceivers were able to form an accurate first 
impression of empathic traits based on the behaviour of the target and not based on 
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the facial appearance of the target, whether the behaviour was communicated in an 
animation or in still pictures.  
Having demonstrated the capacity for inferences of empathic trait on the 
basis of visual behaviour cues, would perceivers be able to identify who has low EQ 
and who has high EQ after hearing the target talking for a few seconds? The goal of 
Study 5 was to answer this question. Perceivers were asked to judge the EQ of the 
target while watching a short video (without sound) or listening to the soundtrack 
derived from the same audio video. Results reveal that (1) performance in the video 
condition formed the same U-shaped trend as found in the previous studies, (2) 
perceivers were only effective in identifying the targets who had high EQ in the 
audio condition, and (3) perceivers performed slightly better in the video condition 
than the audio condition overall. Hence, Study 5 has extended the previous findings 
by providing new evidence on the ability to infer empathic traits merely from vocal 
behaviour cues.  
Additionally, Study 5 included two surveys to examine the relationship 
EHWZHHQ DVVHVVPHQWV RI WKH WDUJHWV¶ (4V DQG UDWLQJV RI WKH WDUJHWV¶ H[SUHVVLYLW\
Independent judges were asked to assess expressivity of the targets after either 
viewing a silent video or listening to an audiotrack (in the Joke Scenario). The results 
UHYHDOWKDWHLWKHULQWKHYLGHRRUWKHDXGLRFRQGLWLRQLQGHSHQGHQWMXGJHV¶UDWLQJVRI
WKHWDUJHWV¶H[SUHVVLYLW\ZHUHVLJQLILFDQWO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKSHUFHLYHUV¶MXGJPHQWVRI
WKHWDUJHWV¶(4V)ROORZLQJWKHVHSUHOLPLQDU\UHVXOWV6WXGy 6 reported in Chapter 5 
was conducted to further investigate the correlation between evaluation of 
expressivity and judgments of EQ. Perceivers had to rate both expressivity and the 
EQ of the target while watching a video with sound in the Joke Scenario (taken from 
Study 2). The results indicated a strong association between the ratings of EQ and 
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the estimates of expressivity, and this correlation was not caused by cross 
contamination from answering one question (of expressivity or of EQ) to another, 
and cannot be explained by saying that perceivers treated the two questions (of 
expressivity and EQ) identically.  
Given the findings of the impressive U-VKDSHG SDWWHUQ IRU SHUFHLYHUV¶
capacity to infer empathic traits, would the U-shaped pattern also be apparent in 
inferences of the Big Five personality traits? Chapter 6 reported two studies 
investigating how well people form a first impression of the Big Five traits based on 
thin slices of behaviour.   
In Study 7, using the same video stimuli as Study 2, perceivers were asked to 
guess the Big Five traits of each target after viewing an audio video either in the 
Conversation, the Joke or the Screen Test Scenario. The findings were summarized 
as follows. (1) Perceivers demonstrated the same kind of trend towards performance 
of guessing the five traits in each scenario: There were main effects associated with 
the traits and the scales and an interaction between Trait and Scale. The interaction 
between Trait and Scale was also affected by the scenarios. (2) Accuracy in the 
judgments of the Big Five traits was not different between scenarios. (3) Perceivers 
could make an overall accurate judgment of each of the five personality dimensions 
except for the dimension of A across the three scenarios. (4) Performance in guessing 
each personality dimension formed a similar type of U-shaped pattern, in which 
perceivers could not correctly guess the targets who belonged to the middle scale of 
each trait but were effective in identifying the targets who scored low or high in one 
or more traits, and the accuracy in one or both of the extreme scales was greater than 
the average scale in each trait with the exception of the trait A: Perceivers were 
better at identifying the cases of low N, high E, low and high O, and low and high C. 
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Though the U-shaped trend was not apparent for the trait A, perceivers still were 
effective in detecting targets with low A. 
To examine whether this sort of U-shaped trend for judgmental accuracy in 
the Big Five traits would be apparent with different types of behavioral information, 
Study 8 required perceivers to guess the five personality traits of each target either 
after viewing a video with sound (the Video and Audio Condition), a video without 
sound (the Video Only Condition) or hearing a soundtrack taken from the same 
video clip (the Audio Only Condition) based on the Conversation Scenario (taken 
from Study 2). Results were reported as follows: (1) There was a similar kind of 
trend towards judgmental accuracy in the Big Five traits for each type of information, 
including main effects related with the traits and scales as well as an interaction 
between the traits and the scales. (2) Overall, perceivers demonstrated best 
performance in inferring the Big Five traits after watching a video with sound and 
performed worst while viewing the same video without sound. (3) Performance in 
the Video and Audio Condition replicated the findings in Study 7 with a few small 
exceptions: Perceivers could generally make accurate judgments of the five traits 
except for N, and performance in each trait formed a similar kind of U-shaped 
pattern, in which perceivers consistently failed to identify the targets who were 
average in each trait but were effective in identifying the targets who were low in N, 
low and high in E, low and high in O, high in A, and low and high in C. (4) In the 
Video Only Condition, perceivers could only infer the trait of O, and the U-shaped 
trend demonstrated that perceivers were better at guessing the cases of low O and 
high E. (5) In the Audio Only Condition, perceivers could make overall accurate 
judgments of the traits of O and E, and were more effective in identifying the targets 
with high N, low and high E, low O and high A.      
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The studies presented in Chapters 3 to 6 repeatedly revealed an intriguing 
phenomenon of being able to form an accurate first impression of personality from a 
brief sample of behaviour, with special sensitivity in identifying those who have 
unusual personalities compared with those who have average personalities. What are 
the intuitions of ordinary people about our capacity to form accurate first impressions 
of personality?    
,QVSLUHG E\ WKH LGHDV RI 0LOJUDP  LQ DQ LQYHVWLJDWLRQ RI SHRSOH¶V
intuitive perception in the phenomenon of obedience to authority, we developed a 
VXUYH\ EDVHG RQ WKH ILQGLQJV RI WKH HLJKW VWXGLHV H[DPLQLQJ RUGLQDU\ SHRSOH¶V
FRPPRQVHQVH YLHZV DERXW ILUVW LPSUHVVLRQV RI RWKHUV¶ SHUVRQDOLWLHV 7KH GDWD
suggest that ordinary people believe that (1) it is very common and very important to 
form a first impression of personality in our social life, (2) people are not accurate in 
forming a first impression of personality, whether it is at an overall level or based on 
brief different types of information (e.g., video, picture, and audio), but personality 
inferences could be made from the behavior rather than just the appearance of 
another person, (3) people are capable of distinguishing persons with extreme 
personalities from the average person, and (4) people tend to feel highly confident of 
being able WR PDNH DQ DFFXUDWH MXGJPHQW RI DQRWKHU¶V SHUVRQDOLWLHV $SDUW IURP
underestimating the abilities to infer personalities on first meeting, most of their 
commonsense views captured by the survey are basically consistent with evidence of 
actual performance (reported in the previous chapters).    
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8.2 How Well Can People Guess Personalities From a Brief Sample 
of Behavior?  
8.2.1 Overall Accuracy of Personality Inferences  
 2YHUDOO WKH HLJKW VWXGLHV KDYH GHPRQVWUDWHG SHUFHLYHUV¶ FDSDFLW\ WR IRUP
accurate impressions of personalities on first meeting. People can correctly guess 
empathic traits after viewing a short video (either with or without sound), after 
observing still pictures capturing an activity, or after merely hearing a soundtrack for 
several seconds. They are able to draw inferences of many personality dimensions of 
WKH%LJ)LYHWUDLWVDIWHUEULHIO\REVHUYLQJWKHWDUJHW¶VEHKDYLRur or hearing the target 
speaking, either across different scenarios or only in the Conversation Scenario; they 
are also capable of inferring the trait O after watching the video without sound and 
making correct judgments of the dimensions of E and O while hearing sound from 
the video in the Conversation Scenario.  
 In Comparison with previous research on accuracy in first impressions of 
personality, the research reported in this thesis offers new information in answer to 
WKHTXHVWLRQ³KRZZHOOFDQSHRSOHGUDZLQIHUHQFHVRISHUVRQDOLWLHV"´)LUVWRIDOOLQ
spite of adopting self-other agreement as a criterion of accuracy, unlike previous 
studies, the current research utilized signal detection method instead of correlation 
analysis to calculate self-other agreement of personality judgments; that is, the 
WDUJHW¶VDFWXDO personality (measurable with the relevant questionnaires) served as a 
³VLJQDO´DQGRQO\ZKHQSHUFHLYHUVFRUUHFWO\LGHQWLILHGWKDW³VLJQDO´FRXOGVHOI-other 
agreement be counted. This method allows an assessment of accuracy that is 
independent of underlyiQJ EDVH UDWHV RI WDUJHWV¶ DFWXDO VFDOHV RI SHUVRQDOLW\ WUDLWV
ORZDYHUDJH	KLJKDQGSHUFHLYHUV¶UHVSRQVHELDVLQDSDUWLFXODUVFDOHRIHDFKWUDLW
Correlational measures, in contrast, can only tell us about the extent to which the 
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SHUFHLYHU¶VUDWLQJVDUHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHWDUJHW¶VVHOI-ratings but not about accuracy 
based on the amount of elevation (i.e., positive or negative bias). Hence, signal 
GHWHFWLRQ LV PRUH XVHIXO LQ WHOOLQJ XV DERXW SHUFHLYHUV¶ FDSDFLW\ IRU SHUVRQDOLW\
inferences.   
In addition, instead of using artificial stimuli, such as crafted trait-related 
scenarios and deliberate actions, the present research involved a large sample of 
stimuli collected from several naturalistic social settings where targets engaged in 
various trivial activities like having a casual conversation, telling a joke, being kept 
waiting and so forth, which could happen to anyone in everyday life. Besides, the 
context in which perceivers made personality judgments of the targets resembled the 
way in which people usually judge what another person is like in the real world. 
Taking consideration of these factors, we assume that the current findings of overall 
accuracy in personality inferences should have high external validity.  
 Moreover, the present findings have added a body of knowledge to the 
existing accuracy research of personality judgments. First of all, we conducted the 
initial investigation to examine the capacity for inferences of empathic traits from 
thin slices of behaviour, and provided compelling evidence indicating that people are 
able to form an accurate first-impression judgment of empathic capacity. Secondly, 
ZH H[DPLQHG SHRSOH¶V DELOLWLHV WR LQIHU SHUVRQDOLW\ WUDLWV EDVHG RQ D EDWWHU\ RI
observable behaviour samples in more than one situation, and found that people 
perform equally well in drawing personality inferences in different situations 
experienced by the same sample of targets. Thirdly, we explored influences of 
different types of behavioral cues (visual and sound, visual only, and sound only) on 
accuracy in personality judgments, conditions which have received little attention in 
extant research. Results indicated that specific kinds of information have varying 
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effects on judgmental accuracy depending on which traits are being inferred. For 
example, merely visual (either in animated or still form) or auditory information is 
sufficient for perceivers to make an overall accurate judgment of empathic traits 
though performance is slightly better after observing visual than auditory information. 
However, while having access to only visual or sound information, perceivers are 
only able to infer one or two personality dimensions of the Big Five traits, while they 
can infer the majority of the Big Five traits while having access to both visual and 
sound information.  
8.2.2 The U-shaped Pattern in Accuracy of Personality Judgments 
 Most importantly, the research presented in the current thesis explored 
SHRSOH¶V ILQH-grained abilities to infer different levels of particular traits, and 
revealed a striking U-shaped pattern of accuracy, in which perceivers can make 
systemically accurate judgments of targets who have extreme traits but are unable to 
make accurate judgments of targets who are average. The U-shaped trend emerged 
consistently across different scenarios and different types of target behaviour when 
perceivers were inferring empathic traits. Perceivers were equally effective in 
identifying targets who had either low or high empathic capacity after watching a 
video of the target (whether the video was audible or not) and after viewing one or 
three still photographs of the target engaging in some kind of behaviour; they were 
also good at identifying the targets with high empathy while listening to a snippet of 
sound of the target. In contrast, the strength of U shape for inferences of the Big Five 
traits was affected by several factors such as scenarios, personality dimensions, and 
different types of behaviour information. In general, the U-shaped trend was strong 
in the Conversation Scenario and in the Video and Audio Condition, demonstrating 
the same kind of U-shaped pattern for accuracy in inferring personality dimensions. 
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In the Video Only Condition, perceivers were effective only in making judgments of 
low O and high E, and in the Audio Only Condition, they were only good at guessing 
the cases of low and high E, high N, low O and high A.  
 In summary, it seems that people have a great talent for making an accurate 
inference of extreme personality traits after observing a brief sample of behaviour. 
How could this happen? According to the lens model, proposed by Brunswick (1955), 
social perception of uncertain (distal) events is dependent upon a process of 
inference from immediately observable (proximal) cues. Given the lack of one-to-
one connection between the two, perceivers must consider the probabilities that 
proximal cues signal distal events. That is, judgmental accuracy depends on valid 
information being available and it depends on the perceiver having the ability to 
interpret this information.  
In the lens model for personality judgments (see Fig. 8.1), the distal 
psychological event is the actual personality that may manifest in a variety of 
behavioral cues; these cues may or may not be properly interpreted by perceivers. 
Only when perceivers notice the valid information and appropriately perceive it can 
they make an accurate judgment of personality. A person who has some unusual 
personality traits might stand out from average people by emitting clearer and more 
noticeable indicators of behaviour (proximal cues), such as an expressive face, 
peculiar body movements, unique vocal characteristics, and the like. As such, 
perceivers are more likely to stand a chance of detecting the clues and attribute them 
to signs of having an extreme personality.  
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Fig. 8.1. Lens model of personality judgments and behaviour cues.  
 
As a social participant, we have numerous practices to observe personality 
perception in daily life, and during this time, we might monitor if we have formed an 
DFFXUDWH LPSUHVVLRQ RI DQRWKHU¶V SHUVRQDOLW\ 3HUKDSV WKLV H[SHULHQFH DOORZV XV WR
develop expertise in identifying those who have an unusual personality. For example, 
if we perceive someone as being very sociable on first meeting, we would expect the 
person to act in accordance with such a trait, and we could tell whether our 
impression is accurate or inaccurate while interacting with the person in future. 
Through such experiences we might thus refine our ability to identify those 
behavioral cues which offer information about personality, especially extreme 
personality.    
8.3 How Do People Engage in Guessing Personalities of Others?  
8.3.1 Accurate Personality Judgments Based on Behaviour  
 A series of studies on empathic trait judgments have demonstrated that 
perceivers made an accurate inference of empathic capacity through information 
Actual 
Personality 
Cue 1 
Cue 2 
Cue 3 
Cue 4 
Personality 
Judgment 
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about behaviour rather than the mere appearance of the target. When observing a still 
photograph where the target was at the very first moment reading joke, perceivers 
failed to correctly guess the EQ, either at overall or fine-grained levels. In 
comparison, when viewing photographs showing the moment as the target delivered 
the punch line of the joke (such as a smile), perceivers were generally good at 
inferring the EQ, and performance formed a U-shaped pattern, indicating more 
sensitivity to targets who were extreme than the targets who were average.  
 $OWKRXJK6WXGLHVDQGGLGQRWGLUHFWO\FRPSDUHSHUFHLYHUV¶SHUIRUPDQFHLQ
viewing animated videos and in viewing still photographs, there was still evidence 
suggesting that accuracy in judgments of the Big Five traits was based on 
LQIRUPDWLRQ DERXW WKH WDUJHW¶V EHKDYLRur but not facial appearance. If information 
DERXW WKH WDUJHW¶V DSSHDUDQFH ZHUH VXIILFLHQW IRU SHUFHLYHUV WR GUDZ DFFXUDWH
inferences of the Big Five traits, perceivers would perform equally well after 
watching a video whether it was with sound or silent. The results reveal that 
perceivers were much more effective in inferring the five personality dimensions in 
the Video and Audio Condition than in the Video Only Condition. That is, on the 
basis of behaviour rather than appearance, it seems perceivers can make an accurate 
judgment of the Big Five traits.  
 As discussed in Chapter 6, owing to properties of different personality traits, 
manifestations of personality connect with behaviour cues varying in quantity (e.g., 
WKH GXUDWLRQ RI D ³WKLQ VOLFH´ DQG WKH TXDOLW\ WKH W\SHV RI EHKDYLRUDO LQIRUPDWLRQ
channels). In general, it seems that some personality traits, such as empathy and 
extraversion, are relevant to a diversity of activities and events people perform in 
everyday life; these traits thus become more visible and observable compared with 
other personality dimensions like neuroticism, which are perhaps more inward and 
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private such that perceivers do not have easy access to sufficient observable cues for 
making an accurate judgment (e.g., Funder & Sneed, 1993; Carney et al., 2007).  
 Accordingly, different types of behavioral information could have different 
effects on accuracy of personality inferences depending upon the personality trait. 
Overall, it seems that visual and audio information in combination provides more 
informative cues than audio only for making accurate intuitive personality judgments. 
For some traits, such as empathy, visual only information and visual and audio 
information might provide the same level of informative cues for perceivers to form 
an accurate first impression; yet, for other traits, such as some dimensions of the Big 
Five, visual only information might involve behavioral indicators that could be 
interpreted in ambiguous or even conflicting ways, which leads to poor performance 
in guessing some of the Big Five traits based on visual only information.  
 In summary, perceivers can make accurate inferences of personality by 
observing thin slices of behaviour. The behaviour can be demonstrated in a video 
with sound, a video without sound, or a soundtrack only; the behaviour can be 
presented in one or three photographs that sampled different moments while targets 
were conducting a certain activity. And different types of behaviour information 
have different impacts on the process of being able to infer empathic traits and the 
Big Five traits.  
8.3.2 Assumed Similarity and Personality Judgments    
 ³$VVXPHG VLPLODULW\´ JHQHUDOO\ UHIHUV WR WKH WHQGHQF\ WR YLHZ RQH¶V RZQ
psychological characteristics in others (e.g., Cronbach, 1955; Human & Biesanz, 
2012). Both studies reported in Chapter 3 reveal that perceivers assumed similarity 
while engaging in guessing empathic traits of another person who they were 
unacquainted with. That LV ZKHQ DVNHG WR PDNH D MXGJPHQW RI D WDUJHW¶ (4 DIWHU
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observing thin slices of behaviour, perceivers tended to project their own EQ onto 
WKH WDUJHW (4 ,Q 6WXG\  SHUFHLYHUV¶ DFWXDO (4V WKDW ZHUH IHG EDFN EHIRUH WKH\
UDWHGWKHWDUJHW¶V(4ZHUHVLJQLIicantly associated with their average ratings of the 
WDUJHWV¶(4V,Q6WXG\SHUFHLYHUVGLGQRWUHFHLYHIHHGEDFNRIWKHLUDFWXDO(4VEXW
ZHUH DVNHG WR JXHVV WKHLU RZQ (4 LQVWHDG LQ WKLV FDVH SHUFHLYHUV¶ UDWLQJV RI WKH
WDUJHWV¶(4VGLGQRWFRUUHODWHZLWKSHUFHLYHUV¶DFWXDO(4V PHDVXUHGE\ WKHLU VHOI-
reports on the EQ questionnaire) but with the EQ that they guessed about themselves. 
Even after controlling for their actual EQs, this correlation still survived. Therefore, 
the results of both studies converge to suggest that on first meeting someone else, 
those who believe they have low empathy tend to judge others having low empathic 
capacity while those who believe they have high ability in empathising are more 
likely to perceive others as having high empathy.   
 Previous research has reported an assumed similarity effect on personality 
MXGJPHQWV ZKLFK ZDV LQGLFDWHG DV WKH FRUUHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ SHUFHLYHUV¶ DFWXDO
SHUVRQDOLW\ DQG SHUFHLYHUV¶ DVVHVVPHQWV RI DQRWKHU¶V SHUVRQDOLW\ HJ %HHU 	
Watson, 2008; Watson, Hubbard, & Wiese, 2000). However, as discussed above, the 
SUHVHQWGDWD VXJJHVW WKDWSHUFHLYHUV¶DFWXDOSHUVRQDOLW\GRHVQRWQHFHVVDULO\ LPSDFW
on personality judgments. This inconsistency might be due to the way by which 
assumed similarity is determiQHG,QSUHYLRXVVWXGLHVSHUFHLYHUV¶DFWXDOSHUVRQDOLW\
and the personality they rated about the targets were usually assessed using the same 
or similar personality questionnaires (e.g., the 20 adjective bipolar scales of the Big 
Five traits or the first-person and the third-person version of the NEO-FFI 
TXHVWLRQQDLUH ,Q WKLV FDVH WKH FRUUHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ SHUFHLYHUV¶ VHOI-reported 
SHUVRQDOLW\DQGWKHLUHVWLPDWLRQRIWKHSHUVRQDOLW\RIRWKHUVPLJKWUHIOHFWSHUFHLYHUV¶
consistent patterns in response to the items in the questionnaires rather than 
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indicating that perceivers projected their own personality onto other people. In 
DVNLQJ SHUFHLYHUV WR GLUHFWO\ JXHVV WKH UHVXOWV RI WKH WDUJHWV¶ (4 WHVW LQVWHDG RI
HYDOXDWLQJ WKH WDUJHWV¶ (4V E\ FRPSOHWLQJ WKH (4 Tuestionnaire, the present 
procedure has the advantage of eliminating this potential risk of inflating the effect 
of assumed similarity, and thus is more useful in examining assumed similarity in 
personality judgments on first meeting.  
 Why would perceivers assume similarity when judging other people? 
According to the explanation of self-based heuristic, perceivers use the information 
DERXW WKH VHOI WR ³ILOO LQ WKH JDS´ LQ WKH DEVHQFH RI VXIILFLHQW LQIRUPDWLRQ DERXW
another person when making an intuitive personality judgment (Ready et al., 2000; 
Human & Biesanz, 2012). Evidence indicates that less visible traits (such as N) are 
more likely to correlate with stronger assumed similarity while more visible traits 
(such as E) are perceived with less assumed similarity (Watson et al., 2000). In 
6WXGLHV DQGSHUFHLYHUVKDG WR IRUPD ILUVW LPSUHVVLRQRI WKH WDUJHW¶V HPSDWKLF
traits after watching a video only spanning from several to thirty seconds; because 
this information is so sparse perceivers might have drawn upon knowledge of 
themselves by default in making a judgment on how empathising another person is.  
8.3.3 Expressivity and Empathic Trait Judgments  
  Studies 5 and 6 suggest that there is a significant correlation between estimates 
RI WDUJHWV¶ H[SUHVVLYLW\ DQG UDWLQJV RI WDUJHWV¶ (4V 7KRVH ZKR ZHUH SHUFHLYHG DV
having high expressivity were also seen as having high empathic capacity while 
those who were judged as having low expressivity were regarded as being low in the 
trait of empathy.   
 As discussed in Chapter 5, the trait of empathy is more or less expressive, 
which could manifest in a diversity of behaviour, such as facial expressions, vocal 
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cues, prosocial actions, and so on. Even so, owing to its behavioral manifestations, 
expressivity might be more visible than the trait of empathy (the EQ). In a mundane 
scenario (e.g., reading a standard text) that involves little other-oriented emotions, 
people might not leak out obvious empathy-RULHQWHGUHDFWLRQVWRRWKHUV¶IHHOLQJVE\
contrast, the extent to which a person is expressive could be more or less revealed in 
some mannerisms: For example, we might be likely to perceive a person as being 
expressive if the person is talkative and demonstrative; conversely, if a person is 
usually quiet and reserved, we might see the person as having low expressivity. 
While observing the target reading a joke, perceivers might have a better chance to 
observe behavioral cues in relation to expressivity than in detecting empathising 
responses to other-oriented emotions. Hence, by linking the visible (expressivity) 
ZLWK WKH OHVV YLVLEOH WKH (4 SHUFHLYHUV HQJDJH LQ JXHVVLQJ DQRWKHU¶V HPSDWKLF
traits on the basis of evaluating how expressive the person would be, though this 
does not necessarily mean that judgments of expressivity could predict accuracy in 
guesses of empathic traits.  
8.4 Confidence and Personality Judgments 
 As shown in Study 2, despite finding that perceivers generally believed that 
they had correctly guessed the EQs of the targets, those perceivers who were more 
confident of their ability for guessing EQ were not actually any better at guessing EQ, 
and perceivers who had less confidence in their EQ judgments did not perform worse 
in identifying who had high and low EQ. Moreover, perceivers seemed to be rather 
overconfident in their ability to infer empathic traits of another person: Even though 
they were unacquainted with targets and observed them only in a short video, they 
were inclined to be confident of being able to identify who had low or high EQ.  
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 Does this mean that people consider it to be easy to form an accurate first 
impression of personality based on thin slices of behaviour? According to the survey 
presented in Chapter 7, ordinary people are skeptical about forming an accurate first 
impression of personality. Then why would any people be confident that their 
judgment of EQ was accurate in Study 2?  
 In accordance with the self-verification theory, people actively seek to behave 
in ways that confirm what they believe to be true about themselves (Swan & Read, 
1981). In this case, even if it was difficult to guess the EQ based on a video lasting 
merely several seconds, once the judgment was made, perceivers might want to be 
believed they are capable of guessing the EQ of another person and duly express this 
belief by rating high confidence of their EQ judgments.  
 Previous research on personality judgments (e.g., Carlson et al., 2010; Ames, et 
al., 2010) has also suggested high levels of confidence in ratings of first impressions 
of the Big Five traits, though the evidence of a relationship between judgmental 
accuracy of personality and judgmental confidence has been inconsistent (see 
Chapter 3 for detailed discussion). In addition, the survey suggests that people 
usually believe that they have formed an accurate first impression of others but they 
also hold negative views about whether they can form an accurate first impression. 
Taken together, these data raise a question for the future research: Would the 
phenomenon of being overconfident only happen in first-impression formation of 
personality or is it more generally the case that once a judgment is made, whether it 
is about physical events or psychological phenomena, people tend to be confident?  
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 3HRSOH¶V &RPPRQVHQVH 9LHZV $ERXW )LUVW ,PSUHVVLRQV RI
Personality  
 ,WLVYHU\FRPPRQWRIRUPDQLQWXLWLYHLPSUHVVLRQRIDQRWKHU¶VSHUVRQDOLW\RQ
first meeting in everyday social life. With this experience, people naturally develop 
many commonsense views about first impressions of personalities, some of which, as 
reported in Chapter 7, are accurate to some extent, whereas some are inaccurate.  
 During social interaction, some commonsense views are more likely to be 
verified in comparison with others. For example, if a person has a distinguishing 
characteristic, we would be more likely to remember the person and thus might have 
more chances to check whether our first impression of the person is accurate. 
Consequently, our first impressions of those who have unusual personalities might be 
subject to verification through our social experiences. Thus, when asked whether we 
are more accurate in judging another person with an extreme personality than a 
person with an average personality, we are probably qualified to give a well-
informed response. In contrast, when asked, for example, whether people are 
generally able to form an accurate first impression of others, we might lack sufficient 
experience to give a well-informed response and default to a negative position, 
which happens to be wrong.    
8.6 Future Research  
8.6.1 Person-Situation Debate and Personality Judgments 
 The person-situation debate concerns whether aspects of the person or the 
situation are more powerful in shaping behaviour (e.g., Kenrck & Funder, 1988; 
Malle, 2011). Given that the effects of many situations that people encounter vary 
depending on the traits of the person, consensus has developed in suggesting the 
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interplay of persons and situations in the determination of actions (e.g., Shinner, 
2009; Funder, 2006). However, there remains a lack of experimental data directly 
examining the interaction of person-situation in naturalistic circumstances; instead, 
there seems to be over-use of hypothetical persons and situations described in 
sentences. To address this matter, Funder (2006) argues that behaviour of a sample 
of subjects (targets) must be directly measured in more than one situation.  
 In Study 2 (see Chapter 3), we used a large corpus of behaviour stimuli, in 
which the same group of 47 targets were filmed while experiencing three different 
scenarios (The Conversation, the Joke, & the Screen Test). Perceivers were asked to 
make judgments of the EQs of the targets after watching videos of either the 
Conversation, the Joke, or the Screen Test Scenario. The results indicated that 
SHUFHLYHUVSHUIRUPHGHTXDOO\ZHOOLQPDNLQJDFFXUDWHMXGJPHQWVRIWKHWDUJHWV¶(4V
across the scenarios. Likewise, utilizing the same stimuli, Study 7 (see Chapter 6) 
also found no main effect of scenario when perceivers had to make inferences of the 
Big Five traits after viewing a video in one of the three scenarios. Hence, the 
findings from Study 2 and Study 7 converge in suggesting that overall there is cross-
situational consistency in the accuracy of first impressions that perceivers formed of 
WKH WDUJHWV¶ SHUVRQDOLW\ WUDLWV ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV WDUJHWV KDYH IDLUO\ VWDEOH WUDLWV WKDW
allow perceivers to make the same accurate judgments across the scenarios 
encountered by the targets.   
 On the other hand, Study 2 demonstrated that perceivers were better at 
identifying targets who had high empathic capacity in the Conversation and the Joke 
Scenario than in the Screen Test Scenario. In a similar vein, Study 7 shows that the 
U-shaped pattern for accuracy in judgments of the Big Five traits was affected by the 
scenarios ± There was an interaction among Trait, Scale and Scenario, and the 
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interaction between Trait and Scale was also influenced by the scenario (e.g., the U-
shaped trend of the trait E in the Screen Test Scenario was quite different from the 
other scenarios). These findings imply that situational factors could also play a part 
in determining WKH WDUJHWV¶ EHKDYLRur; as a result, the impressions that perceivers 
formed on the targets might be affected by different scenarios.  
 In brief, Studies 2 and 7 provided preliminary evidence for the interplay of 
persons and situations of the long-standing person-situation debate by investigating 
SHRSOH¶V DELOLW\ WR LQIHU SHUVRQDOLWLHV IURP REVHUYDEOH EHKDYLRur samples in more 
than one situation. Moreover, the lines of research offered an operational approach 
allowing examination of the person-situation controversy with high ecological 
validity. That is, as with the procedure in Studies 2 and 7, perceivers make 
personality judgments of the same sample of targets who are observed in several real 
situations ± If personality played a key role in deciding behaviour, then the targets 
would be consistently perceived as who they are across situations; if situations were 
sufficiently powerful to determine behaviour, then there would be a main effect 
associated with situation; if both personal and situational factors contributed to the 
determination of behaviour, there would be an interaction between personality 
judgments and situations.   
 8.6.2 Further Research on the U-shaped Trend of Personality Judgments  
    The present research has revealed the U-shaped trend in personality judgments, 
where perceivers are more effective in recognizing targets who have one or more 
extreme traits compared with the targets who have average personalities. As with 
signal detection, in which a certain signal (such as a light or a sound) is more likely 
to be detected accurately and quickly when the signal is stronger, can we argue that 
SHRSOH ZKR KDYH XQXVXDO SHUVRQDOLWLHV SUHVHQW D VWURQJHU ³VLJQDO´ WKDQ WKRVH ZLWK
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average personality? If so, perhaps there are other ways of measuring this stronger 
signal and in particular perceivers might be able to detect unusual traits more quickly 
as well as more accurately. Based on the methodology developed in this thesis, 
future research can shed light on this question by examining response time along 
with judgmental accuracy.   
 Using eye-tracking methodology, previous studies on mentalising have found 
that people flexibly deploy different visual strategies for making retrodictive 
mentalising inferences about events happening in the world (Pillai et al., 2012) and 
inferring the gift another person received (Cassidy et al., in press). For instance, 
while watching a person in a video who was experiencing one of four given 
scenarios, perceivers who spent more time looking at the eye region of the target 
were less successful at detecting the scenarios of the Compliment, the Story and the 
Waiting but not the Joke; in contrast, looking at the mouth region did not relate to 
accuracy in identifying any of the four scenarios (Pillai et al., 2012). Would 
variations in gaze patterns correlate with accuracy in identifying targets with 
different intensities of the same trait? That is, would the way in which people 
scrutinize those who have extreme personality be different from the way in which 
they scrutinize the average person? Furthermore, would eye movement strategies 
vary depending on the particular trait that the perceiver is asked to judge? Integrating 
eye-tracking methodology into the procedure of trait inferences will provide an 
answer to these questions.   
 Finally, in order to investigate the neural bases of empathic processing, Zaki et 
DO  DGRSW D VRFLDO QHXURVFLHQWLILF PHWKRGRORJ\ ZKHUHE\ SHUFHLYHUV¶ EUDLQ
activity was observed using fMRI while they watched videos of targets and made 
judgments on how they were feeling. Results demonstrated that an accurate 
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XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIDQRWKHU¶VHPRWLRQVGHSHQGVRQVWUXFWXUHVZLWKLQWKHKXPDQPLUURU
neuron system thought to be involved in shared sensorimotor representations and 
regions implicated in mental state attribution (the superior temporal sulcus and 
medial prefrontal cortex). What is the neural basis of making trait inferences? 
Moreover, when observing a target with extreme traits, is this represented as more 
intense activity in relevant substrate or does a different substrate become active 
compared with when we observe an average person? An approach combining the 
procedure developed in this thesis with neuroscienfic methods (e.g. fMRI  & EEG) 
will help to answer these questions.  
8.6.3 A Broad Framework of Research on Mentalising 
 As summarized in Chapter 1, research on mentalising began with an effort to 
chart when and how young children acquire a theory of mind using the false-belief 
paradigm. More recent research has embraced a wider age range of participants, 
including infants, older children and adults, and has developed ecologically 
DSSURSULDWH WDVNV LQ UHVHDUFKLQJSHRSOH¶V DELOLWLHV WR LQIHUPHQWDO VWDWHVEDVHGRQD
brief sample of behaviour.  
 By contrast, person perception in the area of social psychology has 
WUDGLWLRQDOO\ VWXGLHG DGXOWV¶ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI RWKHU SHRSOH LQ UHJDUG WR WKUHH
categories (Brunner & Tagiuri, 1954): the recognition of emotions in others, the 
accuracy of personality judgments, and the processes by which personality 
impressions are formed. Research on interpersonal perception accordingly focuses on 
the question of how well people can perceive each other and the processes by which 
people come to perceive each other. 
 Despite adopting different theoretical frameworks and different paradigms, 
research on mentalising and person perception, in a broad sense, deals with the same 
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issues of inter-personal understanding. Both areas of research concentrate on the 
issues of how well people understand other minds. Furthermore, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, if the main purpose of mentalising is to interpret (retrodict) behaviour and 
to predict behaviour, then surely it is essential to consider not only mental states but 
personality traits as well given their roles in explanation and prediction of behaviour.    
 Why are perceivers better at detecting targets who have extreme traits than 
targets who have average traits? Is it adaptive to be especially good at identifying 
people with an unusual personality and if so, why? As depicted in Fig. 8.2, when 
predicting how a target will behave or when retrodicting what happened to the target, 
ZH QHHG WR WDNH DFFRXQW RI WKH WDUJHW¶V VWDWH VLWXDWLRQ DQG WKH WDUJHW¶V WUDLW
(personality). In some cases, when situational norms are strong, it might not be 
necessary to give much attention to traits. For example, there is a strong norm to the 
effect that we stop at a red traffic light: In predicting that a target will stop we only 
need to consider the situation and there is not normally any need to consider the 
WDUJHW¶V SHUVRQDOLW\ +RZHYHU LI ZH WKRXJKW WKDW WKH WDUJHW KDG DQ XQXVXDO
personality, we might predict that he or she would not stop at a red light, even though 
most other people do so. Hence, in the particular case, if we are to make a prediction 
that varies from the default (people stop at red lights), it will probably be because we 
think the target is peculiar. In short, being aware of extreme traits is probably 
adaptive in making accurate predictions of behaviour; being aware of average traits 
might not help our prediction to be any more accurate than if we only knew about the 
situation. Accordingly, it might thus be adaptive to be particularly attuned to extreme 
traits when making predictions of behaviour.   
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Fig. 8.2. A broad framework of mentalising. The dotted lines represent relationships that cannot be 
directly observed while the solid lines represent relationships that can be directly observed; the arrows 
represent the direction of the relationship.   
 
A similar argument applies to retrodiction. If a target displays a strong 
reaction, this can probably be explained by saying that he/she experienced something 
striking; but if the target were peculiarly expressive, it might be that the target 
experienced something rather mundane but he/she is nevertheless the kind of person 
who reacts strongly. Hence, it will help to interpret the reaction if we can detect that 
the target is unusual but by default we would probably assume that the strong 
reaction was caused by a striking event. This example thus illustrates that it might be 
adaptive to be attuned to extreme traits when making retrodictions.  
8.7 Overall Conclusion 
 In conclusion, a series of studies presented in this thesis offer the following 
results. (1) Overall, perceivers can form an accurate first impression of an empathic 
trait and some dimensions of the Big Five traits from a brief sample of behaviour. (2) 
The fine-grained abilities to infer personality form a U-shaped pattern, in which 
State 
/Situation 
Personality 
/Trait 
Person Prediction 
/Retrodiction 
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perceivers are effective in guessing who have low or high empathic capacity and 
who is extreme in one or more of the Big Five dimensions. (3) Perceivers make 
V\VWHPLFDOO\ DFFXUDWH SHUVRQDOLW\ MXGJPHQWV EDVHG RQ WKH WDUJHWV¶ EHKDYLRur rather 
than appearance, and the behaviour can be presented either in the form of audio 
video, silent video, audio only, or photograph. Different types of behavioral 
information impact on judgmental accuracy depending upon different types of 
personality traits. (4) There is no difference in the accuracy in guessing empathic 
traits and the Big Five traits across three scenarios experienced by each target. (5) 
Perceivers use the strategy of assumed similarity in making an initial judgment of 
EQ, by which perceivers who believe they are high in EQ tend to guess the target 
also has high EQ while perceivers who judge themselves to have low EQ are more 
likely to rate low EQ in the target. (6) Perceivers are generally confident that they 
have correctly guessed empathic traits, either about themselves or the targets, though 
the confidence in self-perception is higher than in other-perception; notwithstanding, 
there is no correlation between judgmental confidence and judgmental accuracy. (7) 
3HUFHLYHUV¶ UDWLQJV RI WKH WDUJHWV¶ H[SUHVVLYLW\ VLJQLILFDQWO\ Forrelated with their 
DVVHVVPHQWVRIWKHWDUJHWV¶(4 
 In addition, the survey reveals that people usually underestimate the ability to 
form an accurate first impression of others based on various behavioral information. 
With this exception, most of their commonsense views about first-impression 
personality judgments are consistent with the aforementioned empirical findings.       
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